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NEW ENGLAND AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION UNDER 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990 
Geoffrey L. Wilcox* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ground level ozone pollution is a major constituent of smog.1 It is a 
highly reactive and extremely corrosive gas that adversely affects 
both animal and plant life.2 Scientists have long recognized that expo-
sure to elevated levels of ozone is dangerous for people with impaired 
respiratory systems and for children, and unhealthy for the popula-
tion as a whole.3 Although it is difficult to quantify the cumulative 
societal damage to human health caused by exposure to ozone, the 
effects, ranging from temporarily impaired lung performance to per-
manent lung damage, impose a heavy tol1.4 Scientific studies have also 
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1 See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN 
URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION (1991) [hereinafter RETHINKING OZONE]. Ground level 
ozone and stratospheric ozone pose separate environmental concerns. Ozone in the upper 
atmosphere shields the planet and its inhabitants from harmful ultraviolet rays of the sun. 
Depletion of stratospheric ozone by chlorofluorocarbons and other pollutants raises the risk of 
disrupting the Earth's protective mantle of atmosphere. Ground level ozone, however, is the 
cause of human lung injury, agricultural damage, and other environmental problems. It is thus 
not the chemical that is the "pollution," but rather the chemical in the wrong place. Id. 
2 See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CATCHING OUR 
BREATH: NEXT STEPS FOR REDUCING URBAN OZONE (1989) [hereinafter CATCHING OUR 
BREATH]. In both animal and plant tissues, ozone oxidizes the cells at an accelerated rate 
thereby causing premature aging. In plants this interferes with photosynthesis and in humans 
it interferes with breathing. 
3 See id. at 39-70. 
4 Valuation of varied factors such as quality of life reductions, decreased work productivity, 
1 
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established that ground level ozone causes serious damage to the 
economy through reduced agricultural crop productivity.5 In addition, 
experts have documented the detrimental effects of ozone on trees, 
and extrapolate that the effects of elevated ozone levels on the envi-
ronment as a whole are significant.6 The cross-media potential for 
pollution transport has recently received scrutiny as scientists es-
tablish the causal connection between water pollution and air pollu-
tion.7 In light of these dangers and costs to society,8 Congress directed 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate ozone as a 
criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA),9 to establish a 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ground level 
ozone,1O and to restrict emissions of ozone's precursor chemicals. 
Unlike other pollutants, ozone does not emanate directly from auto-
mobiles or other sources. Ozone results instead from the combination 
of oxygen, nitrogen oxides (NOx) and various hydrocarbon pollutants 
called volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the atmosphere.n Com-
bination of these chemicals in conjunction with the energy provided 
by sunlightI2 produces ozone through a series of photochemical reac-
and increased medical costs is a speculative endeavor, but experts place the amount in the range 
of $500 million to $4 billion per year. [d. at 39. 
5 [d. at 24,79-93. The estimates vary considerably, but one suggests that a reduction of just 
25% of the increment between background levels and the current levels of ozone would translate 
into a $500 million to $1 billion per year increase in crop production. 
6 [d. at 79. 
7 Experts contend that transport from the Midwest of airborne nitrogen oxides, a precursor 
chemical for ozone, is the largest source of nitrogen pollution in the Chesapeake Bay. See Todd 
Shields, Scientist Tracks Bay Pollution Back to Stacks in the Midwest, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 
1996, at Bl. 
8 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1994). Unless otherwise noted, all U.S.C. cites are current 
through 1994. 
9 Pub. L. No. 101--549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994». Prior 
incarnations of the CAA are identified as the "19XX CAA." 
!O The NAAQS is the result of detailed review of scientific studies to determine the level at 
which the pollutant will have no adverse effects for humans. See RETHINKING OZONE, supra 
note 1, at 68. The current standard allows a daily maximum one-hour average ozone concentra-
tion of 0.12 parts per million (ppm). If the ambient air of an area exceeds this standard more 
than once per year averaged over a three-year period, the area is a "nonattainment" area for 
ozone. CATCHING OUR BREATH, supra note 2, at 3. 
11 CATCHING OUR BREATH, supra note 2, at 97. 
12 The necessity of intense sunshine and high temperatures to the creation of ozone results in 
an ozone "season" during which ozone formation peaks. Throughout most of the country, the 
season is from May to October, but it can be shorter in the northern portion of the country or 
year round in the southern portion of the country. See generally EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY 
AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT 1993 43 (EPA-4541R-94-026) (1994) [hereinafter 1993 EPA 
TRENDS REPORT]. 
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tions.13 An ozone molecule therefore typically forms in the atmosphere 
at some distance removed from the automobiles, smokestacks, or 
other sources that emitted its constituent parts.14 The precise distance 
from those sources at which the molecule forms and the subsequent 
course the molecule follows are subject to a complex set of chemical, 
topographical, and meteorological variables.15 Through computer 
modeling, scientists are able to estimate the suspected rate of ozone's 
creation and analyze its subsequent movement in air currents in the 
atmosphere.16 The latter phenomenon, known as "ozone transport," 
poses major pollution concerns in the United States and raises sig-
nificant challenges in statutory implementation for EPAP 
13 Experts continue to explore the complex chemical processes involved in the creation of 
ozone. Scientists have recently reexamined the synergies between man-made and biogenic 
sources of NOx and VOCs in the atmosphere that frustrate even the most stringent controls 
on man-made sources of ozone precursors. See Paul J. Miller, Cutting Through the Smog: The 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and a New Direction Towards Reducing Ozone Pollution, 12 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 124, 124-25 (1993) (noting that President Reagan's infamous "trees cause 
pollution" statement was not completely without basis in reality). 
14 Common sources of VOCs are exhaust from internal combustion engines, evaporation of 
solvents and petroleum products, and chemical manufacturing. NOx derives from fossil fuel 
combustion in sources such as automobiles and power generating plants. CATCHING OUR 
BREATH, supra note 2, at 4. 
15 Modeling studies suggest that ozone can form 100 miles or more from the source of the 
original chemical components under the proper meteorological conditions. Id. at 23, 225. The 
Ozone Transport Assessment Group, discussed infra note 397 and accompanying text, has 
commissioned modeling to assess how much transport from the Midwest and South affects the 
states of the Northeast. Preliminary results suggest that ozone precursors typically may not 
blow more than 200 miles, thus providing ammunition to states that seek to avoid additional 
control measures designed to alleviate ozone pollution in more distant areas. See Jim Nichols, 
Findings Cloud Pollution Theories; Midwest Smog May Not Drift to the Northeast, CLEV. 
PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 2, 1996, at 1A. 
16 Experts hotly debate the methodology, variables, assumptions, results, and implications of 
these models, but they do provide some relatively objective bases for policymakers to rely upon. 
Challenges to EPA actions often devolve into technical disputes about the details of modeling 
and their outcome-determinative effects. See, e.g., Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 157-61 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (reciting lengthy disputes about modeling that the court ultimately resolved by 
deference to agency expertise in the absence of arbitrary and capricious actions). EPA has been 
under pressure to revise its models to reflect different policy goals. See Mobile Sources Group 
Aims to Revise In-Use, Emission Modeling Standards, Chem. Reg. Rep. Daily (BN.A), at D-3 
(July 28, 1995). As an example of these debates, one need only peruse the technical comments 
and responses to EPA actions entailing modeling such as NOx exemptions. See, e.g., Approval 
of Section 182(0 Exemption; Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, 61 Fed. Reg. 2428, 
2429-36 (1996) (hereinafter Lake Michigan NOx Waiver). 
17 EPA describes ozone as "the most complex, difficult to control, and pervasive of the six 
principal pollutants." See EPA AIR QUALITY TRENDS BROCHURE 1994 (EPA-4541F-95-003) 
(1995) (available at <http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrn94>) [hereinafter 1994 EPA TRENDS BRO-
CHURE]. 
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Ground level ozone is the most pervasive air pollution problem in 
the nation. IS Despite technological advances in pollution control, pri-
marily through measures that reduce emissions from automobiles, 
increases in population and in per capita consumption of energy have 
kept ambient ozone levels high.19 Large portions of the United States, 
both urban and rural, have ozone levels that exceed the ozone 
NAAQS.20 Particularly in the northeast corridor of the United States 
from Virginia to Maine, the incidence of days with ozone levels that 
exceed the standard is growing.21 In 1993, all states in the Northeast 
Ozone Transport Region (Northeast OTR),22 except Vermont, had 
more violations than in 1992, and many states had twice the number 
of violations that occurred in those same areas in the previous year.23 
These violations occurred in substantial part because of ozone trans-
18 There are currently 68 areas designated as nonattainment for ozone. EPA's current list of 
nonattainment areas is available at <http://www.epa.gov/airs/nonattn.htm1>. 
19 See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: Whats 
Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549 (1991) (arguing that we have 
placed too much reliance on technological solutions to pollution and not enough on the underlying 
issues of population and consumption growth). EPA officials have noted that there has been 
"dramatic" progress in reducing levels of ambient ozone in the 25 years following the 1970 CAA 
despite the facts that "the U.S. population grew by 27%, the domestic economy grew by 90%, 
and the number of vehicle miles traveled grew by 111 percent" during the same period. See 
Clean Air Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
and Health and Environment of the Comm. of Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., available in 
LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGSTST File, (Nov. 9, 1995) (testimony of Mary Nichols, Assistant 
Adm'r, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA) [hereinafter Nichols TestimonyJ. 
20 Ozone transport is not purely an urban problem. EPA monitoring and modeling have 
demonstrated that transport from northeastern cities has invaded such otherwise pristine 
wilderness areas as Maine's Acadia National Park with ozone levels in excess of the NAAQS. 
Even Alaska's remote Denali National Park suffers from smog transported from Pacific Rim 
countries. See Linda Kanamine, Environmental Haze Diminishes Scenic Vistas; Magnificence 
is Lost in the Summer Heat, U.S.A. TODAY, May 23,1991, at 8A. 
21 Other recognized transport regions are the Chicago region, the Cleveland-Erie, Pa. region, 
the Texas-Louisiana region, and the southern California intrastate region. Prior to the 1990 
CAA, Congress considered creation of ozone transport regions for the Chicago and Texas-Lou-
isiana regions as well as for the Northeast. See Sen. Mitchell Offers Clean Air Act Extension 
Bill; New Deadlines Ties to Pollution Control, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 573 (June 12, 1987). 
22 Section 184 of the 1990 CAA created the Northeast Transport Region expressly to address 
the problem of ozone transport that plagues the urban corridor from metropolitan Washington, 
D.C., to Maine. The creation of the Northeast OTR and its impact upon ozone transport are 
discussed in more detail below. The jurisdictions in the Northeast OTR are: Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the northern portion of Virginia. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7511(c). 
23 EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, THE LONG RANGE TRANSPORT OF OZONE IN THE 
OZONE TRANSPORT REGION 2 (1994) [hereinafter OTR TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENTJ. 
1996] INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION 5 
port from other states in the Northeast OTR or beyond.24 The levels 
of ozone in 1994 were stable, probably through a combination of 
meterological conditions and emissions reductions.25 
The summer of 1995, however, brought numerous incidents of ozone 
nonattainment.26 Many states with nonattainment areas around the 
country had petitioned EPA for redesignation to attainment status27 
because ozone levels had been relatively low for two of the requisite 
three years needed to establish compliance.28 The 1995 heat wave 
rendered the petitions moot as many of these areas suffered repeated 
ozone violations.29 Rather than redesignation to attainment, some 
moderate nonattainment areas may instead face elevation to serious 
nonattainment status for failure to meet the NAAQS in the three 
years prior to their 1996 attainment deadline.30 Critics of the 1990 
24 Id. at 7. 
25 See 1994 EPA TRENDS BROCHURE, supra note 17. EPA noted that in 1994 there was 12 
percent less ozone than in 1985, but qualified this by explaining that ozone levels vary depending 
upon meterological conditions and that 1994 had the second best record for nonattainment in 
the ten preceding years. Id. In essence, the level of improvement should be viewed with caution. 
See id. 
26 The ozone season of 1995 was the worst since 1988 for NAAQS violations. See Gary Lee, 
High Ozone Levels Prompt Warnings to Stay Indoors; Readings Far Exceed Federal Stand-
ards, WASH. POST, July 28, 1995, at A3 (noting that 28 states had violations halfway through 
the season). The Northeast OTR had significantly more violations in 1995 than in 1994. See 
Northeast Ozone Problems Continue, Show Long Term Gain, OCTANE WK., Oct. 9, 1995, at 2. 
New Jersey and Maryland, for example, each had 14 exceedences of the NAAQS in 1995. Id. 
Comparatively speaking, however, 1995 was still an improvement over 1988. See Smoggy Days 
of Summer Are On The Way Out, THE CAPITAL, Sept. 8, 1995, at Al (noting that although 
Baltimore had 14 violations in 1995, it was an improvement over the 36 violations in 1988); see 
also Summer Ozone Exceedences In OTR Drop 82% From Level in Steamy '88, ENV'T WK., 
Jan. 12, 1996 (noting that with 267 cumulative NAAQS violations across the Northeast OTR in 
1995, it was nevertheless an improvement over 1988). 
27 A state or area attains the ozone NAAQS if the number of violations during a three-year 
period is less than or equal to three, and the state meets other requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 
(1995). For a fuller discussion of the relevant factors, see Proposed Rule, Approval and Prom-
ulgation of Implementation Plans and Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes: 
State of Michigan, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,522 (1996) (detailing the requisite elements and analysis to 
establish attainment). 
28 EPA reported a general improvement in ozone levels over the ten-year period ending in 
1993 when the agency "meteorologically adjusted" the data to "smooth out" the particularly bad 
ozone season in 1988. 1993 EPA TRENDS REPORT, supra note 12, at 43. EPA subsequently 
reported that 1994 was the second best year in the preceding ten years for compliance with the 
ozone NAAQS. See 1994 EPA TRENDS BROCHURE, supra note 17. 
29 See, e.g., Bob Wyss, Ozone Alert May Mean Bad News for Drivers, PROVIDENCE, July 20, 
1995, at 1A. Like many other areas, Rhode Island had petitioned EPA to designate the state as 
in attainment because of fortuitously low ozone readings for 1993 and 1994. Id. Halfway through 
the 1995 ozone season, the state's petition was moot because of multiple ozone violations. Id. 
30 The Pittsburgh area was on the verge of attainment, but 17 ozone violations during 1995 
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CAA have argued that Congress unduly skewed the statute because 
of the heat wave and pollution crisis of the summer of 1988.31 The 
summer of 1995 demonstrated that 1988 was not merely a rare aber-
ration like the proverbial "hundred year flood" and that the country 
continues to have a serious ozone transport problem.32 
As both the number and extent of violations of the ozone NAAQS 
increase, an ever larger percentage of the population of the country 
endures exposure to unhealthy levels of ozone on a regular basis.33 
Moreover, recent studies suggest that the current ozone N AAQS may 
be too permissive to protect human health, particularly for individuals 
already suffering from an impaired ability to breathe or individuals 
means that EPA will likely redesignate it as serious nonattainment instead. See Sharon Voas, 
High Ozone To Affect Car-Pollution Planning, PITI'. POST-GAZETI'E, Sept. 10, 1995, at B3. 
Pittsburgh businesses are particularly concerned with the impact of more stringent controls 
that would result from an increased nonattainment classification. See Karen Kovatch, State's 
Sf:rategy to Reduce Ozone Still Up In the Air, PITI'. TIMES, July 1, 1996, at 13. 
SlOne bill in Congress actually proposes an amendment to the CAA to include a congressional 
finding that 1988 was a "climatological anomaly" and to specify that exclusion of 1988 data 
changes a number of key calculations. See H.R. 46, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Another bill 
similarly proposes to designate 1995 a climatological anomaly and to instruct EPA to disregard 
the 1995 data in connection with consideration of areas for redesignation to attainment. See H.R. 
3446, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 109 (1996). EPA noted a similar "climatological anomaly" in 1983 
and it is likely that they recur on a cyclical basis. See RETHINKING OZONE, supra note 1, at 4. 
At some point, elimination of all years with inconvenient data will prove counterproductive. 
32 A report issued by the conservative Cato Institute was highly critical of the 1990 CAA 
because it based nonattainment status on data including the "anomalous meteorological condi-
tions of 1988." See Cato Institute Urges Overhaul of CAA to Align Policy With Regulatory 
Need, Air Water Pollution Rep. (Info. Access Co.) No. 33 (July 24,1995). It claims that 1988-90 
data rendered 38 areas in the Northeast OTR as nonattainment, whereas 1992-94 data would 
render only 13 of these areas as nonattainment. Id. Data shopping for outcome-determinative 
years is unwise and ignores meteorological cycles. Rather than omitting years with data incon-
sistent with the policy preferences of the analyst, it might be preferable to include a longer span 
of years in the nonattainment calculation to obtain a more statistically accurate determination. 
One bill introduced in Congress proposes an amendment that would require EPA to make 
attainment determinations by looking at data for five consecutive years and dropping out the 
years with the highest and lowest number of exceedences of the ozone N AA QS. See H.R. 3446, 
104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 107 (1996). Such an approach lengthened to account for weather cycles 
might alleviate truly anomalous years and discourage data shopping, but states are unlikely to 
want EPA to scrutinize data for a decade before granting redesignation. 
33 EPA reported in 1993 that approximately 51 million people lived in counties that violated 
the ozone NAAQS in 1993. See 1993 EPA TRENDS REPORT, supra note 12, at 96. EPA qualified 
this figure by noting that it only takes into account the counties that have ozone monitors and 
reflects only one year's data. Id. at 97. The actual number exposed to high level ozone may be 
higher. See id. at 96. EPA's 1994 estimate was that 50 million people lived in areas with air that 
violated the ozone NAAQS. See 1994 EPA TRENDS BROCHURE, supra note 17. As a comparison, 
EPA estimated that 112 million people lived in counties that violated the ozone NAAQS in 1988 
alone. See 1993 EPA TRENDS REPORT, supra note 12, at 96. EPA has not yet issued its report 
for 1995. 
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who exercise or work outdoors.34 The true percentage of the popula-
tion endangered by ozone may well be higher than currently recog-
nized.35 
EPA is currently considering changing the ozone NAAQS.36 An 
independent scientific review committee has examined the available 
data and recommended that EPA modify the standard to provide a 
more adequate margin of safety, especially given the effects of long-
term exposure to ozone not currently addressed by the standard.37 
The exact nature and degree of modification to the ozone N AAQS 
EPA decides upon will have far reaching impacts.38 If EPA lowers the 
ozone NAAQS to reflect a more conservative standard for the pollut-
ant to provide greater protection, one could assume that the number 
of violations would increase in many areas in the Northeast OTR. 39 
34 As noted above, the current federal standards pennit a peak of 0.12 ppm of ozone for a one 
hour period once per year. See RETHINKING OZONE, supra note 1, at 68. Studies suggest that 
this level should be 0.08 ppm or lower in order to provide an adequate margin of safety. See 
Timothy E. Wheeler, Smog Risk Greater Than Believed, BALT. SUN, Mar. 5, 1995, at 1C. Some 
experts believe that the level should be lower still to reflect the potential harm of long-term or 
continuous exposure to lower concentrations of ozone that may have a cumulative adverse 
effect. See id. 
35 The American Lung Association argues that 60% of Americans suffer exposure to unhealthy 
ozone levels and that EPA should lower the ozone NAAQS by 40%. See Jim Nichols, Outcry 
Against Ozone Hasn't Vanished in the Air; Ohio Still Too Lax on Smog, U.S. EPA Says, CLEV. 
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 25, 1996, at IE. 
36 See Advance Notice of Proposed R ulemaking, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
Ozone or Particulate Matter, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,719 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50) 
(proposed June 12, 1996) [hereinafter Ozone NAAQS Proposal]. EPA has proposed changing 
the standard to lengthen the average concentration period from one hour to eight, to lower the 
standard ppm, to alter the number of exceedences permitted in a year, and to change the 
weighing of monitoring data to reflect population density or other factors. Id. at 29,721-22. EPA 
plans to issue proposed decisions on the ozone NAAQS by November, 1996, and to take final 
action by June, 1997. See Ozone Proposal Headed To OMB in August: Industry Concerned 
About Level of Input, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 591 (July 29,1996). 
37 Ozone NAAQS Proposal at 29,271. The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) 
unanimously recommended the switch from a one-hour standard to an eight-hour standard and 
all members recommended a reduction of the concentration of ozone from .12 ppm to somewhere 
in the range of .07 to .09 ppm. Id. Significantly, CASAC noted that there was no true "safe" 
level of ozone because it "may elicit a continuum of biological responses down to background 
concentrations." Id. The question thus becomes one of balancing the risks against the difficulties 
of reducing the ambient concentration level. 
38 Representative Waxman has expressed concern that certain changes in the standard would 
transform nonattainment areas into attainment areas without achieving any emission reduc-
tions, thereby meeting the goals ofthe 1990 CAA only by moving the goalposts. See Cost/Benefit 
Analysis Not Needed For Setting Health-Based Ozone Standards, EPA Official Says, Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1203-04 (Nov. 17, 1995). 
39 A Harvard School of Public Health researcher concluded that the proper ozone N AAQS 
should be either 0.10 or even 0.08 ppm rather than the current 0.12 ppm. See David L. Chandler, 
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This increase in violations probably would create a concomitant in-
crease in the number of nonattainment areas and an increase in the 
statutorily defined level of nonattainment in many areas.40 
Despite the emerging ozone crisis recognized by lawmakers, scien-
tists, environmentalists, and others, the CAA has thus far proven an 
unwieldy tool to address a complex problemY Among the shortcom-
ings of the CAA is its failure to address adequately the ozone trans-
ported across state boundaries by the forces of nature.42 It is obvious 
that air travels everywhere unimpeded by the man-made constructs 
of jurisdictional borders.43 Paradoxically, the CAA generally treats 
each state as a separate unit and requires determinations regarding 
a state's compliance with the N AAQS as though the state were in a 
vacuum.44 This approach is a result of the principle of cooperative 
federalism upon which Congress constructed the CAA.45 Following 
Ozone Worries Scientwts, Who Call for New Standards, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1995, at 2l. 
With regard to Boston, he estimated that this lower standard would have resulted in 50 
violations of the NAAQS in the summer of 1994 rather than the six that occurred with the 
present standard. [d. 
40 For example, the Ohio EPA anticipates that nearly every area in the state would fail to 
attain even if EPA chooses a standard in the middle of the range under consideration. See 
Nichols, supra note 35. If EPA chooses the strictest standard advocated by the American Lung 
Association of 0.07 ppm with only one allowable exceedence per year, almost every area in the 
country would fail to attain. See id. HEPA chooses the most lenient standard under considera-
tion, 0.09 ppm with five allowable exceedences per year, many areas currently designated as 
nonattainment could comply. See id. The American Petroleum Institute commissioned an analy-
sis of the number of non attainment areas there would be nationwide using various permutations 
of concentration level and number of allowable exceedences based upon 1993-95 data. See 
Standard-Setting Process for Ozone, PM to Be Coordinated Under New EPA Process, Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 372 (May 31, 1996). The analysis reportedly reflected a vast divergence 
in the number of nonattainment areas possible, e.g., 0.075 ppm with five exceedences would 
result in 260 nonattainment areas, whereas 0.105 ppm with three exceedences would only result 
in 19. [d. EPA rejected the analysis as misleading. [d. 
41 See Reitze, supra note 19, at 1612-16 (noting fundamental shortcomings of CAA to deal 
with air pollution in certain contexts). 
42 See Nichols Testimony, supra note 19 (stating that despite general improvement in air 
pollution levels, areas subject to transport "continue to experience unacceptably high levels of 
ground level ozone"). 
43 Hence the pithy observation that "air pollutants, by their nature, do not respect political 
boundaries." Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 880 (1st Cir. 1973). 
44 The notable exception, aside from § 1l0(a)(2)(D), is § 176A which allows states to form 
interstate transport regions and devise regional control strategies. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a). Even in 
this scenario, however, EPA continues to assess each state's SIP as a separate plan and only 
insures that it contains common elements required by EPA after their request by a majority of 
the members of the ozone transport region. [d. Section 176A(c) provides that the remedy for 
an ozone transport commission to insure compliance by its members is a request to EPA to find 
a recalcitrant state's SIP inadequate to prevent transport under § 1l0(a)(2)(D). [d. 
45 Courts have described the CAA as a "bold experiment" in cooperative federalism in which 
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this principle, the federal government sets standards and state gov-
ernments develop and implement plans to meet the standards.46 
This fragmented approach to ozone abatement invites inconsisten-
cies in the methods and degrees of ozone precursor control exercised 
by different states.47 Moreover, conflicting economic or political objec-
tives of different jurisdictions potentially exacerbate the level of 
ozone transport. For example, states have deluged EPA with re-
quests for exemptions from required NOx control measures on the 
grounds that NOx reductions will result in more ozone, not less, in 
downwind areas.48 Some downwind states contend that their citizens 
will suffer from additional ozone transport as a result of such an 
exemption.49 
EPA "identifies the end to be achieved, while the states choose the particular means for realizing 
that end." Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson County, Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1075 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (quoting Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982»; see also H.R. REP. No. 490, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in II COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3169 (Cong. Info. 
Servo 1993) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II]. 
46 42 U.S.C. § 7407. An EPA official describes the approach as a "partnership" in which states 
choose the methods best suited to their circumstances to meet statutory objectives of the 1990 
CAA and the federal government provides national standards. Among the reasons for federal 
involvement are: (i) protection of the health of all citizens at a minimum level; (ii) avoidance of 
50 separate standards to hamper industry; (iii) avoidance of interstate transport; and (iv) 
prevention of a "race to the bottom" among states seeking competitive advantage at the expense 
of public health. See Nichols Testimony, supra note 19. 
47 Consider, for example, the diametrically opposed philosophies of Virginia and Massachu-
setts. Massachusetts, a victim of transport, has embraced control measures such as Ozone 
Transport Commission Low Emissions Vehicle (OTC LEV). Virginia, the likely source of some 
of ozone transport, has battled EPA on numerous issues and even disputes the constitutionality 
of OTC LEV. See Virginia v. EPA, Case Nos. 95-1163,95-1177, & 95-1180, at 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 
filed Mar. 14, 1995). 
48 A dilemma has arisen with the regulation of ozone because studies have suggested that 
CAA-mandated reductions in NOx may increase the production of ozone under certain condi-
tions. See Air Pollution: State Requests For NOx Waivers Should Be Denied, Environmental-
ists Say, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 684 (Sept. 9, 1994). EPA has granted a number ofthese 
waivers grudgingly. See, e.g., Lake Michigan NOx Waiver, supra note 16. Section 182(f)(2) of 
the CAA obligates EPA to consider waivers of the NOx control measures after a determination 
that air quality may improve without the measures. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(f)(2). 
49 See Air Pollution: New York Challenges EPA's Exemptions to NOx Requirements for Parts 
of Midwest, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at D-19 (Mar. 28, 1996) [hereinafter New York 
Challenges]. EPA granted a NOx waiver for the Chicago area, and the State of New York has 
sued EPA to reverse the waiver. EPA explicitly stated that the waiver was contingent until it 
receives additional modeling data to address the ozone transport impacts of the waiver upon 
the downwind areas, at which point the Agency may exercise its authority under Section 
110(a)(2)(D) to require NOx emission controls to halt significant contribution of ozone to other 
jurisdictions. See id. New York contends that EPA should exercise that statutory authority 
immediately and "should not even be considering exemptions" until the Ozone Transport As-
sessment Group has made its recommendations for regional ozone controls. See N. Y. Lawsuit 
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Over the last three decades, Congress has gradually strengthened 
the CAA to address interstate transport of criteria pollutants in 
general and ozone in particular. 50 In the last three revisions of the 
CAA, Congress has given EPA an increasingly central role in regu-
lating interstate transport by modifying the statutory standards for 
EPA's review of state implementation plans (SIPs).51 Congress still 
has not, however, addressed the underlying fundamental questions of 
how to apportion the nation's air resources among states in the con-
text of air pollutant transport prevention.52 The statute thus does not 
clearly indicate how EPA should resolve transport disputes. Because 
EPA oversees the development of SIPs for all states, EPA must 
implement the provisions of the CAA to prevent ozone transport in 
accordance with an incomplete statutory mandate. 
EPA's implementation of the current CAA ozone transport provi-
sions has roused criticism from many quarters. Industry often com-
plains that the statute imposes unreasonable burdens and interferes 
with competitiveness.53 Environmental groups contend that EPA has 
not interpreted and enforced the transport provisions aggressively 
enough.54 Some states assert that the statute unconstitutionally 
Against Midwest NOx Filed Despite Contingency of EPA's Waivers, 1996 Uti!. Env't Rep. 
(McGraw-Hill) 9 (April 26, 1996). 
50 See infra Section II, regarding evolving SIP review requirements. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 7410. The SIP contains the detailed program of state laws that each state 
devises to comply with the CAA within the state or separate areas of the state. See id. § 7410(a). 
52 See generally Marc Alan Silverstein, Interstate Ozone Pollution: Unresolved Issues, 3 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 291 (1979). 
53 For example, the automobile manufacturing industry has adamantly opposed the Northeast 
OTC LEV program approved by EPA. Industry claims that the program will force them to sell 
"advanced technology vehicles to an unwilling market" that will hurt their sales and ultimately 
consumers. See Petition to Bring CAL LEV to Northeast Approved by EPA, but Talks Continue, 
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 242, at D-3 (Dec. 20, 1994). Oil companies complain that the 
reformulated fuel requirement causes economic and competitive disadvantages, especially when 
EPA waffles on allowing areas to opt out of the program and forces the industry to absorb the 
costs. See Allanna Sullivan, Reformulated Fuel Pumping Up Gas Prices, CHI. 'I'RIB., Sept. 3, 
1995, Transportation Section, at 2. The electric power industry and the coal industry have 
vigorously opposed additional NOx emission controls for midwestern power plants to benefit 
the states of the Northeast OTR because the cost of additional controls would render them less 
competitive in the open market for electric power. See, e.g., Julie R. Cryser, Ozone: Pressure 
From Northeastern States to Reduce Pollution From Outside the Region Could Have Economic 
Repercussions in West Virginia, CHARLESTON SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, Aug. 4,1996, at PIB 
(quoting power industry officials critical of the Northeast OTC for "passing the ozone buck"). 
The utility industries in the Northeast OTR are demanding additional emissions controls for 
their midwestern and southern cohorts to prevent unfair competition by generators who do not 
have to bear the same costs for pollution controls. See Eric Niiler, Energy Deregulation Brings 
Fears of Wind-borne Pollution, PATRIOT-LEDGER (Quincy, MA), Mar. 22,1996, at 7. 
54 See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, No. 94-1692 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1994) 
(challenging the agency's overwhelming transport policy). 
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usurps state powers.55 Citizens are vehemently opposed to some con-
trol measures mandated by the CAA to reduce ozone precursors and 
ozone transport.56 Amid this criticism, EPA must act in accordance 
with the provisions of the statute or, in the case of statutory ambigu-
ity, divine congressional intent from sources other than the statute.57 
EPA has striven to implement the CAA "flexibly" to accommodate 
the more conservative and less conservationist political atmosphere 
of Washington resulting from the November, 1994, congressional elec-
tions.58 Given the recent calls in Congress to amend the CAA or to 
55 A number of states contend that the creation of the Northeast OTR pursuant to CAA § 184 
was unconstitutional because: (i) it creates a form of regional government without the consent 
of the states; (ii) it infringes on the right of a state to choose its own method to elect its 
representative; (iii) it creates an impermissible distinction between the affected states and all 
other states; and (iv) it subjects the citizens of the affected states to economic disadvantages. 
See Attorneys Say LEV Section of CAA Could Face Constitutional Challenge, INSIDE EPA, 
Dec. 22, 1994, at 1. Virginia officials initially threatened to oppose the OTC LEV program 
because they wanted a new vote taken after the November, 1994, election of additional Repub-
lican governors, whom they expected to vote against the measure. See Gary Lee, EPA Approves 
Plan for New Class of Low-Polluting Cars in Northeast, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1994, at A4. 
Virginia subsequently filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Northeast OTC and its 
actions including OTC LEV. The suit is pending before the District of Columbia Circuit. See 
Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 95-1163, 95-1177, & 95-1180 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 14, 1995). Other ob-
servers have explored the constitutional issues more fully. See generally Daniel B. Trinkle, 
Comment, Cars, Congress, and Clean Air for the Northeast: A Separation of Powers Analysis 
of the Ozone Transport Commission, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 169 (1995) (considering the 
OTC and OTC LEV constitutional because they are not in violation of either the Appointments 
Clause or the nondelegation doctrine); Gordon C. Wilson, Note, Limitations on Congressional 
Power to Establish Interstate Mechanisms of Governance: The Unconstitutionality of the Ozone 
Transportation Region Created Under Section 184 of the Clean Air Act, 11 J.L. & POL. 381, 
409-10 (1995) (declaring Section 184 unconstitutional for violating the Appointments Clause and 
the Compact Clause). 
56 See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel, Not in My Garage: Clean Air Act Triggers Backlash as Its Focus 
Shifts to Driving Habits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1995, at AI. The article notes a Pennsylvania 
grassroots rebellion against "everything from having to use gasoline nozzles designed to catch 
excess fuel vapors to buying reformulated gasoline" and a feeling that "cars have emerged right 
up there with guns as a 'Constitutional Right.'" Id. The attitude is reminiscent of the 19th 
century "Whiskey Rebellion" in which western Pennsylvanians opposed unpopular laws by 
force. 
57 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying 
the Chevron analysis to EPA's interpretations of various provisions of the 1990 CAA). 
58 EPA's desire to avoid bureaucratic fiats is reflected in rules that encourage states to develop 
alternative means to obtain emissions reductions. See Final Rule of Ozone Transport Commis-
sion; Low Emission Vehicle Program for the Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 60 Fed. Reg. 
4712, 4713 (1995) [hereinafter OTC LEV Final Rule]. The Agency has signaled that it is 
amenable to flexible approaches where possible. For example, EPA officials have met with 
representatives of the states to hear recommendations which ranged from a moratorium on 
sanctions for states acting in good faith to an alternative to enhanced inspection and mainte-
nance requirements. See Moratorium on Clean Air Sanctions Among Many EPA Actions 
Sought by States, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at D-4 (Jan. 23, 1995). EPA has followed 
through on the recommendations by providing for less stringent automobile inspection and 
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shackle EPA, a reexamination of the ozone transport provisions is 
nowappropriate.59 
This paper will first discuss the efforts by Congress and EPA to 
address interstate air pollutant transport under the CAA up to and 
including the 1990 Amendments.6o Second, it will illustrate how the 
current CAA imposes anomalous results upon states subject to ozone 
transport. Third, this paper will explore some recent EPA efforts to 
moderate harsh effects of the ozone transport provisions upon states. 
Fourth, it will describe some bills currently before Congress that 
address directly the problem of ozone transport and its ramifications 
for states. Finally, this paper will argue that Congress could amend 
the 1990 CAA to rectify statutory and implementation problems for 
downwind states, yet continue to encourage expeditious attainment 
of the NAAQS. Specifically, this paper will suggest that downwind 
states need three forms of statutory relief: (i) alleviation of the dra-
conian punishment for being merely the recipient of ozone from up-
wind states; (ii) creation of a meaningful mechanism to initiate prompt 
EPA action against upwind states that do not cooperate to control 
ozone transport across state or regional borders; and (iii) clarification 
that Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) authorizes EPA to force states to reduce 
ozone precursor emissions below the level of the NAAQS if necessary 
to prevent transport. 
On the latter point, this paper will argue that Congress should 
either provide clearer instructions and guidance to EPA concerning 
how the agency should allocate air resources or should state unequivo-
cally that EPA has explicit authority to devise and implement the 
proper resource allocation formula. Without clearer guidance in the 
CAA, the ozone transport problem will follow the paradigm of the 
tragedy of the commons, in which self-interested users ruin shared 
maintenance programs in qualified areas of the Northeast OTR. See Supplemental Final Rule, 
Inspection/Maintenance Flexibility Amendments (Ozone Transport Region), 61 Fed. Reg. 39,032 
(1996). 
69 Dissatisfaction with the CAA has led some members of Congress to propose amendments 
that range from mere technical alterations to outright repeal of the CAA. See infra Section V. 
Other members have attempted to preclude enforcement of the CAA through appropriations 
bill riders that prohibit EPA from spending funds for designated programs. See Gary Lee, 
House Panel Signals Assault on EPA Initiatives, WASH. POST, July 14, 1995, at A19; Air 
Pollution: Controversial Air Act Programs Would Be Weakened by House Bill Riders, Daily 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at D-18 (July 12, 1995). 
60 This paper will focus on the CAA transport provisions as they impact nonattainment and 
maintenance areas as opposed to the impacts on areas that already attain, treated as "prevention 
of significant deterioration" or "PSD" areas. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479. 
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resources like the ambient air because they do not suffer the full 
consequences of their actions.61 Overall, this paper will suggest the 
futility of continued treatment of state borders as legal fences against 
transport, and the need for states of the Northeast OTR and else-
where to cooperate to resolve transport issues. 
II. OZONE TRANSPORT UNDER THE CAA 
The vexing problem of interstate pollution provided one of the most 
compelling arguments in favor of federal regulation of pollution rather 
than continued state and local control of the issue.62 The pernicious 
effects of cross-boundary pollution and the failure of common law 
remedies to resolve disputes among neighboring states prompted 
Congress to intervene under the commerce clause power of the U.S. 
Constitution.63 Three decades later, the issue that originally motivated 
Congress to enact federal pollution statutes remains largely unre-
solved.64 Congress has grappled with pollution transport through 
three revisions of the CAA in 1970, 1977, and 1990. The successive 
amendments and EPA's implementation of the provisions illustrate 
some of the intransigent problems inherent in attempts to remedy 
ozone transport and suggest areas for further improvement. 
A. The 1970 Clean Air Act 
Prior to the 1970 CAA, Congress addressed the issue of cross-
boundary pollution or pollution transport through the mechanism of 
interstate conferences.65 Congress contemplated that states sharing a 
61 The famous explanation of this behavioral phenomenon concerned unregulated grazing on 
the town common that resulted in the ultimate ruin of the common because each grazier could 
profit by adding cattle without bearing the full cost of damage to the common. See Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968), reprinted in RICHARD 
B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 68 (2d ed. 1978). 
62 See generally Sidney Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the 
Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067 
(1965) (setting forth the argument that when pollution crosses state borders and state controls 
are ineffective, the federal government should intervene). 
63 See generally Bruce M. Kramer, Transboundary Air Pollution and the Clean Air Act: An 
Historical Perspective, 32 KAN. L. REV. 181 (1983). The first provision of the CAA continues to 
harken back to this basis for federal regulation in its finding that most Americans live in 
metropolitan areas that straddle state and local boundaries and, by extension, need protection 
in the form offederal antipollution legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1). 
64 Far from a nostalgic memory, interstate pollution disputes remain a prominent source of 
interstate friction. See, e.g., New York Challenges, supra note 49. 
65 See Kramer, supra note 63, at 187. 
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common border with significant transboundary pollution would vol-
untarily engage in conferences in which they ostensibly would sort 
out such problems among themselves.66 The federal government's 
involvement consisted primarily of mediation and facilitation. If the 
parties could not reach agreement, the federal government could 
itself seek to abate the interstate pollution in federal COurt.67 The 
conference system proved cumbersome and ineffective to resolve the 
thorny technological, economic, and political issues of pollution abate-
ment between states.68 
In the 1970 CAA,69 Congress directed EPA to take a more active 
role in the regulation of interstate pollution.70 The 1970 CAA required 
each state to generate a SIP in which the state had to specify the 
enforceable pollution control measures it would undertake to reduce 
emissions and comply with the NAAQS.71 The statute instructed EPA 
to approve a state's SIP if it contained certain minimum required plan 
elements designed to help the state attain the NAAQS. Section 
1l0(a)(2)(E) of the 1970 CAA directed EPA to approve a SIP if, among 
other things, it included provisions for "intergovernmental coopera-
tion" to counter transported pollutants that might "interfere" with 
attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS in other jurisdictions.72 
66 Under the 1963 CAA, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) could call a 
conference among the relevant state and local pollution control agencies in the affected states 
to consider cooperative means to abate interstate pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(b) (1976) (re-
pealed 1977). 
67 If the parties did not take adequate steps to protect the health and welfare of citizens of 
other states, the 1963 CAA empowered the Secretary of HEW to request the Attorney General 
to bring an action on behalf of the federal government against the polluter to abate the interstate 
element of the pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(g)(I) (1976) (repealed 1977). 
68 The abysmal results are chronicled by commentators. See generally Carl J. Debevec et al., 
Comment, Air Pollution in the Marietta-Parkersburg Area-A Case History, 32 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 58 (1971); see also Kramer, supra note 63, at 187, 189 & n.59, 190. 
69 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91~04, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in various 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
70 As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the 1970 CAA ''reflect[ed] congressional 
dissatisfaction with the progress of existing air pollution programs and a determination to 
'tak[e] a stick to the states' in order to guarantee the prompt attainment and maintenance of 
specified air quality standards." Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (quoting Train 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975». 
71 The SIP remains an integral part of the CAA. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
72 The Section provided, inter alia, that SIPs include ''provisions for intergovernmental coop-
eration, including measures necessary to insure that emissions of air pollutants from sources 
located in any air quality control region will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance 
of such primary or secondary standard" in any other jurisdiction. Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91~04, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(D». 
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The statute expressly instructed states to take the necessary meas-
ures to "insure" against the effects of transported pollutants on neigh-
boring states, albeit indirectly through EPA's SIP approval process.73 
EPA interpreted the statute's exhortation less aggressively. The 
agency concluded that Congress merely intended to foster interstate 
cooperation through the exchange of information and did not intend 
to require a state to halt emissions at the insistence of a neighboring 
state.74 EPA therefore promulgated a regulation that only required 
each state to agree in its SIP to share information on "factors" that 
might affect the air quality of other states.75 Like earlier attempts to 
control air pollution through interstate cooperation, this approach 
relied upon a degree of altruism among states.76 
Environmental groups disputed EPA's interpretation of the statute 
and attempted to compel EPA to enforce Section 110 to abate inter-
state pollution. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) for-
mally challenged EPA's position in connection with the approval of a 
SIP for Iowa.77 NRDC argued that the requirement of an interstate 
information exchange was inadequate to prevent interstate pollution 
that interfered with attainment or maintenance in other jurisdictions 
in contravention of the statute.78 NRDC further contended that the 
mere exchange of information would not substitute for binding inter-
state agreements or compacts to abate transboundary emissions.79 
A federal appellate court rejected NRDC's position, holding that 
the information exchange was a legitimate means to attain "intergov-
ernmental cooperation" as contemplated by Congress in the statute.80 
Possession of the information, the court reasoned, would enable states 
73 Id. 
74 Commentators described EPA's regulatory response as "trifling." See Kenneth L. Hirsch & 
Steven Abramovitz, Clearing the Air: Some Legal Aspects of Interstate Air Pollution Problems, 
18 DUQ. L. REV. 53, 68 (1979). 
75 The regulation provided that: 
Each plan shall provide assurances that the State agency having primary responsibility 
for implementing national standards in any region, or portion thereof, will promptly 
transmit to other State agencies having similar or related responsibility in the same 
or other States, information on factors (e.g., construction of new industrial plants) 
which may significantly affect air quality in any portion of such region or in any 
adjoining region. 
40 C.F.R. § 51.21(c) (1977) (superseded). 
76 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
77 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 690 (8th Cir. 1973). 
78 Id. at 692. 
79Id. 
8() Id. 
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to develop their respective SIPs to address interstate pollution. Even 
if other means might be more effective, the court relied on the funda-
mental tenet of administrative law that the agency acting within the 
scope of its statutory authority had discretion to determine "what 
degree of governmental cooperation and other measures are neces-
sary to insure noninterference with the attainment and maintenance 
of national standards."81 
The NRDC case illuminates three continuing debates in transport 
policy: (i) the degree to which EPA should control the resolution of 
disputes between states; (ii) the degree to which upwind and down-
wind states should bear responsibility for their neighbor's air quality; 
and (iii) the degree to which the CAA should require states to work 
together to resolve common problems. The first issue concerns the 
appropriate extent of EPA's role in transport disputes. Congress 
based the CAA on the principle of cooperative federalism, i.e., the 
federal government sets minimum standards and the state govern-
ments enact local laws to implement those standards.82 The inevitable 
tension between federal and state power generates disputes as to the 
proper sphere of influence of each sovereign in transport scenarios.83 
At one extreme, EPA could dictate solutions to each state through 
the SIP process. At the other end of the spectrum, EPA could merely 
act as a disinterested mediator between states. The CAA contains a 
fundamental dichotomy because the states ostensibly set their own 
policies to meet national objectives, yet EPA is the final arbiter of 
appropriate policies.84 Because of this structure, some critics believe 
that Congress intends EPA to take a more proactive role.85 Others 
believe that EPA should let states resolve transport issues.86 This 
81 [d. at 692-93. 
82 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7401. 
83 See, e.g., Prepared Testimony By the Honorable Becky Norton Dunlop, Secretary of Natu-
ral Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia, Before the House Budget Committee, Congo Hearing 
Testimonies (Fed. News Serv.), at 1 (Mar. 5, 1996) (invoking Jefferson, Madison, and Patrick 
Henry to criticize the "Big Nanny central government" and stating that "there is scarcely any 
human activity-with the possible exception of daydreaming-that the central government does 
not attempt to manage, to regulate, in a word to control"). 
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
85 See, e.g., Petitioners' Motion for Expedited Review at 1, Conservation Law Found. v. 
Browner (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 94-1692) (challenging the EPA policy of allowing states subject 
to transport to provide SIP attainment demonstrations over time rather than by the statutory 
deadline). 
86 See, e.g., infra notes 331--32 and accompanying text (discussing suggestions that states may 
gerrymander their nonattainment area boundaries or move ambient air quality monitors as they 
deem appropriate); see also EPA- Browner Tells NCSL Money Cut, State Standard Setting Not 
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issue was at the heart of the NRDC suit challenging the agency 
interpretation of the 1970 CAA, and the issue remains a central theme 
in ozone transport disputes.87 
Another recurring motif of transport policy is the tension between 
the rights of upwind and downwind states. The 1970 CAA placed EPA 
in an untenable position. Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) provided that EPA was 
to approve SIPs with necessary measures to avoid interference with 
attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS in another area.88 The 1970 
CAA did not, however, explain what would constitute such interfer-
ence or what might comprise necessary measures to prevent it in any 
given situation. It was unclear, for example, whether EPA was to 
allow an upwind jurisdiction to emit any amount of ozone precursors 
if it would prevent the downwind state from using the full "quota" of 
emissions represented by the NAAQS.89 Congress sidestepped the 
divisive political decisions regarding allocation oflimited air resources 
between states, and put EPA in the difficult position of arbiter of the 
relative rights of upwind and downwind jurisdictions. How upwind 
and downwind states should share finite air resources remains a 
difficult and largely unaddressed question.90 EPA continues to bear 
primary responsibility for resolving disputes concerning the alloca-
tion of air resources. 
The third perennial issue concerns the proper format for state 
cooperation to solve shared transport problems. At the time of the 
1970 CAA, the statute created a mechanism for states to meet volun-
tarily to hammer out solutions between one another. EPA's role 
through the SIP process was only to insure that states provided for 
intergovernmental cooperation. Critics suggested that stronger 
Good Combo, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 137, at D-19 (July 18, 1995) (predicting 50 different 
standards, chaos, and responsible states at the mercy of irresponsible states). 
87 See supra notes 49 & 55. The dispute continues unabated. For example, New York has sued 
EPA for not doing enough to prevent transport, even as Virginia presses its claims that EPA 
has exceeded its authority. [d. 
88 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 1l0(a)(2)(E), 84 Stat. 1676, 1681 
(1970). 
89 See id. This view of the NAAQS as a guaranteed quota for emissions has potentially 
mischievous effects and is inconsistent with certain aspects of the CAA. For example, in the 
1990 CAA Congress imposed region-wide control measures within the Northeast OTR and 
thereby impinged on the ostensible "quotas" of attainment areas in the transport region for the 
benefit of nonattainment areas. This contradicts the assertion that Congress intended the 
NAAQS as a right to emit that amount of a pollutant without regard to its effects elsewhere. 
42 U.S.C. § 7407. 
90 See infra note 475 and accompanying text (discussing current legislative initiatives to factor 
out upwind state contributions to downwind state nonattainment). 
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measures such as binding agreements or compacts were necessary to 
stop transport.91 Congress has subsequently sought means to require 
greater interstate cohesiveness among adjacent states.92 The degree 
to which the CAA should obligate states to work together is an issue 
of continuing concern.93 
EPA's interpretation of Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) under the 1970 CAA 
effectively transferred to the states the duty to resolve interstate 
transport disputes. After judicial approval of its interpretation of the 
statute, EPA continued to implement its authority under the Section 
as though it was merely to encourage states to resolve transport 
problems along lines comparable to the discredited conference 
method. 
B. The 1977 Clean Air Act 
In the 1977 CAA,94 Congress attempted to correct the agency and 
judicial interpretation of Section 1l0(a)(2)(E)95 by amending the stat-
ute to provide that SIPs must include provisions prohibiting state 
sources from interfering with attainment or maintenance of NAAQS 
in any other jurisdictions.96 In addition, Congress added a new Section 
126 that empowered states to petition EPA for a finding that a major 
source in another state emitted or would have emitted a transported 
air pollutant in violation of Section 1l0(a)(2)(E).97 Upon such a finding, 
91 See Hirsch & Abramovitz, supra note 74, at 98-102. 
92 See infra notes 162--{)3 and accompanying text (discussing Northeast OTR). 
93 See, e.g., Trinkle, supra note 55, at 169; Wilson, supra note 55, at 409---10; Attorneys Say 
LEV Section of CAA Could Face Constitutional Challenge, INSIDE EPA, Dec. 22,1994, at 1; 
Lee, supra note 55 (discussing the dissatisfaction of states in the Northeast OTR that allege 
that the CAA is unconstitutional). 
94 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642). 
95 Congress was critical of the 1970 CAA as "an inadequate answer to the problem of inter-
state air pollution." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1409. 
96 The 1977 CAA provided in pertinent part that SIPs must have provisions "prohibiting any 
stationary source within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will ... 
prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State of any . . . national . . . ambient air 
quality standard." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108,91 Stat. at 693. 
97 Section 126 of the 1977 CAA provided in part: 
(a) Each applicable implementation plan shall-
(1) require each major proposed new (or modified) source-
(A) subject to part C (relating to significant deterioration of air quality) or 
(B) which may significantly contribute to levels of air pollution in excess of the 
national ambient air quality standards in any air quality control region outside the 
State in which such source intends to locate (or make such modification), 
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Section 126 authorized EPA to restrict or stop the emissions from 
certain existing sources or to forbid construction of new or modified 
sources.98 Both provisions gave EPA additional tools to force states 
to remedy cross-boundary transport of pollutants, but the limitations 
of the provisions overwhelmed the benefits.99 
The 1977 amendments to Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) expressly expanded 
EPA's authority to disapprove a SIP for failure to limit emissions that 
interfered with attainment or maintenance in another state. Whereas 
the 1970 CAA version of the Section merely instructed EPA vaguely 
to insure that there were provisions to avoid interference with down-
wind attainment or maintenance, the 1977 CAA directed EPA to 
approve a SIP only if there were specific prohibitions to prevent such 
emissions. The distinction is subtle, but it reflected a greater concern 
that one state not adversely affect another. 
The limitations of Section 1l0(a)(2)(E), however, rendered it inef-
fective as a mechanism to address ozone transport. First, Section 
1l0(a)(2)(E) omitted clear standards or directives to EPA regarding 
the amount of emissions that would constitute a violation of the pro-
vision.loo The statute required EPA to insure that the SIP had ade-
quate measures to "prevent" nonattainment, but it provided no guid-
ance as to the meaning of this term.IOI It was unclear whether a 
violation would occur only if the upwind state sent the downwind 
state air that already violated the NAAQS or if the upwind state sent 
the downwind state any amount of ozone that contributed to nonat-
tainment.102 Commentators noted that a literal reading would inevita-
to provide written notice to all nearby States the air pollution levels of which may 
be affected by such source at least sixty days prior to the date on which commencement 
of construction is to be permitted by the State providing notice, and 
(2) identify all major existing stationary sources which may have the impact de-
scribed in paragraph (1) with respect to new or modified sources and provide notice to 
all nearby States of the identity of such sources not later than three months after the 
date of enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1977. 
(b) Any State or political subdivision may petition the Administrator for a finding that 
any major source emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition 
of Section llO(a)(2)(E)(i). 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 126,91 Stat. at 724. 
98ld. 
99 See Kramer, supra note 63, at 195-97. 
100 See Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson County, Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1076 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (lamenting that neither the statute nor the legislative history defines when an 
emission in one state will "interfere" with attainment in another). 
101 See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1982). 
102 See Hirsch & Abramovitz, supra note 74, at 67 ("[t]he statutory goal is salutary; its meaning 
doubtful."). 
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bly lead to inequities, for example, a developed downwind state with 
polluted air could forever block an upwind state from developing. lOS 
As in the 1970 CAA, Congress left the question of what degree of 
transport mattered and what states must do to alleviate transport to 
the discretion of EPA.104 EPA filled this void by developing its policy 
on an ad hoc basis through the Section 126 proceedings discussed 
below. 
Second, the provision continued to refer only to the emissions from 
stationary sources rather than the wider universe of sources such as 
mobile sources, area sources, or combined groups of sources that 
together might emit large amounts of transported pollutants.105 Omis-
sion of mobile sources in particular precluded EPA from finding a 
violation of the provision in the event of transport of ozone precursor 
chemicals from automobiles, the predominant source of transported 
ozone in many nonattainment areas.1oo The restriction of the prohibi-
tion to individual stationary sources thus drastically curtailed the 
number of situations in which EPA could use Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) to 
remedy transport. 
Finally, Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) provided no mechanism for initiation 
of EPA review of SIP provisions by affected states.107 Unlike Section 
126, states could not directly petition EPA under Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) 
to assess whether another state's emissions violated the SIP require-
ments to prevent transport. States could submit comments in connec-
tion with an agency rulemaking to approve a SIP already underway, 
but could not initiate that review by EPA. This left only the citizen 
suit provision in CAA Section 304,108 and the right to challenge an 
103 See STEWART & KRIER, supra note 61, at 498. 
104 See Kramer, supra note 63, at 201, 212-13. Contemporary critics of the 1977 CAA argued 
that "unartfully and vaguely drawn language" in § 110(a)(2)(E) and § 126 failed to address 
fundamental questions of interstate pollution. See id. at 201. Other commentators suggested 
that § 110(a)(2)(E) authorized EPA to make an "inquiry" into which state should restrict its 
emissions, based on some indeterminate factors, and approve or disapprove the SIPs accord-
ingly. See DAVID P. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION, § 4.18 at 4-50 (1981). 
105 STEWART & KRIER, supra note 61, at 498. 
106 See The Honorable Henry A. Waxman et aI., Cars, Fuels, and Clean Air: A Review of Title 
II of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,21 ENVTL. L. 1947, 1950 (1991) ("mobile sources 
are the single most important cause of ozone pollution, the nation's most widespread air pollut-
ant"); see also CATCHING OUR BREATH, supra note 2. 
107 See Timothy Talkington, Interstate Air Pollution Abatement and the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990: Balancing Interests, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 957, 964-67 (1991). A § 126 
petition triggers an EPA review of the emissions impact of the sources enumerated in the 
petition. See id. A state cannot independently initiate a § 110 SIP review. See id. 
108 The citizen suit provision allows suits against EPA to compel performance of nondiscre-
tionary acts or duties. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
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agency final order as arbitrary and capricious under Section 307/°9 as 
possible means to direct EPA's attention to a transport problem. 
As a result of these limitations, Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) of the 1977 
CAA proved of limited utility to states. After the 1977 revisions, 
Connecticut attempted to stop EPA from allowing a Long Island, 
New York, power plant to burn high sulfur fuel.110 Connecticut alleged 
that the plant's high stacks emitted sulfur dioxide and particulates 
that adversely affected the air quality across Long Island Sound.l11 
EPA assessed Connecticut's claim through the notice and comment 
rulemaking process for the plant's special exemption and denied the 
state's requested relief.112 Accordingly, the state challenged EPA's 
final rule alleging that it violated Section 1l0(a)(2)(E).na 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explored 
Connecticut's varied complaints regarding EPA's approval of the New 
York plant's special exemption to use high sulfur fuel. 114 Although the 
Second Circuit was sympathetic to Connecticut and acknowledged 
that a key assumption of the CAA was that Congress intended to 
prevent one state from "foisting off' its pollution problems on other 
states, the court upheld EPA's decision.n5 The court readily admitted 
that the statutory language of Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) posed a dilemma. 
If the Agency forced an upwind state to reduce its emissions to 
protect a downwind state, it would potentially "hold one state hostage 
to another's failure to enact the pollution control strategies necessary 
to conform to the requirements of the [CAA]."116 On the other hand, 
failure to restrict emissions from an upwind state would adversely 
affect the downwind state and "foreclose" its options for controlling 
pollution. ll7 Despite recognizing the glaring statutory uncertainty in 
the provision, however, the court concluded that the extent of its 
109 See id. § 7607(d)(9)(A). The judicial review of final rules pennits any affected party to 
obtain judicial review of the agency's action within certain parameters. See generally id. § 7607. 
110 Connecticut v. EPA, 695 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1982). 
III [d. at 153-&4. 
112 [d. 
113 [d. 
114 The court wryly noted that Connecticut alleged a violation of "every portion" of 
§ 1l0(a)(2)(E). [d. at 155. 
115 Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d at 164. The Second Circuit opined that "[n]o aspect of this 
novel attempt to establish joint state and federal responsibility is more crucial than the provi-
sions which guarantee that air pollution generated in one state does not disrupt another state's 
plans for complying with the national standards." [d. at 151. 
116 [d. at 164. 
117 [d. at 163. 
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review was only to determine whether the EPA action was arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise inconsistent with 
law.u8 This standard of review coupled with judicial deference to 
agency determinations doomed further inquiry into the merits of 
EPA's interpretation of the statute. Based upon the language of the 
provision and the facts at issue, the Second Circuit concurred with 
EPA's determination that a small contribution of a pollutant to an-
other state's nonattainment was probably below the level at which 
Congress intended EPA to intervene.l19 
The effect of the Second Circuit's decision was to dissuade states 
from seeking relief under Section llO(a)(2)(E).120 So long as the EPA 
interpretation of the statute was not "plainly unreasonable," states 
could not successfully challenge EPA's rulemaking determinations 
regarding the contribution necessary to constitute a violation of Sec-
tion llO(a)(2)(E).121 In this case, EPA interpreted the phrase to mean 
that it should approve the state's SIP variance for high sulfur fuel 
unless the change would actually cause a NAAQS violation in another 
jurisdiction.l22 EPA refined this view in other cases discussed below, 
but the Agency continued to refuse downwind states redress for the 
effects of transport on their nonattainment status. 
Section 126 of the 1977 CAA likewise had significant limitations as 
drafted by Congress and as applied by EPA.l23 The Section ostensibly 
provided states with a means to combat interstate transport from 
neighboring jurisdictions.124 The Section did arm states with two im-
portant rights: (i) mandatory disclosures regarding emissions from 
certain types of new and existing sources in neighboring states; and 
(li) a means to petition EPA to investigate and rectify a particular 
118Id. at 155. 
119Id. at 164. The court's foray into the thickets of science and modeling was unusual and 
another federal court labeled it ''brave.'' Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson County, Ky. v. 
EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1092 (6th Cir. 1984). 
120 See Talkington, supra note 107, at 966 (noting that after this decision and its progeny "it 
is difficult to imagine a scenario" in which a state could use § 110 and § 126 successfully). 
121 Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 1982). 
122 Id. at 156. 
123 Many of these shortcomings and impending implementation problems were obvious to 
observers and commentators from the outset. See, e.g., William V. Luneberg, The National 
Quest for Clean Air 1970-1978: Intergovernmental Problems and Some Proposed Solutions, 73 
Nw. U. L. REV. 397, 432-36 (1978) (predicting implementation fiascos because of the difficulties 
of proving the source of a given ozone molecule, the placement of the burden of emission 
reduction on a single upwind source, and the reliance on a case-by-case solution of a pandemic 
problem). 
124 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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transport problem. The mandatory disclosure of information was a 
significant boon, given the burdens involved in discovery of this infor-
mation by other means. More importantly, however, Section 126 dis-
closures allowed advance notice of emissions from new or modified 
sources, and thus a meaningful opportunity to oppose such sources 
prior to their construction and before political and economic momen-
tum might preclude successful opposition. The enforcement mecha-
nism of Section 126 allowed states to petition EPA to prohibit new or 
modified sources or to prohibit continued operation of existing sources 
after three months unless the sources agreed to reduce their emis-
sions to eliminate the interstate effect.125 The Section also granted 
states the ability to challenge emissions from upwind states promptly 
rather than at the next scheduled SIP revision of the upwind state.126 
The utility of Section 126 of the 1977 CAA for downwind states to 
halt transport of any criteria pollutant, and especially ozone, was 
extremely circumscribed. The Section applied only to "major station-
ary sources of emissions."127 By definition, this excluded most individ-
ual pollutant sources except power or manufacturing plants. Section 
126 theoretically permitted actions based upon ozone transport,128 but 
because most ozone does not derive from major source emissions, such 
an action could arise only in unusual circumstances.129 The majority of 
125 See supra text accompanying note 97. 
126 One commentator opined that § 126 was redundant given the review of transport impacts 
required by § 110 in the SIP review process. See Silverstein, supra note 52, at 294. Section 126 
arguably fulfills a distinct and necessary function, however, by providing states with a right to 
petition EPA to consider a particular transport dispute. 
127 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). The 1977 CAA 
defined "major source" to mean facilities that emitted or could emit 100 tons or more per year 
of any pollutant. Id. Section 302(j) of the 1990 CAA continues to define "major sources" as 
stationary sources that emit 100 tons or more per year of any air pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j). 
In the case of ozone nonattainment areas, however, § 182 provides that there is a sliding scale 
with "major source" defined as a source with emissions of 50 tons per year in serious nonattain-
ment areas, 25 tons per year in severe nonattainment areas, and 10 tons per year in extreme 
nonattainment areas. Id. §§ 7511(c)-7511(e). Section 302(z) defines a "stationary source" as 
generally anything other than mobile sources, thereby excluding automobiles. Id. § 7602(z). 
128 EPA has indicated that § 126 actions are available for the six criteria pollutants regulated 
by the CAA. See Interstate Pollution Abatement; Proposed Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,851, 
34,856--57 (1984) [hereinafter Interstate Pollution Abatement 198.H 
129 There are no reported decisions concerning state actions under § 126 to seek redress for 
transported ozone. It is doubtful whether a state could maintain such an action given the 
relatively small proportion of ozone precursors produced by major stationary sources and in 
light of the requirement that the source must significantly contribute to nonattainment. Maine 
has asserted its intention to test this conclusion by filing a § 126 petition for ozone transport. 
See infra note 529. 
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ozone derives from a variety of sources that Section 126 does not 
encompass.130 
Compounding the legal hurdles raised by Section 126, any attempts 
to regulate individual emitters of ozone are scientifically problematic 
as well.131 The limitations on computer modeling make the identifica-
tion of a single source of ozone, or even a group of comparable sources, 
difficult to prove with certainty.132 As a result, the practical modeling 
and scientific limitations make Section 126 useful only in a small 
subset of transport scenarios such as where a large stationary source 
is immediately adjacent to a border. 
Perhaps the most crucial limitation of Section 126 was the require-
ment that the pollution from the upwind jurisdiction must "sig-
nificantly contribute" to nonattainment in a given area. The 1977 CAA 
included no explicit guidance regarding what level of contribution to 
non attainment would be significant.133 The precise meaning of the 
term "significantly contribute" has therefore proven controversial 
and has stalled attempts by states to use Section 126 against 
transboundary pollution.l34 The language of the provision is suscepti-
ble to a spectrum of interpretations.135 
EPA has interpreted the term so restrictively that, to date, no state 
has been able to utilize Section 126 successfully to obtain redress.136 
130 Prior to the 1990 CAA, Congress considered data that indicated the breakdown of major 
VOC sources was: 50% mobile source emissions from cars and trucks; 30% emissions from 
solvent evaporation from sources like dry cleaners and printers; and 12% from home fuel 
combustion. The breakdown of major NOx sources was: 35% mobile sources; 35% electric 
utilities; and 12% industrial fuel combustion. In urban areas the percentage attributable to 
mobile sources ofVOCs and NOx was higher. H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 202-03 
(1990), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 46, at 3226-27. 
131 See generally Talkington, supra note 107, at 959 (noting that "[l]ong range transport and 
shifting wind currents make identification of specific sources of air pollution nearly impossible"). 
132 See Miller, supra note 13, at 151 (regarding the limits of current modeling technology). 
133 See, e.g., Interstate Pollution Abatement 1984, supra note 128, at 34,858; Interstate Pollu-
tion Abatement; Final Determination, 47 Fed. Reg. 6624, 6626 (1982) [hereinafter Interstate 
Pollution Abatement 1982l. 
134 Commentators noted the need for EPA to develop a rule to preclude "de minimis" inter-
ference yet avoid situations in which a small "poorly controlled" source could stop the construc-
tion of new well-controlled sources. See Jerome Ostrov, Interboundary Stationary Source 
Pollution-Clean Air Act Section 126 and Beyond, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 37, 77 (1982). 
135 Commentators have noted the extreme malleability of the statutory language and dearth 
of legislative history to pin down its intended meaning: "The rationale of Section 126---that 
pollution problems ought not to be exported-is highly imprecise, and would support any 
standard ranging from a rigorous no cross-boundary trespass rule to a lax test allowing full 
appropriation of a neighbor's dispersion capacity." See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW, § 3.16, at 320 (1986). 
136 See Talkington, supra note 107, at 957 (noting that "[hlistorically EPA regulation and 
enforcement under § 126 can only be described as ineffectual"). 
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EPA administratively thwarted attempts by states to use Section 126 
to reduce transported pollutants in the 1980s, and states sought re-
dress in the courts. In Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson 
County, Kentucky v. EPA, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reviewed EPA's denial of a petition by an area in Ken-
tucky based upon sulfur dioxide transport from Indiana.137 EPA's mod-
eling indicated that the Indiana source only contributed up to three 
percent of the sulfur dioxide in the Kentucky nonattainment area.13B 
In its notice and comment consideration of the petition, EPA enter-
tained comments upon whether this amount of contribution consti-
tuted a "substantial contribution" to nonattainment.139 The Agency 
rejected strict interpretation of the standard as a "but for" test that 
required the petitioner to show that the upwind state was the sole 
reason for nonattainment in the downwind area.140 EPA declined, 
however, to answer the ultimate question concerning what precise 
quantity would suffice. Because the percentage of contribution was 
relatively small, the Agency merely decided that a three percent 
contribution was not "sufficiently significant ... under any reasonable 
interpretation of the statutory language."141 The lesson of the case was 
that contribution of only up to three percent of the pollutant in a 
nonattainment area is not significant for purposes of Section 126.142 
In New York v. EPA, three states challenged EPA's denial of their 
Section 126(b) petitions.l43 The states alleged that their sulfur dioxide 
nonattainment was a direct result of transport from a number of 
upwind states. In its consideration of the petitions, EPA assessed 
whether out-of-state sources made a significant contribution to the 
level of pollution causing nonattainment.l44 EPA reached the merits 
only on the petition by Pennsylvania and concluded that "more than 
137 See Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson County, Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1071 (6th 
Cir.1984). 
138 Interstate Pollution Abatement 1982, supra note 133, at 6627 (1982). This counter-intuitive 
conclusion sparked debate about the accuracy of EPA's modeling, but the court deferred to the 
agency's expertise in designing models and interpreting data. See Air Pollution Control, 739 
F.2datl0~. 
139 Although § 1l0(a)(2)(E) was silent as to the amount of pollution transport that would 
violate the provision, EPA interpreted the statute to bar transport that would "cause or 
substantially contribute to" nonattainment. See Interstate Pollution Abatement 1982, supra 
note 133, at 6628. 
140 See id. at 6626. The reviewing court deferred to EPA's decision in the absence of contrary 
statutory guidance. See Air Pollution Control, 739 F.2d at 1093. 
141 Air Pollution Control, 739 F.2d at 1093. 
142 Id. at 1093-94. 
143 New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). 
144 Id. at 577. 
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80% of the [sulfur dioxide] contributing" to nonattainment came "from 
Pennsylvania sources, and that therefore the out-of-state sources did 
not 'significantly contribute' to the violation."l45 By implication, ap-
proximately twenty percent of the pollutant did emanate from other 
states. Again, EPA reached its determination and denied the petition 
based upon the relative proportions of the pollutant sources produced 
in-state and out-of-state. This was equitable as the downwind states 
sought to impose emissions controls on upwind states before they had 
addressed their own emissions adequately.l45 The lesson of the case, 
however, was that even twenty percent of pollutants from transport 
may not constitute significant contribution for purposes of Section 
126. 
These cases demonstrate that EPA assesses the level of contribu-
tion that is significant on a case-by-case basis and, therefore, what is 
significant in one situation might not be significant in another. N ever-
theless, EPA's determinations suggest that as little as three percent 
or as much as twenty percent contribution to nonattainment for a 
given pollutant was not sufficient to constitute significant contribu-
tion. By setting the standard high, EPA effectively has eliminated the 
use of Section 126 to halt interstate transport unless a state had a 
very high level of a pollutant from another jurisdiction. 
As a further limitation, EPA interpreted Section 126 narrowly to 
require only an investigation of the interstate emissions from one or 
more major sources targeted in the petition rather than a general 
review of the upwind state's SIP for violation of Section 
1l0(a)(2)(E).147 In the New York decision, the state argued that a 
Section 126 petition obligated EPA to conduct a broader review of the 
SIPs of various upwind states to insure that they complied with 
145 [d. at 580. 
146 Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson County, Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1077, 1094 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (noting the patent unfairness of the EPA ruling in light of the different emissions 
levels permitted by the two states). Equity was not an overriding concern, however, in Air 
Pollution Control. The SIP governing Kentucky permitted its three power generating plants 
to emit only 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide per million BTU s of energy. The SIP governing Indiana, 
however, permitted its single power plant, only one mile upwind from Kentucky, to emit 6.0 
pounds of sulfur dioxide per million BTUs. As a result, the Indiana plant was able to operate 
without any emission controls and particularly without the expensive control measures Ken-
tucky imposed upon its sources. Despite the disparity in the emissions levels, the Indiana 
jurisdiction was in attainment for sulfur dioxide and the Kentucky jurisdiction was not. EP.Ns 
modeling demonstrated that the Indiana source did not contribute massively to the Kentucky 
problem, but the appearance of inequity pervaded the rulemaking process and the judicial 
review of the agency determination. [d. 
147 New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d at 577-79. 
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Section 1l0(a)(2)(E).148 EPA resisted this reading of the statute, and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit agreed that neither the statutory language nor the structure 
and legislative history of the 1977 CAA supported the state's posi-
tion.149 The result of this interpretation is that states cannot use 
Section 126 to initiate a review of another state's entire SIP. 
Viewed in toto, the 1977 CAA did not provide effective solutions to 
prevent pollutant transport.150 Presumably EPA was able to use Sec-
tion 1l0(a)(2)(E) to convince states to limit transport in the adminis-
trative diplomacy that occurs in the SIP approval process. The rela-
tively small number of reported judicial challenges to EPA SIP 
reviews for failure to prevent transport perhaps supports this hy-
pothesis. Nevertheless, in the way that mattered most, i.e., the reduc-
tion of transported pollutants, the 1977 CAA was not effective.15l 
C. The 1990 Clean Air Act 
The 1990 CAA included many major amendments to address air 
pollution problems ranging from a new market-based approach to acid 
rain control in Title IV to a new permit program in Title V.152 The 1990 
CAA also contained numerous new provisions intended by Congress 
specifically to rectify widespread ozone nonattainment.153 Congress 
expressed concern that most urban areas throughout the country 
148 [d. at 577-78. 
149 [d. at 578--79. 
150 Despite years with improved ozone readings, some experts contend that most reductions 
have been illusory because they result from weather patterns more than human efforts to 
control precursors. See RETHINKING OZONE, supra note 1, at 4. 
151 In conjunction with the 1990 Amendments, Congress noted that the 1977 CAA and EPA 
programs had not resulted in the reductions essential to meet the NAAQS. See H.R. REP. No. 
490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1990), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 45, at 
3169. 
152 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671. Courts and attorneys still struggle with the volume and complexity 
of the changes. A federal court recently touched upon this point: 
The amicus brief of the United States describes the Clean Air Act as an extremely 
complex law and tells us that the "enormity of the 1990 amendments beggars descrip-
tion." Congress, amicus informs us, took what was widely perceived as an "unap-
proachable piece of legislation" and tripled the Act's length and "geometrically in-
creased its complexity." After reviewing the Clean Air Act and the voluminous record 
pertaining to the Act submitted on this appeal, we have no reason to doubt the validity 
of the government's description of it. 
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 
525 (2d Cir. 1994). 
153 See The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990,21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1758--61 (1991) [hereinafter Waxman, Overview]; see generally The 
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violated the ozone NAAQSl54 and recognized the pivotal role ozone 
transport played in many nonattainment areas.155 To reduce ozone 
nonattainment, new 1990 CAA provisions centered on five areas: (i) 
categorization of nonattainment by degree of pollution and imposition 
of graduated control programs;156 (ii) introduction of emissions reduc-
tion milestones;157 (iii) creation of NOx emissions controls;158 (iv) intro-
duction of new federal control measures;159 and (v) creation of an 
interstate ozone transport region.160 
Among the most marked changes of the 1990 CAA were those that 
directly addressed ozone transport. For the first time, the 1990 CAA 
established a regional approach to ozone transport to counteract the 
chronic nonattainment that stretches from Virginia to Maine.l6l In 
Section 184(a), the statute created the ~ ortheast OTR, encompassing 
Honorable Henry A. Waxman et al., Roadrrw,p to Title [ of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990: Bringing Blue Skies Back to America's Cities, 21 ENVTL. L. 1843 (1991) [hereinafter 
Waxman, Roadmap]. 
154 See Waxman, Overview, supra note 153, at 1756-57; H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 145--47 (1990), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 45, at 3169-71. 
155 See for example the statements of Connecticut's Senator Lieberman concerning the effects 
of transport: "The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection has concluded that 
even if all of the industry in the state was shut down and all of the cars in the state were stopped 
that the state would still not comply with the nationally established ozone standard." IV COMM. 
ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 5076 (Cong. Info Servo 1993) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IV] 
(comment of Sen. Lieberman, Senate debate, January 31, 1990). 
156 The graduated control program of § 182 divides ozone nonattainment areas into five levels 
of nonattainment: marginal, moderate, serious, severe, and extreme based upon the area's 
measured level of ozone. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a. Section 182 specifies required control measures for 
each category of nonattainment with each higher level requiring the control measures of the 
preceding level plus more aggressive measures. [d. The more serious the nonattainment, the 
longer the deadline for reaching attainment. [d. 
157 Milestones are specific percentage reductions of VOCs to encourage gradual progress 
towards attainment. Moderate, serious, severe, and extreme ozone nonattainment areas must 
reduce VOC emissions by 15% over the six years following enactment of the 1990 CAA. After 
that 15%, serious, severe, and extreme areas must further reduce VOC emissions by 3% per 
year until attainment. In addition to these percentages, the states must also generate reductions 
to offset all new increases in emissions after the base year. [d. §§ 7511(b)(I)-7511(c)(2)(B). 
158 Section 182(f) provides that states must enact control measures to reduce NOx emissions 
comparable to those for VOCs. [d. § 751la(f). 
159 Section 183 requires EPA to develop further control strategies to address ozone precursor 
emissions and to make those strategies available to states through guidance documents. The 
purpose of the federal control measures is to devise new methods to control hitherto unregu-
lated emissions sources such as consumer products like paints and solvents. [d. § 7511b. 
160 [d. § 751lc. 
161 A long-stated goal of the CAA is to encourage interstate cooperation, and the CAA contains 
a formal advance consent of Congress to compacts or other binding agreements between states. 
[d. § 7402. The 1990 CAA was the first to require states to cooperate regionally. See id. § 7511c. 
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the states of the Northeast and a Northeast Ozone Transport Com-
mission (Northeast OTC) with representatives of the Northeast OTR 
jurisdictions, to make regional determinations regarding ozone trans-
port.162 Creation of the transport region finally acknowledged that 
transport of ozone precursors across a geographic region makes states 
and their emission control programs interdependent.l63 
Next, Section 184(b) of the 1990 CAA stipulated control measures 
necessary to reduce rampant ozone precursor emissions and directed 
states to impose these measures on a region-wide basis.l64 These 
mandatory measures required reduction of VOCs and NOx emissions 
to alleviate ozone within the entire ozone transport region.l65 Section 
184(b) requires states to impose certain control measures universally 
throughout their borders including areas without local ozone NAAQS 
violations.l66 Section 184(b) thus departs from the standard require-
ments of the CAA by imposing control measures on attainment areas 
for the benefit of nonattainment areas regardless of whether the 
former actually contribute pollutants to the latter. 
To further reduce ozone precursor emissions, the 1990 CAA in-
vested the Northeast OTC with the power to petition EPA to impose 
additional region-wide control measures requested by the Northeast 
OTC after a majority vote of its members.l67 Under Section 184(c), 
EPA must assess the recommendation to determine if the requested 
control measure is "necessary"l68 to reach attainment of the ozone 
NAAQS in any area of the Northeast OTR.169 To encourage EPA to 
act upon these recommendations, Section 184(c) obligates EPA to 
make its determination within a set period of time and places the 
burden upon EPA to establish that a recommended control measure 
162 Id. § 7511c. 
163 See Waxman, Roadrnap, supra note 153, at 1896. 
164 The control measures are: (i) cities with a population of 100,000 or more must have 
enhanced motor vehicle inspection and maintenance programs and must apply reasonably 
available control measures (RACT) to certain VOC sources; (ii) the entire state must have stage 
II vapor recovery or an equivalent measure for emissions reductions; and (iii) all stationary 
sources throughout the state that emit 50 tons per year or more of VOCs must meet the 
regulations generally applicable to major sources in a moderate nonattainment area. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7511c(b)(1)-(2). 
165 Id. § 7511c(b). 
166 Id. 
167Id. § 7511c(c). 
168 "Necessary" is a term of art EPA has defined through rulemaking under § 184. A control 
measure is "necessary" if any areas in the Northeast OTR cannot attain the ozone NAAQS 
without it. See OTC LEV Final Rule, supra note 58, at 4719. 
169 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(c). 
30 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:1 
is not necessary to reach attainment if it declines to approve the 
Northeast OTC recommendation.170 Congress's presumed intent in 
creating the Northeast OTC to make regional determinations on air 
pollution policy was to encourage states to devise their own solutions, 
yet to avoid the pitfalls of the "conference" approach to interstate 
dispute resolution.l71 The 1990 CAA diverged markedly from those 
historical antecedents by giving EPA the affirmative duty to assess 
the communal decisions of the Northeast OTC and to impose new 
control measures if appropriate.172 Congress also sought to encourage 
regional solutions to ozone transport by providing for the creation of 
additional pollutant transport regions. Section 176A permits EPA, 
either at its own instigation or at the request of any state, to create 
a transport region.l73 The basis for creation of a new region is an EPA 
finding that interstate transport of any pollutant "contributes sig-
nificantly" to a NAAQS violation in another state.174 Similarly, EPA 
may add a state or area to an existing transport region upon a finding 
of significant contribution to transport, or may remove a state or area 
from an existing transport region upon a finding that inclusion of the 
state or area will not significantly contribute to regional attainment.175 
Enactment of Section 176A reflected widespread belief that regional 
170 The legislative history indicates that Congress purposely placed this burden upon EPA to 
preclude agency inaction. For example, Senator Lieberman noted: 
The Administrator has the final authority to disapprove additional measures recom-
mended by the Commission. However, EPA bears a heavy burden of demonstrating 
that the additional control measure is not necessary to bring any area of the region 
into attainment by the dates provided and to recommend equal or more effective 
actions that could be taken by the Commission to conform the disapproved portion of 
the recommendations. 
I COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 1053 (Cong. Info. Servo 1993) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
I] (statement of Sen. Lieberman, Senate debate, Oct. 27, 1990). 
171 A number of statements in the official legislative history indicate the concern that air 
pollution in the Northeast is a common enemy best fought on a united front. See, e.g., id. at 1053 
("[t]he creation of a regional air quality commission is an important and creative part of the bill. 
It recognizes that it is impossible to put a cleanup bubble over an individual State. It puts some 
responsibility on the States to be good neighbors .... ") (statement of Sen. Lieberman, Senate 
debate, Oct. 27, 1990). 
172 Commentators had long advocated that the best means to fight transport was to encourage 
a regional approach among states in conjunction with stronger federal involvement as a neutral 
''voice of reason" to resolve disputes. See Silverstein, supra note 52, at 294. 
173 42 U.S.C. § 7506a. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. EPA has promulgated guidance regarding how areas can opt out of the Northeast OTR. 
See discussion infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
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solutions are the best method to alleviate nonattainment caused by 
transport.I76 
The 1990 CAA also amended former Section 1l0(a)(2)(E) in sig-
nificant ways.177 Most importantly, the amendment drastically ex-
panded the coverage of the provision by supplementing the reference 
to emissions from "sources" with emissions from "other types of emis-
sions activity."178 This modification allows EPA to consider emissions 
from any source or group of sources within the state when assessing 
the extraterritorial impacts of transport.179 This single change means, 
for example, that EPA can disapprove a SIP on the basis of transport 
from a large number of mobile sources in a given state or area, 
thereby empowering EPA to address the predominant source of 
ozone transport in most jurisdictions.lso 
Second, Section 1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) now expressly permits EPA to 
consider emissions that "contribute significantly" to nonattainment in 
another area or state.I81 The statute still neither defines this term nor 
provides other meaningful guidance regarding the precise amount of 
cross-boundary emission necessary to violate the standard.182 Based 
upon the change of language, however, it appears that the Section is 
more restrictive than the former prohibition against transport of a 
176 See Waxman, Roadrrw,p, supra note 153, at 1937. 
177 Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) now provides that the SIP submitted to EPA by a state shall: 
contain adequate provisions-
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, any source or other 
type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts 
which will-
(!) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any 
other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard, or 
(II) interfere with measures required to be included in the applicable implementation 
plan for any other State under part C of this subchapter to prevent significant dete-
rioration of air quality or to protect visibility, 
(ti) insuring compliance with the applicable requirements of Sections 7426 and 7415 of 
this title (relating to interstate and international pollution abatement). 
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). 
178 [d. 
179 For example, in the OTC LEV Final Rule, EPA looked beyond the emissions of stationary 
sources to include the emissions of all sources. See OTe LEV Final Rule, supra note 58, at 4713. 
180 See infra note 335 and accompanying text. EPA has expressed its intention to utilize 
Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) against states that fail to institute appropriate control measures on all 
sources of ozone precursors to combat transport. 
181 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(D)(i). 
182 One commentator has branded the standard "no standard at all" and compared it to Justice 
Stewart's famous visual test for obscenity, knowing it when he saw it. See Talkington, supra 
note 107, at 967. 
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"pollutant in amounts which will prevent attainment or maintenance" 
as provided in the 1977 CAA.l83 Formerly, EPA arguably could not 
halt emissions of a pollutant in one state unless it was the sole cause 
of nonattainment in another.l84 Alternatively, literal application of the 
1977 CAA provision suggested that EPA should restrict any emission 
from an upwind state if it interfered with attainment. 185 Section 
1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) now expressly indicates that EPA may halt emis-
sions that are simply a contributing factor in another state's nonat-
tainment.l86 In this respect, the changes in Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) follow 
the evolution of the standard EPA developed administratively in the 
Section 126 cases.187 Congress apparently chose to codify the approach 
taken by the Agency. 
Finally, Section 1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) of the 1990 CAA provides a sepa-
rate standard of scrutiny of SIPS for transport impacts upon mainte-
nance areas and thus bifurcated the analysis for compliance.188 Main-
tenance areas are those areas that EPA formerly classified as 
nonattainment but that have subsequently complied with the 
NAAQS.189 In the 1977 CAA, the Section instructed the EPA to insure 
that states included SIP prohibitions against emissions that would 
"prevent" maintenance of the NAAQS.190 This standard suggested a 
higher level of proof in which an aggrieved state had to show that the 
emissions from the upwind state were the only impediment to contin-
ued attainment. The 1990 CAA provides instead that EPA must pro-
hibit emissions that would merely "interfere" with maintenance of the 
NAAQS.191 This clarification suggests that Congress intended EPA to 
restrict upwind state emissions more stringently than before. Such a 
policy is logical because it rewards states that have enacted the con-
trol measures necessary to attain the N AAQS and discourages trans-
port into areas perhaps already predisposed to nonattainment. 
183 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
184 A party in Connecticut v. EPA, the owner of the power plant that wished to use high sulfur 
fuel regardless of its effect on neighboring states, seriously argued for this interpretation of the 
statute. See 696 F.2d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 1982). 
185 EPA instead opted for a reasonable interpretation of the statute to prevent "significant" 
or "substantial" contribution of pollutants to nonattainment areas. See Air Pollution Control 
Dist. of Jefferson County, Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1091 (6th Cir. 1982). 
186 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(D)(i). 
187 Courts had already effectively read into § 1l0(a)(2)(E) of the 1977 CAA the "significant 
contribution" standard of § 126. See Air Pollution Control, 739 F.2d at 1093. 
188 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
189 See generally id. § 7505a (discussion of maintenance areas). 
190 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
191 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(II). 
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The 1990 CAA did not greatly amend Section 126 concerning a 
state's right to halt or limit emissions from major sources in other 
states.192 The most notable alteration changed the Section to provide 
expressly that a state may maintain an action because of emissions 
from a group of major sources rather than having to develop proof 
that a single major source emitted the offending transported pollut-
ant. This change ratified the interpretation already followed by EPA 
that recognized the impracticality of proving that a single source 
emitted the pollutant and also the reality that a large number of major 
sources can together produce a significant contribution to the nonat-
tainment of another state, even if they would not individually.193 The 
lack of other changes suggests congressional satisfaction with the 
status quo in spite of the inability of any state to maintain a successful 
action under Section 126 to date.194 
The changes Congress enacted in the 1990 CAA indicate that it was 
aware of the significant problem posed by ozone transport.195 Viewed 
in terms of the three fundamental problems of transport policy appar-
ent after the 1970 CAA, Congress has continued to move toward 
stronger measures to counter transboundary pollution. Congress 
strengthened EPA's position by broadening the SIP review process 
to encompass a wider universe of relevant emissions sources.196 Os-
tensibly, this will increase the Agency's power to resolve the alloca-
tion of air resources between states. Congress also attempted to 
clarify the relationship between upwind and downwind jurisdictions 
under the CAA by providing a more explicit standard for prevention 
of cross-boundary pollution.197 The standard is still imprecise, but 
192 Section 126 now provides that any state or political subdivision may petition EPA for a 
finding that "any major source or group of stationary sources emits or would emit any air 
pollutant in violation of [§ 110(a)(2)(D)]." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). 
193 See Interstate Pollution Abatement 1984, supra note 128, at 34,851 n.50. 
194 One commentator has noted the continued disjunction between § 110 and § 126 and has 
speculated that because § 126 does not track the "any source of emissions" language of § 110, 
it will continue to cause trouble for states seeking redress. See Talkington, supra note 107, at 
975. 
195 Legislative history confirms the concern of Congress. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 202, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 45, at 3226. 
196 Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) now includes emissions from "any source or other type of emissions 
activity." 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(D). Earlier versions of the provision limited the review to 
emissions from "stationary sources." See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 
§ 108, 91 Stat. 685, 693 (1977). 
197 The standard in § 110 now prohibits emissions that would "contribute significantly to 
nonattainment in, or interference with maintenance by, any other State." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2)(D). In an earlier incarnation, this provision required prohibition of emissions that 
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Congress has signaled that the level of transport the EPA must 
prohibit is somewhere between the extremes for which the parties 
have argued, i.e., EPA must prevent transport that is a "significant 
contribution" to nonattainment. In addition, Congress sought to en-
courage states to cooperate on a regional basis rather than as fifty 
competing free agents. In the case of the Northeast OTR, Congress 
imposed a regional approach on the affected states.198 For other states, 
Congress has created a new mechanism for interstate cooperation to 
combat pollutant transport that is less complicated and perhaps more 
effective than its predecessors.199 Six years after its enactment, how-
ever, the 1990 CAA has not provided all the necessary solutions to 
ozone transport and has engendered new controversies. 
III. ANOMALOUS IMPACTS OF THE 1990 CAA 
The history of the CAA reflects that Congress has taken an inter-
stitial approach to combat ozone transport.2OO Given this approach, 
Congress could not anticipate all of the complications that might arise 
in the implementation of the statute.201 Since the enactment of the 
1990 CAA, EPA and states have encountered daunting problems in 
the application of the statute's provisions to the realities of ozone 
transport. Many problems arise from the ramifications of the statute 
for downwind jurisdictions. 
The disadvantages for downwind states begin at the definitional 
level and extend throughout the statutory provisions of the 1990 
CAA. First, the definition of "nonattainment" may apply to an area 
regardless of the source of the ozone or other pollutant that violates 
the applicable NAAQS.202 The degree of an area's nonattainment de-
pends solely upon the measured quality of the ambient air at a limited 
number of monitors.203 Although the statutory definition of nonattain-
would "prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State." See Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108, 91 Stat. at 693. 
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c. 
199 See id. § 7506a. 
200 See, e.g., supra Section II and accompanying text (discussing slow evolution of 
§ 1l0(a)(2)(D)). 
201 For example, control measures created by Congress in the 1990 CAA have proven less 
effective and more expensive than anticipated in 1990 and Congress has subsequently acted to 
change the control measures. See infra notes 469-70 and accompanying text. 
202 Section 107(d)(1)(A) provides, inter alia, that EPA and the state designate as nonattain-
ment: "any area that does not meet (or that contributes to ambient air quality in a nearby area 
that does not meet) the national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard for the 
pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A). 
203 See generally id. § 7511. 
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ment explicitly acknowledges that one area can cause the nonattain-
ment of another, the provision makes no exceptions for an area so 
affected. EPA must thus classify an area as nonattainment for ozone 
even if the area has no sources of ozone or ozone precursors within 
its geographical boundaries or under its legal control through the SIP 
process. In short, the CAA definition can designate an area nonattain-
ment simply because it is the recipient of another area's polluted air.204 
Once designated nonattainment, the area must comply with the full 
panoply of requirements and restrictions that attend this status. For 
example, the CAA obligates a moderate nonattainment area to imple-
ment the control measures enumerated in Section 182(b) even if the 
area does not encompass the actual sources of the pollutant in its 
ambient air.205 Section 182 imposes a regime of control measures that 
escalates by steps depending upon the severity of the area's nonat-
tainment from marginal to extreme.206 With each escalation in the 
severity of nonattainment, the CAA imposes additional mandatory 
control measures that involve increasing cost and complexity. In the-
ory, adoption of the extra control measures will cause the area to 
reach attainment by the specified attainment date.207 
If the actual sources of the pollutant lie outside the boundaries of 
the area, however, the control measures will fail to ameliorate the 
area's nonattainment.208 Assuming that the area has some emissions 
of ozone precursors, certain controls may initially have limited posi-
tive effects. As the control measures limit or eliminate the indigenous 
sources of ozone precursors, additional control measures will be in-
creasingly ineffective to improve ambient air quality.209 N otwithstand-
204 Members of the l04th Congress have noted this critical problem. For example, Michigan's 
Senator Levin described the situation in his state as follows: "[T]hese three counties are not the 
cause of their own or any other area's ozone problem and no matter what these counties do for 
themselves, it is unlikely that they will be able to achieve and stay in attainment." 141 CONGo 
REc. S4589 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
205 42 U.S.C. § 75Ua(b). 
206 [d. 
'lJYl See Waxman, Roadmap, supra note 153, at 1860. 
208 For example, a 1991 study of the Lake Michigan area indicated that air entering the region 
already contained as much as 100 ppb of ozone and thus left little margin for local emissions 
before a NAAQS violation occurs. See Ozone Nonattainment Under the Clean Air Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env't, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and 
Tech., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1994) (statement of Don Theiler, Director, Bureau of Air 
Management, State of Washington) [hereinafter Ozone Hearing]. 
209 EPA has acknowledged that additional controls in areas subject to transport may be 
"futile" and that it is "implicit in the [CAA] that the purpose of control measures is to achieve 
attainment." See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans and Designation of Areas 
for Air Quality Planning Purposes; State of Michigan, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,831, 31,842 (1996) (redes-
ignating Grand Rapids area to attainment) [hereinafter Grand Rapids Redesignation]. 
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ing this result, Section 181(b)(2) mandates an increase in the severity 
level of the area's designated nonattainment classification if the area 
misses an attainment deadline.210 There could, therefore, be scenarios 
in which a state no longer has any ozone precursor emissions yet the 
level of transported ozone obligates that state to enact an ever more 
restrictive set of controls to meet unreachable ambient air goals.211 
Eventually, a state will be unable to implement controls that will 
achieve the necessary reductions to reach the attainment target.212 
When a state can no longer submit a SIP that will demonstrate 
compliance with the ozone NAAQS, it will run afoul of the require-
ments for timely and complete SIP submissions in Section 110. More-
over, Section 110(k)(5) directs EPA to make a "SIP call" at any time 
it finds a state's SIP inadequate to reach attainment and to give the 
state a reasonable period, not to exceed eighteen months, to rectify 
the shortcoming.213 Failure to demonstrate timely attainment or other 
infractions regarding SIP submissions are grounds for EPA to sanc-
tion a state.214 Under Section 179,215 EPA may sanction a noncomplying 
state within its discretion at any time following a finding of noncom-
pliance and must sanction a noncomplying state eighteen months 
following such a finding.216 Even if EPA exercises its discretion not to 
210 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(2). 
211 Midwestern officials have noted the problem of being "bumped up" to a higher category of 
nonattainment simply because the state is downwind from a more polluted area. See Ozone 
Hearing, supra note 208, at 25. 
212 The rural western counties of Michigan provide the quintessential example. These areas 
suffer from significant ozone pollution despite a lack of significant sources of the precursor 
chemicals. The ozone evidently results almost exclusively from transport from the Chicago 
metropolitan area and thus any controls imposed by the state of Michigan will have little, if any, 
result. EPA officials have acknowledged that the CAA requires controls that the Agency knows 
will not improve the area's air quality. See Areas With Transported Ozone May Get To Extend 
Attainment Deadline, Nichols Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 141, at D-12 (July 26, 1994) 
(acknowledging futility of control measures for western Michigan) [hereinafter Areas With 
Transported Ozone]. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 741O(k)(5). 
214 The four triggers are nonsubmittal, incompleteness, substantive unapprovability, and 
nonimplementation of SIPs. Id. § 7509(a). 
215 Section 179(b) includes two mandatory sanctions: (i) suspension of certain federal highway 
funds; and (ii) offset requirements for development that require a two to one ratio of reductions 
for new sources in the nonattainment areas of the state. EPA must impose one of the sanctions 
after 18 months and must impose the other after an additional six months if the state has not 
corrected the deficiency. Id. § 7509(a)-(b). 
216 EPA contends that it may issue sanctions within its discretion under § 1l0(m) for 18 months 
following a finding and must issue sanctions thereafter in accordance with § 179(b). Unlike 
mandatory sanctions, EPA may impose discretionary sanctions statewide under certain circum-
stances and it is not limited to nonattainment areas. See Criteria for Exercising Discretionary 
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impose early penalties because of inequitable transport-related cir-
cumstances, Section 179 explicitly directs EPA to sanction a state 
eighteen months after a finding that its SIP is insufficient to bring an 
area into attainment unless the state has corrected the deficiency.217 
In either scenario, the sanctions mete out harsh punishment for a 
jurisdiction unable to attain because of pollutants transported from 
outside that area.218 
Ultimately, if the state is unable to implement emissions controls 
sufficient to reach attainment, Section 110(c) contemplates that EPA 
shall take over this responsibility and develop a Federal Implemen-
tation Plan (FIP).219 The FIP process strips a state's authority to make 
its own technical, economic, and political decisions regarding pollution 
control within its own bailiwick. In the worst case scenario, where 
there are no ozone precursor sources within the state, EPA can pre-
sumably do little through a FIP either to remedy the problem or to 
affect the state adversely.220 In a more realistic scenario, however, in 
Sanctions Under Title I of the Clean Air Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 1476 (1994); see also Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
217 The prospect of losing federal highway money gets the attention of states otherwise 
unwilling to comply with the CAA. VIrginia's Governor has been openly hostile to EPA and the 
state has sued to have the CAA declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Allen Sues 
U.S. on Air Pollution; Governor Contends States Can Decide How to Regulate Range of Areas, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at B5 (quoting Virginia's Governor as saying "[w]e're not going to 
continue to just be jerked around like serfs"). Virginia will lose approximately $1 billion per year 
in highway funds if the state does not comply with the 1990 CAA. Virginia's Attorney General 
contends that conditioning federal highway funds on compliance with the CAA constitutes a 
10th Amendment violation. See Paul Kemezis, States' Revolt Against EPA Emission Rules is 
Growing, ENV'T WK., Jan. 12, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7721141. Virginia also stands to suffer 
economically if EPA imposes the offset sanction for new sources of emissions. VIrginia's Gover-
nor has been an outspoken advocate for new manufacturing plants outside Richmond in an ozone 
nonattainment area. Imposition of sanctions could make the location and the state as a whole 
less attractive. See Rex Springston, Motorola's Pollution Record Clean; Proposed Plant Poses 
Little Threat to Area, Officials Say, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1995, at AI. Virginia 
lost its constitutional challenge to the sanctions provisions of § 179 in Virginia v. Browner, 80 
F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1996), but is attempting to reassert them in connection with a case still 
pending, Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 95-1163, 95-1177, & 95-1180 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 14, 1995). 
Another federal court has already rejected a similar constitutional challenge by Missouri. See 
Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1336-37 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
218 A number of bills pending in the 104th Congress propose to rectify this problem by placing 
a moratorium on EPA's sanctions authority. See infra Section V (discussing legislative initia-
tives). 
219 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c). 
220 EPA officials have expressed hesitancy to impose FIPs when the Agency cannot reduce 
emissions faster than the states themselves. A number of environmental groups contend that 
EPA is shirking its responsibilities and have filed suit to force the Agency to act. See Environ-
mental Groups Sue EPA Over VOC-Reduction Enforcement, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 118, 
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which a state has some sources of ozone such as its citizens' automo-
biles, the CAA will require EPA to devise controls to reduce ozone 
that the drivers or industry of the state might consider draconian.221 
Inhabitants of the state must then endure not only the control meas-
ures necessary to reach attainment for their own emissions, but also 
extra measures to make up for ozone that wafts in from upwind 
states.222 
Further complications arise because of the conformity rule set forth 
in Section 176(c).223 That Section prohibits the federal government 
from having any involvement in projects that fail to conform with a 
state's SIP. The statute defines "conformity" broadly to indicate that 
a project: (i) must be consistent with the SIP's purpose of reducing 
the number and severity of NAAQS violations and achievement of 
"expeditious attainment;" and (ii) cannot cause new violations, exac-
erbate existing violations, or delay compliance with any required 
reductions or the ultimate attainment deadline.224 One primary pur-
pose of the conformity rule is to "protect the integrity of the imple-
mentation plan by ensuring that its growth projections are not ex-
ceeded without additional measures to counterbalance the excess 
growth."225 
Application of the conformity rule to a nonattainment area requires 
the federal government to scrutinize all projects closely to prevent 
at D-12 (June 19, 1996) (explaining groups' demands that EPA develop FIPs because states 
have failed to submit rate of progress emissions reductions plans). 
221 To date, EPA has only been involved in the development of a FIP for southern California. 
The action and its resulting plan have been unpopular with many Californians. See Wash. Legal 
Found., Legal Opinion Letter, The California Federal Implementation Plan (FIP): EPA's For-
mula For Economic Disaster (July 15, 1994) (describing the FIP as "draconian in its impact and 
impractical in its requirements"). 
222 Members of the l04th Congress have proposed a moratorium on EPA's authority to impose 
FIPs on states with ozone nonattainment violations. See infra Section V (discussing legislative 
initiatives). 
223 Section 176(c) provides, in part: "No department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal 
Government shall engage in, support in any way or provide financial assistance for, license or 
permit, or approve, any activity which does not conform to an implementation plan after it has 
been approved or promulgated under Section [110] ofthis title." 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(I). Pursuant 
to the statute, EPA issued a "Transportation Conformity Rule" and a "General Conformity 
Rule." Criteria and Procedures for Determining Conformity to State or Federal Implementation 
Plans of Transportation Plans, Programs, and Projects Funded or Approved Under Title 23 
U.S.C. or the Federal Transit Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,188 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.93) 
[hereinafter ConfOTmity Criteria]; Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State 
or Federal Implementation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,214 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 6, 
51,93). 
224 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(I)(A}-(B). 
225 ConfOTmity Criteria, supra note 223, at 62,190. 
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further adverse environmental effects.226 In an ozone nonattainment 
area, this may reduce the number and scope offederal projects. Trans-
portation projects in particular will suffer drastic curtailment unless 
they meet stringent standards for conformity. The policy goals behind 
the conformity rule are laudable, but the effects upon areas subject 
to ozone transport may be inequitable and counterproductive. 
For example, a prohibition against a given federal project in a 
downwind area with serious ozone nonattainment but few true 
sources of ozone precursors might adversely affect that area's devel-
opment and economic climate. Ironically, if the upwind area meets the 
NAAQS within its own borders and EPA has not made a finding that 
it significantly contributes to the woes of the downwind area, the 
upwind area may more easily comply with the conformity rule and 
thereby benefit by continued federal projects that may increase trans-
port to the downwind state.227 
The anomalies of the nonattainment and ozone transport provisions 
also impact upwind jurisdictions under the express terms of the eAA. 
The definition of attainment contemplates that if an area contributes 
to nonattainment elsewhere it may thereby be in nonattainment.228 
This definition does not track the language of Section llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) 
which refers more restrictively to "significant" contribution to an-
other jurisdiction. Section llO(k)(5) also obligates EPA to issue a SIP 
call whenever a state's SIP is "substantially inadequate" to mitigate 
the effects oftransport.229 Section llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) provides that EPA 
must review SIPs to insure that they prohibit "any source or other 
type of emissions activity ... which will contribute significantly to 
226 As a result of challenges by environmental groups, Congress clarified the statute to insure 
that the conformity rules apply only to nonattainment areas and maintenance areas. See Na-
tional Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 305(b), 109 Stat. 568,580 
(1995) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7506(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995»; see also Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 454 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
227 The l04th Congress has introduced bills that propose moratoriums on EPA's ability to use 
ozone nonattainment resulting from failure to implement certain control measures as a factor 
in conformity decisions. See, e.g., S. 248, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995). 
228 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A). 
229 Section 1l0(k)(5) provides: 
Whenever the Administrator finds that the applicable implementation plan for any 
area is substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the relevant [NAAQS], to miti-
gate adequately the interstate pollutant transport described in § [176A] or § [184] ... 
or to otherwise comply with any requirement of this chapter, the Administrator shall 
require the State to revise the plan as necessary to correct such inadequacies. 
[d. § 7410(k)(5). 
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nonattainment in, or interference with maintenance by, any other 
State .... "230 
A literal application of these provisions might require EPA to halt 
much of the otherwise lawful emissions activity in an upwind state. 
For example, air crossing the border from state A to state B will have 
some level of ozone even if state A is unquestionably in attainment 
for ozone. It is unclear whether EPA must restrict emissions in state 
A so that the air at the border contains not more than 0.12 ppm of 
ozone, no ozone whatsoever, or any amount in between those ex-
tremes.231 This conundrum has "plagued" EPA for decades.232 
If EPA forces a state to reduce its emissions solely to prevent 
transport, rather than because of any in-state nonattainment, EPA 
will effectively have deprived that state of the increment of emissions 
ostensibly permitted by the NAAQS. Similarly, if EPA forces a state 
to accelerate control measures purely for the benefit of downwind 
states, EPA will have interfered with the upwind state's power to 
select and time implementation of control measures. A stringent en-
forcement of Section 1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) might therefore hold the citi-
zens or industry of an upwind state "hostage" to a downwind state.233 
A failure to comply with an EPA-mandated reduction would subject 
the upwind state to the same gauntlet of escalating statutory controls, 
FIPs, and potential sanctions. 
As a practical matter, many states will be simultaneously both 
upwind and downwind relative to other states. The CAA attempts to 
limit EPA's scrutiny of transport to emissions activity within the state 
itself rather than that from farther upwind.2M Given the complex 
variables at work in the creation of ozone, however, it may be difficult 
for many states to establish that the particular ozone causing down-
wind nonattainment came from farther upwind rather than from their 
own in-state emissions. Thus, if Massachusetts wants to receive relief 
from upwind sources of ozone in New York, it must also be willing to 
extend the same courtesy to downwind receivers of its own ozone 
such as Maine. 
230 [d. § 7410(a)(2)(D). 
231 EPA evidently intends to address the issue of significant contribution on a case-by-case 
basis. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's recent interpretations of 
significant contribution). 
232 See Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County, Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1094 (6th 
Cir.1984). 
233 See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 1982). 
234 The statute refers only to "any source or other type of emissions activity within the state." 
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). 
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States in the Northeast OTR endure additional problems with the 
regime of transport provisions in the CAA. One reason for discontent 
is the blanket application of control measures throughout a state 
without regard to the geographical scope of the nonattainment areas 
within that state.235 The result is that large areas of a state may face 
additional controls and standards that are arguably unnecessary. Crit-
ics complain that this renders an entire state unattractive to economic 
development because of the stringency of the control measures.236 
Inclusion in the Northeast OTR thereby compounds the perceived 
unfairness of the CAA. If any Northeast OTR state or portion thereof 
is in nonattainment because of transport, the entire transport region 
may potentially have to enact additional control measures and suffer 
the economic and other consequences.237 If the sources of the trans-
ported ozone are located outside the borders of the Northeast OTR 
in Ohio or Virginia, the entire Northeast OTR may suffer because of 
the failure of these upwind jurisdictions to curtail emissions.238 This 
has emboldened states to oppose membership in the Northeast 
OTR.239 
2.35 Id. § 7511c(b). 
236 For example, utility industry representatives have complained that they are economically 
disadvantaged if they locate in attainment areas in western Pennsylvania because the entire 
state is treated as nonattainment because it is located in the Northeast OTR. See Clean Air 
Committee Seeks Balance Between Growth, Attaining Air Quality, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 
60, at D-15 (Mar. 30, 1994). 
237 Section 184(c) provides that the Northeast OTR may pursue additional control measures 
"to be applied within all or a part of such transport region if the commission determines such 
measures are necessary to bring any area in such region into attainment." 42 U.S.C. § 7511c. 
238 In Maine's August 1, 1995, § 126 petition to EPA, the Governor claimed that upwind electric 
generation sources in Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia, Illinois, and Kentucky produce 57 times as 
much NOx as comparable Maine sources and that the total NOx emissions of those states is 285 
times as high. If even roughly accurate, these figures reflect the massive amount of ozone influx 
into the Northeast OTR from states not bound by its restrictions. Letter from Angus S. King, 
Jr., Governor, State of Maine, to Carol Browner, Adm'r, EPA 3 (Aug. 1, 1995) (on file with 
author). 
239 Pennsylvania officials have considered complete secession from the Northeast OTR. See 
Aeppel, supra note 56, at AI. Western Pennsylvania's nonattainment results both from its own 
emissions and from ozone transport from Ohio and West Virginia. Border monitors reportedly 
"regularly" show air with 60 to 100 ppb entering Pennsylvania from the west. See Sharon Voas 
& Don Hopey, The Air Condition is Not Cool, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 1995, at AI. 
Pennsylvania industry views the inclusion of the area in the Northeast OTR as unfair because 
it subjects the area to control measures in excess of those required in adjacent states. See Harold 
D. Miller, Pennsylvania Needs Parity With Neighbors in Clean Air Standards, PITT. POST-GA-
ZETTE, July 30, 1995, at E2. Interestingly, those of that viewpoint maintain that western 
Pennsylvania is only in the Northeast OTR because of Philadelphia's nonattainment, yet the 
data evidently establishes that Pittsburgh's air contributes to nonattainment in Philadelphia. 
See Sharon Voas & Don Hopey, supra. 
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Congress knew the potential unfairness raised by ozone transport 
and its legal ramifications on downwind areas with no ability to con-
trol the sources of the pollutant.24o In response, Congress created 
several limited exemptions in the 1990 CAA that provide relief to 
certain nonattainment areas under extenuating circumstances. These 
explicit exemptions exist for: (i) areas suffering from international 
transport; (ii) rural areas without large amounts of emissions; and (iii) 
areas obligated to impose fines on sources. Congress created an analo-
gous limited exemption for an area within an ozone transport region 
to opt out of the region under specified circumstances.241 
The exemption for areas with ozone transport from foreign sources 
appears in Section 179(B).242 Although the definition of nonattainment 
makes no exception for a state suffering from ozone transport from 
an adjoining state, the statute does grant an area special dispensation 
if the source of the pollution is in another country. Congress carved 
out this exception specifically to aid EI Paso, Texas, because it suffers 
from serious ozone transport across the Rio Grande from Mexico.243 
240 Legislators evinced their concern in connection with the regional approach to ozone reduc-
tions. Maine's Senator Mitchell expressed his concern as follows: "I expect the members of the 
[Northeast Ozone Transport] Commission to fairly but vigorously press for pollution control 
measures, particularly in upwind areas, so that downwind areas like Maine will be able to 
achieve cleaner air." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY I, supra note 170, at 789 (statement of Sen. 
Mitchell, Senate debate, Oct. 27, 1990). New Jersey's Senator Lautenberg expressed similar 
sentiments: 
Of particUlar importance to New Jersey is a provision I sponsored with others in the 
Northeast region to stop other States from sending their pollution into our States, 
harming the health of our residents and putting an impossible burden on our industries. 
This program would regulate pollutants transported from upwind States which make 
it impossible to achieve health standards. 
[d. at 1106 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg, Senate debate, Oct. 26, 1990). 
241 EPA has developed a guidance document to implement this provision. See infra note 271 
and accompanying text. 
242 Section 179(B) expressly provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any State that establishes to the satisfac-
tion of the Administrator that, with respect to an ozone nonattainment area in such 
State, such State would have attained the national ambient air quality standard for 
ozone by the applicable attainment date, but for emissions emanating from outside of 
the United States, shall not be subject to Section [181(a)(2) or (5)] of this title or Section 
[185]. 
42 U.S.C. § 7509a. 
243 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IV, supra note 155, at 5741-42 (statement of Sen. Gramm, 
Senate debate, Mar. 9, 1990). Concerning the effects of transport from Juarez, Texas's Senator 
Gramm stated: 
It is unfair to hold El Paso accountable for pollution that is generated in a foreign 
country that they have no control over .... Unless we have a breakthrough dealing 
with Mexico, it is possible that we could do everything in El Paso, including having 
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Congress recognized that Texas had little or no ability to control 
pollution wafting across a jurisdictional border permeable to air. 
Naturally, the Connecticut River provides a frontier as open to ozone 
as the Rio Grande and thus Vermont and New Hampshire arguably 
stand in the same relation as Mexico and Texas. The rationale for the 
distinction is that, unlike the individual states of the United States, 
Mexico is not governed by the CAA and thus Texas cannot influence 
or obtain redress for the pollution.244 There is no comparable blanket 
exemption for downwind states for domestic transport, presumably 
because the emissions of an upwind state are under the control of 
EPA via Section llO(a)(2)(D). Congress evidently recognized the un-
fairness to downwind areas subject to transport, but chose to provide 
leniency only to those that received transport from another nation 
rather than another state. 
Congress created another exemption from arguably inequitable 
effects of the CAA for "rural transport areas."245 Section 182(h) pro-
vides that if EPA determines that a nonattainment area is not within 
or adjacent to a metropolitan statistical area (and is hence "rural") 
and does not "significantly contribute" to the nonattainment of an-
other area, EPA can designate the area a "marginal" nonattainment 
area regardless of the true level of nonattainment.246 The creation of 
this exemption suggests an intent to avoid infliction of harsh legal 
ramifications for areas with few sources of ozone precursors and little 
transport impact upon other areas. The provision does not completely 
exempt the area from the regime of control measures because the 
Id. 
people stop breathing, and we still might not meet the standards that would be set out 
in this bill. 
244 See Air Quality Problems On Border May Take Interrwtional Cooperation, Officials Say, 
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 88, D-16 (May 8,1995). Despite this exemption, air quality officials 
in Texas have striven to improve the air of El Paso through international cooperation and have 
even considered paying for control measures in Juarez to alleviate the regional problems. See 
id. Border disputes over air quality will only increase as Mexico seeks to industrialize its 
economy and maximize free trade with the United States. See, e.g., Tod Robberson, Haze at the 
Border: Flap Over Coal Fired Plant Strains U.S.- Mexican Cooperation, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 
1995, at A25. EPA officials are reportedly considering exerting pressure on Mexico and Canada 
to reduce ozone transport through mechanisms of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
See OTAG May Flex Muscle Outside U.S. Borders, INSIDE OTAG, Aug. 1, 1996. 
245 Members of the 104th Congress have been critical of the rural-urban distinction and have 
proposed that the exemption should extend to all areas, regardless of population, that do not 
contribute to nonattainment elsewhere. See 141 CONGo REC. S4589 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Levin). 
246 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(h). 
44 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:1 
area must still comply with the requirements for a marginal nonat-
tainment area. This indicates an attempt to balance the desire to avoid 
potential unfairness of the transport provisions with a desire to pro-
tect the air quality of the inhabitants. 
Congress created a comparable exemption from economic hard-
ships in situations where the CAA obligates states to impose financial 
penalties upon sources in nonattainment areas. Section 185 provides 
that states with severe and extreme nonattainment areas must im-
pose fines on all major sources in areas that fail to attain by the 
required date.247 The state must continue the fines until the area 
attains the ozone NAAQS.248 Given the potential cost of lingering 
nonattainment, it would be unfair to impose the fines if nonattainment 
resulted from ozone transport. Section 185(e) thus provides a limited 
exemption for areas that would attain but for transport. By definition, 
the exemption is available only to areas that have a population of 
under 200,000 and are thus relatively rural.249 The exemption is also 
applicable only if: (i) the area can demonstrate that it is unable to 
reach attainment "because of ozone or ozone precursors from other 
areas;" and (ii) the area has "met all requirements and implemented 
all measures" applicable under the CAA.250 Again, the exemption 
suggests a desire to mitigate perceived unfairness, but also to protect 
the health of the inhabitants. If the population exceeds 200,000, Con-
gress evidently concluded that sources should pay fines regardless of 
the effects of transport on the area. 
Further evidence of congressional cognizance of potential unfair-
ness in the statutory regime appears in Section 176A.251 The Section 
governs the creation of regional commissions to abate interstate 
transport of pollution from one or more states when it "contributes 
247 [d. § 7511d(e). The provision provides: 
For areas with a total population under 200,000 which fail to attain the standard by 
the applicable attainment date, no sanction under this Section or under any other 
provision of this chapter shall apply if the area can demonstrate, consistent with 
guidance issued by the Administrator, that attainment in the area is prevented because 
of ozone or ozone precursors transported from other areas. The prohibition applies only 
in cases in which the area has met all requirements and implemented all measures 
applicable to that area under this chapter. 
[d. Major sources in severe ozone nonattainment areas emit 25 tons or more per year of VOCs 
and in extreme areas emit only 10 tons or more per year of VOCs. 
248 [d. § 7511d(a). 
249 [d. § 7511d(e). 
250 [d. 
251 42 U.S.C. § 7506a. 
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significantly to a violation of a national ambient air quality standard" 
in another state.252 Section 176A also includes an express escape 
mechanism for states or portions of states if they cannot make a 
significant contribution to the solution of a transport problem.253 
States or portions thereof can secede from a regional transport com-
mission under certain circumstances.254 Thus, an area within a trans-
port region can receive a de facto exemption from an otherwise re-
quired control measure. No such mechanism exists for states or areas 
to opt out of the statutory nonattainment designation under compa-
rable circumstances. By implication, Congress was willing to allow an 
area to avoid control measures imposed by an interstate transport 
commission if the measures would not hasten attainment for the 
region as a whole. Congress was evidently unwilling to allow the same 
leniency for an area classified as nonattainment simply as a result of 
ozone transport.255 
The existence and extent of the exemptions suggest that Congress 
sought to soften the effects of non attainment on areas subject to ozone 
transport. Of course, the exemptions and their scope result from the 
legislative process and presumably reflect political compromises. The 
mere existence of the exemptions is, however, problematic in light of 
the larger scheme of the 1990 CAA. Congress directed EPA not to 
treat certain areas according to the provisions otherwise applicable 
to nonattainment areas.256 By negative implication, Congress did in-
tend EPA to apply the statute strictly to all other downwind areas 
without regard to the source of the ozone causing nonattainment. 
252 [d. 
253 Section 176A(a)(2) provides, inter alia, that EPA may: 
remove any State or portion of a State from the region whenever the Administrator 
has reason to believe that the control of emissions in that State or portion of the State 
pursuant to this Section will not significantly contribute to the attainment of the 
standard in any area in the region. 
[d. § 7506a(2). 
254 EPA has issued guidance concerning the appropriate circumstances. See infra note 270 and 
accompanying text. As a practical matter, states have evidently concluded that opting out is not 
always in their best interest. Maine lawmakers have railed against the Northeast OTC, but 
probably recognize that membership in the regional alliance gives them leverage in Washington 
not otherwise necessarily accorded to a small state. See Clean Air Competition, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, available in WL Bangordn database. 
255 See 42 U.S.C. § 7506a. A bill proposed in the l04th Congress would accomplish this by 
requiring EPA to factor out ozone resulting from transport in attainment determinations. See 
infra Section V (discussing H.R. 581, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995». 
256 An example is nonattainment areas suffering from transport across the Rio Grande. See 
supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. 
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Subtract the international transport areas and qualifying rural trans-
port areas from the list of nonattainment areas, and the remaining 
areas are those that are predominantly urban or adjacent to urban 
areas like those of the Northeast OTR. The absence of exemptions for 
these types of areas suggests that Congress intended EPA to apply 
the statute literally to many transport areas regardless of perceived 
inequities. 
Implementation problems of the 1990 CAA pose a threat to the 
effectiveness of the statute as a whole. The CAA imposes numerous 
obligations upon states to rectify ozone nonattainment. Many of these 
obligations are politically unpopular and have prompted state govern-
ments to oppose control measures Congress explicitly mandated in 
the CAA.257 The severity of ozone nonattainment throughout the 
Northeast OTR and the imminent attainment deadlines have stimu-
lated those states to consider ever more controversial control meas-
ures, such as the OTC LEV program that requires automobile manu-
facturers to sell vehicles with California emission standards 
throughout the northeastern states.258 Dislike of the OTC LEV pro-
gram has engendered growing dissatisfaction with the regional ap-
proach to reducing ozone transport and has emboldened some states 
to sue EPA259 or to threaten to secede from the Northeast OTR.260 The 
glaring illogic of forcing downwind areas to take drastic steps to 
counteract pollutants from upwind jurisdictions invites states to 
adopt a mode of resignation or defiance that may result in further 
delays in improving the nation's air quality.261 
257 For example, critics have been especially vocal about enhanced automobile inspection and 
maintenance and have succeeded in forcing states to halt or suspend implementation of the 
control measure. Popular opposition also extends to reformulated gasoline, carpooling, and 
alternative energy vehicles. See Scott Allen, Maine Drivers Shun Emissions Testing; Voluntary 
Inspections Run Up Against Hostility, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1995, at 29. 
258 After protracted political wrangling and an extensive rulemaking process, EPA granted 
the Northeast OTC's request that it require either the OTC LEV program or an approved 
alternative such as the "49 State Alternative" with which the automotive industry sought to 
supplant the program requested by the majority of the states in the Northeast OTR. aTC LEV 
Final Rule, supra note 58, at 4713. 
259 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 95-1242 (D.C. Cir. filed May 1, 1995) with Virginia v. 
EPA, Nos. 95-1163, 95-1177, & 95-1180 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 14, 1995). The suit by Massachusetts 
alleged that EPA had failed to do enough to reduce ozone transport, whereas the suit by Vrrginia 
alleged that EPA had impinged overly upon its state sovereignty by trying to reduce ozone 
transport. Id.; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text; infra note 410 and accompanying 
text. 
260 See supra note 239 (discussing the latter day "Whiskey Rebellion" in western Pennsylvania 
that has prompted some in that state to seek secession from the Northeast OTR). 
261 Members of the 104th Congress have noted that perceived unfairness derails otherwise 
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IV. EPA EFFORTS TO MODERATE HARSH EFFECTS OF THE 
1990 CAA OZONE TRANSPORT PROVISIONS 
47 
The perceived systemic unfairness of the CAA to downwind states 
has tested the stoicism of northeasterners and brought forth resent-
ment reminiscent of the type that spurred their forebears to unload 
tea into Boston's harbor.262 For example, most states in the Northeast 
OTR have either refused to enact or have repealed state laws to 
implement CAA-mandated centralized automobile inspection and 
maintenance facilities.263 Unhappiness with various mandatory pro-
grams of the 1990 CAA has arisen across the country.264 Northeast 
OTR states are threatening EPA to resolve the problem of transport 
from upwind states or face new litigation based on Sections 110 and 
126.266 EPA has attempted to work within the constraints of the 1990 
CAA to develop flexible policies266 to avoid the harsh effects of the 
useful CAA programs. See, e.g., Maine's Senator Snowe who, for example, stated: "people in 
Maine are understandably reluctant to move forward with expensive and complicated emissions 
reductions measures if a significant amount of the air that accounts for the nonattainment 
classification is transported in from outside state boundaries." 141 CONGo REC. S5604 (daily ed. 
Apr. 24, 1995). 
262 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 257, at 29 (indicating that vehicle emission test center employees 
feared wearing the company logo into the local bar). 
263 See Smog: ME Plan Omits Centralized Tests; Other States Watch, GREENWIRE (American 
Political Network, Inc.), July 21, 1995, at 2; see also John Milne, N.E. States Reject EPA 
Solutions for Ozone; Maine Plan May Get EPA Approval, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 1995, at 22 
(noting that "opposition became fierce as residents discovered that centralized testing can take 
hours and that repair bills for cars that failed could run into the hundreds of dollars"). Congress 
has amended the 1990 CAA to restrict EPA's insistence upon centralized testing. See infra note 
472 and accompanying text. 
264 See, e.g., Rae 'IYson, 'Clean Air': 7b Some, Dirty Words, U.S.A. 'IbDAY, Mar. 10, 1995, at 
SA. The article enumerates grass roots campaigns against reformulated fuel in Wisconsin and 
New Jersey, against emissions testing in Pennsylvania, against employer trip reduction in 
California, and against centralized vehicle inspection in Virginia. Id. In Missouri, the state 
legislature appropriated one dollar to build inspection stations as "an obvious insult to EPA and 
state regulators." See Haw to Clear the Air, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 1, 1995, at 16D. 
266 See John Milne, Maine Blames Massachusetts, Others For Polluting Air, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Aug. 2, 1995, at 20. Governor King put it plainly, stating that "[i]f the EPA is going to hold our 
feet to the fire, we want to make sure it does the same for our neighbors." See Andrew Kekacs, 
Maine Targets Midwest, Polluting States Pressed to Pay, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 2,1995. 
New York has already challenged EPA's exemption of the Chicago area from NOx controls. See 
New York Challenges, supra note 49. An alliance of Pennsylvania business groups has sued EPA 
alleging that the Agency failed to consider the effects of ozone transport from Ohio in its refusal 
to redesignate Pittsburgh (with 17 ozone NAAQS violations in 1995) to attainment and its 
redesignation of the Akron area to attainment. See Pittsburgh Area Group Petitions For 
Redesignation, Clean Air Network Online, July 15, 1996. 
266 See, e.g., Nichols Testimony, supra note 19 (confirming EPA's "commitment to develop 
common sense, flexible approaches ... to help clean up the Nation's air in the most cost-effective 
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statute on areas suffering from transport, but simultaneously to en-
courage continued progress toward alleviation of the underlying 
ozone transport problem.267 Examination of EPA's efforts illustrates 
continuing difficulties with the provisions of the CAA concerning 
ozone transport. 
A. Clarification of "Significant Contribution" 
One means of providing relief to areas subject to transport lies in 
EPA's own interpretation of the term "significant contribution." Sec-
tion 1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) explicitly instructs EPA to reject SIPs unless 
they contain provisions to prohibit in-state emissions that "contribute 
significantly" to air quality violations in other jurisdictions.268 Like its 
predecessors, the 1990 CAA included no express definition of the 
term, and thus the meaning of the provision is unclear.269 EPA has 
attempted to define the contours of Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) to protect 
downwind jurisdictions. 
EPA may be prepared to interpret the term "significant contribu-
tion" more stringently and to apply it to restrict ozone transport. Two 
recent EPA pronouncements illustrate the Agency's interpretation of 
"significant contribution" and demonstrate how the Agency may ap-
ply the statute in future SIP reviews: (i) the final approval of the OTC 
LEV program for the Northeast OTR;270 and (ii) the guidance memo-
randum detailing the conditions for a state or area to opt out of an 
ozone transport region.271 Both Agency actions entailed an implicit 
manner possible"). The environmental community is skeptical. See Interim Policy Would En· 
sure Progress Continues While PM, Ozone Rules Implemented, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 
2244 (Mar. 29, 1996) (quoting one environmentalist as saying: "[W]hen I hear EPA talking about 
flexibility these days, what I hear is relaxing deadlines."). 
267 In a congressional hearing concerning ozone transport in the Lake Michigan region, the 
Chief of Air Toxics and Radiation for EPA Region V stated that EPA intends to grant relief to 
states administratively. See Ozone Hearing, supra note 208, at 10-11 (statement of G. Gulezian). 
Specifically, the Agency representative mentioned EP.Ns plan to devise a policy to aid areas 
subject to overwhelming transport from upwind areas with later attainment dates and a policy 
to ease the burden of attainment demonstration SIPs. Id. The goal of the Agency is to develop 
policies "which will not unreasonably burden states, but will help to achieve attaimnent of the 
air quality standards as expeditiously as practicable nationwide." Id. 
268 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
269 See infra Section II. 
270 See OTC LEV Final Rule, supra note 58. 
271 Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality, Planning, and Standards, 
EPA, to Edward Sullivan, Commissioner, Maine Dept. of Env't Protection (May 25, 1995) 
(discussing Technical Guidance for Removing Areas from the Northeast Ozone Transport Re-
gion) (on file with Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review) [hereinafter Opt·out 
Memorandum]. 
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analysis of whether one area significantly contributes to another and 
reflect the current Agency understanding of that term in Section 
1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Together, the actions suggest that EPA intends to 
read the statute broadly to protect downwind states from ozone trans-
port. 
One articulation of EPA's interpretation appeared in the Agency's 
approval of the OTC LEV program recommendation by the North-
east OTC. Under Section 184(c),272 EPA had to assess whether OTC 
LEV was a "necessary" control measure to allow the Northeast OTR 
states to attain or maintain the ozone NAAQS.273 Section 184(c)(5)274 
incorporates by reference both Section 1l0(a)(2)(D)275 and Section 
1l0(k)(5)276 to indicate that EPA must issue a SIP call for failure to 
contain a new required regional control measure.277 Based upon these 
internal references, EPA reasoned that the necessity analysis of Sec-
tion 184(c) and the "significant contribution" analysis of Section 
1l0(a)(2)(D) are linked.278 One test of a control measure's necessity is 
whether it is essential to eliminate a significant contribution of emis-
sions to other states.279 If the measure is "necessary," absence of the 
measure equates to a failure to prohibit "significant contribution" to 
nonattainment or interference with maintenance.280 At first blush, the 
logic appears circular, but the provisions of the 1990 CAA compel this 
conclusion in the transport context. If EPA determines that a control 
measure is "necessary" to reduce pollutants in downwind states, the 
lack of that control measure by definition contributes significantly to 
the level of the pollutant downwind.281 
Commenters challenged EPA's proposed final rule imposing OTC 
LEV because of EPA's failure to specify more fully the level of trans-
ported emissions that would be "significant."282 The commenters con-
27242 U.S.C. § 7511c. 
273 See OTe LEV Final Rule, supra note 58, at 4716. 
27442 U.S.C. § 7511c. 
275 [d. § 7410. 
276 [d. 
277 Issuance of a SIP call is the mechanism by which EPA initiates action against the state 
and triggers the state's obligation to correct a perceived deficiency in its SIP. See id. 
278 See Clean Air Act: Ozone Transport Commission; Low Emission Vehicle Program for 
Northeast Ozone Transport Region; Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,664, 48,666 (1994) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85) (proposed Sept. 22, 1994) (incorporating by reference Supplemental 




282 See I OZONE TRANSPORT COMMISSION, Low EMISSION VEHICLE PROGRAM FOR THE 
NORTHEAST OZONE TRANSPORT REGION: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS, 25, 26 
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tended that EPA could not impose a control measure unless it could 
prove that failure to have the measure would contribute a particular 
percentage of the pollutant in another state and that this percentage 
exceeded a specific numerical threshold EPA had previously deter-
mined to be significant.283 The commenters cited Section 126 cases as 
proof of EPA's past reliance on numerical thresholds for "significant 
contribution" and went so far as to claim that EPA's prior Section 126 
determinations created a presumption regarding what level is "sig-
nificant. , '284 
EPA rejected the challenge on a number of grounds. First, the 
express language of Section 184, Section 1l0(a)(2)(D), and Section 
1l0(k)(5) do not explicitly obligate EPA to set a specific quantitative 
standard.285 To the contrary, the provisions only contemplate that 
EPA will determine the level in relative terms, i.e., what is significant 
under the given circumstances. EPA reasoned that the determination 
of whether a control measure is "necessary" and would prevent "sig-
nificant contribution" or "interference" thus requires a case-by-case 
analysis. With respect to OTC LEV, EPA concluded that Northeast 
OTR states could not obtain the requisite fifty to seventy-five percent 
reductions of VOCs and NOx needed to reach attainment without the 
proposed control measure, regardless of the precise percentage re-
duction it would provide.286 
EPA also dismissed the notion that prior findings in Section 126 
cases created a presumption regarding what percentage of contribu-
tion constitutes "significant contribution" to transport.287 EPA distin-
guished the Section 126 cases on the obvious grounds that they dealt 
with other pollutants, other types of sources, and other types of 
modeling problems. Given that the determination of contribution re-
quires case-by-case analysis, such prior findings were not dispositive 
of the issue. EPA also went farther, however, and stated that the 
assessment of Section 126 differs fundamentally from that of Section 
184.288 Section 126 allows EPA to determine whether a given percent-
(1994) [hereinafter LEV PROGRAM COMMENTS]. The primary comment challenging the final rule 
on this issue came from the American Automobile Manufacturers Association which opposed 
the OTC LEV program. [d. 
283 [d. at 26. 
284 [d. at 28. 
285 See id. at 27-28. 
286 [d. at 27-28. 
287 See LEV PROGRAM COMMENTS, supra note 282, at 28--29. 
288 [d. at 29-30. 
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age of contribution to another state's nonattainment is significant in 
the abstract. By this approach, for example, if three percent of a 
state's ozone results from transport, it is arguably not significant 
relative to the ninety-seven percent from in-state sources.289 Under 
Section 184, EPA argued that it must determine whether a proposed 
control measure is "necessary" to achieve the total reductions needed 
to reach attainment. Viewed in this light, even a one percent reduction 
in emissions might be necessary and, thus, significant in the absence 
of other available control measures.290 • 
EPA's explanation stopped short of providing an express definition 
of "significant contribution" of general applicability in the transport 
context. The Agency noted, however, that the necessity test at least 
delineates one type of "significant contribution" under Section 
llO(a)(2)(D).291 EPA's final rule on OTC LEV indicates that one means 
of determining what is "significant contribution" is to assess whether 
a given reduction of contribution will aid attainment or maintenance. 
This approach is diametrically opposed to the former EPA analysis 
under Section 126 that looked primarily at the relative percentage of 
pollution from in-state sources and out-of-state sources to weigh the 
significance of the transported pollutant.292 
If EPA follows the precedent of OTC LEV in SIP reviews under 
Section llO(a)(2)(D), EPA could examine the availability of practica-
ble emission reductions and assess whether elimination of transport 
would make attainment or maintenance more likely instead of requir-
ing that the transport be the predominant cause of pollution.293 This 
could lower the percentage of a pollutant necessary to establish sig-
nificant contribution and remove the emphasis from the relative per-
centage of ozone produced by in-state versus out-of-state sources. By 
altering its administrative interpretation of the term "significant con-
tribution," EPA could use Section llO(a)(2)(D) and even Section 126 
more effectively to stop ozone transport. 
289 This was the scenario faced by EPA in the context of sulphur dioxide transport from 
Indiana to Kentucky. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
290 LEV PROGRAM COMMENTS, supra note 282, at 30. 
291 [d. at 28. 
292 See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing § 126). 
293 One might quibble that § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) does not explicitly include the "necessity" test, 
but as EPA reasoned in its response to comments, § 184 at least establishes necessity as one 
means of defining a significant contribution, as evidenced by its inclusion in § 184 with a cross 
reference to § 110. See LEV PROGRAM COMMENTS, supra note 282, at 28. 
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EPA has also signaled the possibility of a more protective adminis-
trative interpretation of "significant contribution" in another context 
involving ozone and the Northeast OTR. EPA issued a guidance 
memorandum that detailed the conditions under which a state may 
opt out of the Northeast OTR and thereby avoid its required control 
measures.294 The Agency developed the policy at the behest of Maine, 
but indicated that other members of the Northeast OTR have ex-
pressed similar interest.295 The statutory authority for opting out of a 
transport region appears in Section 176A.296 That provision permits 
EPA to excuse areas or states that do "not significantly contribute to 
the attainment of the standard in any area in the [transport] re-
gion."297 
EPA's policy requires states to submit evidence to support a two-
step analysis. The first step entails state submission of modeling to 
establish whether control of ozone precursors in the proposed opt-out 
area "contributes to attainment in another State in the OTR."298 The 
memorandum details the precise multi-level, multi-event modeling 
EPA expects from the state to establish a right to exemption.299 The 
required modeling is rigorous and EPA's scrutiny of the results will 
evidently be more SO.300 The analysis does not weigh what percentage 
of pollutant the area contributes to a nonattainment area.30l Instead, 
the analysis is whether the area contributes any pollutant to such an 
294 Opt-out Memorandum, supra note 271. 
295 Id. Maine would presumably seek exemption for some or all of the state on the theory that 
it only contributes ozone to Canada and thus has a prima facie case for opting out of the 
Northeast OTR. The right to pollute other nations is not absolute, however, and EPA may 
prohibit it under § 115. See 42 U.S.C. § 7415. Maine's Governor has signed state legislation 
calling for the removal of all but three counties from the Northeast OTR. See Maine Legislature 
Finishes 1995 Session, Passes Air Bills, Lifts Ban on Six-Pack Rings, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 
26, at 570 (July 14, 1995). 
296 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(a). 
297 Id. 
298 Opt-out Memorandum, supra note 271, app. at 2. 
299 Id. app. at 2-4. 
300 Id. The executive director of the Northeast OTC has indicated that the policy provides 
"really tough tests" for an area to opt out, echoing EPA's own caution in the Opt-out Memoran-
dum that prior studies have already established the need for regional control measures. See 
Two-Part Test Would Be Required For Areas Seeking to Leave Transport Region, EPA Says, 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 274 (June 2,1995). 
301 The guidance memorandum states that: "If none of the trajectories [of ozone plumes] 
traverse another OTR State within 100 kilometers of a site having observed exceedences and 
within [plus or minus] three hours of the time of the observed exceedence, the trajectory 
analysis would support removing the area in question from the OTR." Opt-out Memorandum, 
supra note 271, app. at 4. 
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area during a violation of the ozone N AAQS. The implication is that 
if an area's continued use of control measures will prevent any contri-
bution to a NAAQS violation in another area, then exemption from 
the Northeast OTR is inappropriate.302 
Similarly, in the second step of the analysis the petitioning state 
must submit evidence to EPA concerning vehicle migration across 
state or area lines.303 The state must establish that failure to have 
otherwise required control measures will not make these commuters 
exporters of pollution to other jurisdictions.304 Although the guidance 
memorandum does not mandate any particular methodology for meet-
ing this second prong of the test, the implication is that if there are 
commuters crossing state lines, the petitioning state has a higher 
burden of proof to justify the exemption from the Northeast OTR.305 
EPA's own succinct summary of the opt-out policy is that states 
must demonstrate through both steps of the analysis that retention 
of control measures in the proposed opt-out area "would not contrib-
ute to attainment elsewhere in the OTR."306 The opt-out policy thus 
arguably imposes a higher burden of proof than the CAA because it 
does not track the language of Section 176A which provides that the 
proposed opt-out area cannot "significantly contribute" to attainment 
elsewhere.307 Presumably, EPA will apply the policy consistently with 
the statutory language and thus EPA intends the policy merely as a 
starting point for states to establish a prima facie case for exclusion 
from the Northeast OTR. Read literally, however, the memorandum 
suggests that the Agency plans to restrict the ability of states or 
areas to opt out of the Northeast OTR by raising the burden of proof. 
It will evidently do so, in part, by interpreting a state's "significant 
contribution" to attainment as a relatively small contribution to at-
tainment. In effect, the agency has at least created a presumption that 
302 Significantly, the policy only addresses downwind areas that have actual violations of the 
NAAQS. Presumably, nothing would bar states or areas that are upwind of areas without 
violations from leaving the Northeast OTR. This is consistent with the language of 
§ llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) that only requires prohibition of significant contribution to nonattainment or 
interference with maintenance. Whether it would allow this same conclusion where it would 
interfere with PSD areas is unclear. See 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
303 See Opt-out Merrwrandum, supra note 271, app. at 2. 
304 [d. 
305 The memorandum does not address the particulars of the modeling, but does state that the 
state must account for the change in emissions and how this would "contribute" to the attain-
ment or nonattainment of adjacent jurisdictions. [d. 
306 [d. app. at 4. 
307 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(a)(2). 
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any exacerbation of downwind nonattainment will disqualify an area 
from opting out of the Northeast OTR. In short, any contribution may 
be "significant contribution" under the proper circumstances. 
Taken together, EPA's recent actions may clarify the agency's cur-
rent interpretation of "significant contribution" in Section 
1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).308 In each action, EPA has explicitly or implicitly 
declined to follow the approach of the Section 126 cases and has 
thereby created a standard potentially more protective of downwind 
jurisdictions.309 Neither action fully illuminates how the Agency will 
decide every instance of transport contribution, but both reflect an 
intent to impose a higher standard. This position is consistent with 
the changes in the 1990 CAA that imposed more stringent standards 
in the review of SIPs for ozone transport impacts.310 It is also consis-
tent with the evolution of EPA's more active intervention to prohibit 
transport. Unfortunately, the EPA administrative interpretations of 
Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) shed little light on how the Agency should resolve 
the underlying questions of interstate equity to allocate emissions 
reductions between upwind and downwind jurisdictions. 
It is relatively easy to find that a small percentage of contribution 
from an upwind state is significant. It is relatively difficult to force 
the upwind state to restrict its emissions when that may cripple its 
economy and enrage its citizens and politicians. While it is preferable 
to allow EPA to make such determinations on a case-by-case basis 
rather than by adherence to an inflexible statutory rule, the continued 
avoidance of the underlying issue will do little to calm either upwind 
or downwind state concerns. It is likely, however, that the courts will 
examine this question if EPA applies its recent interpretation of 
"significant contribution" in SIP reviews and states or environmental 
groups oppose the agency's conclusions.311 
Judicial review of EPA's interpretation of the "significant contribu-
tion" language of Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) will likely result in confirmation 
of the agency reading. It is not logic that compels this conclusion, but 
rather the standard of review and deference courts accord agency 
interpretations generally. Courts review the agency reading of a stat-
808 See id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
309 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
311 EPA's application of the "necessity" standard of § 184 and the "significant contribution" 
standard of § 110(a)(2)(D) is among the issues raised by Virginia in its pending challenge against 
EPA attacking the OTC LEV Final Rule. See VIrginia v. EPA, Nos. 95-1163, 95-1177, & 95-1180 
(D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 14, 1995). 
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ute according to the framework the United States Supreme Court 
enunciated in Chevron USA v. EPA and its progeny.312 Application of 
this standard to EPA's current interpretation of "significant contribu-
tion" should uphold the agency's reading of the statute. The CAA does 
not define the term explicitly. The statutory scheme and legislative 
history shed little direct light on the meaning of the phrase. If any-
thing, the inclusion of the term in the 1990 CAA reflects congressional 
intent to incorporate the agency interpretation of the term in the 
earlier Section 126 cases. EPA's interpretation of the term has histori-
cally received judicial deference and will likely continue to do SO.313 
EPA's interpretation of the term "significant contribution" in Sec-
tion 1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) could provide relief to downwind jurisdictions. 
If the agency adopts a more restrictive definition in SIP reviews than 
in the past, it will reduce the amount of ozone transport to downwind 
states. This reduction of the actual level of transport will go far 
toward permitting the downwind states either to attain or fail to 
attain based upon their own efforts to reduce emissions. Adoption of 
control measures commensurate with in-state emissions will make 
enactment of the control measures less politically charged and more 
defensible as a necessary sacrifice applicable to all states equitably. 
As a collateral benefit, a stricter standard will eliminate transport as 
a disingenuous excuse for states to avoid control measures necessary 
to reduce in-state emissions. 
B. Extension of Attainment Deadlines 
for "Overwhelming" Transport 
EPA has also attempted to aid states subject to substantial ozone 
transport by adjusting attainment dates administratively under cer-
312 Under this test, a court looks first to whether the statutory language is clear and unambi-
guous. See Chevron, Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). If so, the court merely determines whether the agency interpretation comports with the 
plain meaning of the statute. See id. If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, the court 
may look beyond the language to the statutory scheme and legislative history to determine 
whether the agency's interpretation reflects congressional intent and is therefore a permissible 
interpretation. See id. at 843-45. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has recently applied this approach to EPA's conformity regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the 1990 CAA. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 458-60 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). In upholding the Agency's interpretation, the court noted that even if the 
challenger's reading of the statute was perfectly reasonable, the court must still defer to a 
reasonable reading of the statute by EPA. [d. at 458. 
313 The District of Columbia Circuit has vetted the Agency's interpretation of the terms 
"contribute to" in the context of its conformity rule and the statutory requirement that a specific 
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tain limited circumstances. A particularly knotty problem has arisen 
because of the staggered attainment dates Congress inserted into the 
1990 CAA.314 Section 181 provides for differing attainment dates de-
pending upon the severity of an area's ozone nonattainment.315 The 
statute permits areas with more ozone pollution longer periods to 
reach attainment.316 The statute also directs areas within each clas-
sification of nonattainment to enact enumerated control measures.317 
In general, states in each category of nonattainment must enact the 
control measures required for the less polluted tiers of nonattainment 
areas, plus additional stipulated control measures.31B This hierarchical 
regime would appear to treat all areas objectively based upon the 
relative amount of pollutants within each state and to allow states to 
enact appropriate control measures within a statutorily allotted time. 
The staggered attainment dates, however, will wreak havoc upon 
states subject to ozone transport from other jurisdictions.319 
A hypothetical example illustrates the dilemma. Assume that Area 
A has a "severe" ozone nonattainment problem. The CAA explicitly 
allows this area until the year 2007 to reach attainment. Assume that 
Area B has a "serious" ozone nonattainment problem. The statute 
allows Area B until 1999 to comply with the ozone NAAQS. Area A 
is directly upwind from Area B and contributes to Area B's nonattain-
ment via ozone transport. Based solely upon the ambient level of 
transportation plan "contributes to annual emissions reductions." Environmental Defense 
Fund, 82 F.3d at 451Hi9. The court noted that the statute did not define the term and thereby 
created ambiguity as to the level constituting a contribution. See id. at 459. The court never-
theless upheld the Agency's interpretation as reasonable even though its reading of contribu-
tions to emissions reductions could mean no reductions whatsoever. See id. at 460. 
314 Congress was concerned that states had not made adequate progress toward reducing 
ozone pollution and sought to discourage dilatory tactics by setting explicit deadlines for 
improvement. See Waxman, Overview, supra note 153, at 1742-46. 
315 The dates for attainment are as follows: (i) moderate areas have until 1996; (ii) serious areas 
have until 1999; (iii) severe areas have until 2005, or in some cases until 2007; and (iv) extreme 
areas have until 2010. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)-(2). 
316 The congressional rationale for this approach was that areas with more serious nonattain-
ment would need longer periods to comply and that such areas should seek more aggressively 
to reach attainment. See id.; Waxman, Overview, supra note 153, at 1758-60. 
317 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b). 
318 Thus, for example, a state with a moderate ozone nonattainment area must enact control 
measures required for marginal nonattainment areas plus additional control measures specified 
in the statute for moderate areas. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a}-(b). A state with a serious ozone 
nonattainment area must impose controls appropriate for marginal and moderate areas plus 
those measures designated for serious areas and so on. See id. § 7511a(a}-(c). 
319 See, e.g., 141 CONGo REC. 84589-90 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin 
describing how western Michigan's moderate ozone nonattainment areas have no hope to ever 
attain because of transport from more severely polluted areas). 
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ozone, EPA must treat Area B as nonattainment even if Area B has 
taken all steps required by the CAA.320 By 1999, if not before for 
failure to demonstrate attainment, the CAA will require EPA to 
sanction Area B. 321 
In theory, EPA can use Section llO(a)(2)(D) to force Area A to 
alleviate the transport problem by requiring its SIP to contain provi-
sions to prohibit sources from contributing significantly to nonattain-
ment in Area B.322 Unfortunately, if EPA forces Area A to enact 
additional control measures and reduce its ozone precursor emissions 
early for the sake of Area B, EPA will have denied Area A the 
additional time and other protections Congress explicitly afforded 
Area A in Section 181.323 Area B's only direct recourse would be to 
seek Area Ns voluntary cooperation. In a region with significant 
transport over numerous jurisdictions with varying attainment dates 
as in the Northeast OTR, the enforcement problems multiply geomet-
rically. 
In response to this anomalous result, EPA has considered selective 
postponement of attainment deadlines to afford relief to downwind 
areas that suffer from ozone transport.324 EPA devised a special policy 
applicable to areas affected by "overwhelming transport" from up-
wind areas with more serious nonattainment and hence later attain-
ment dates.325 The guidance allows a downwind nonattainment area 
to assume the later attainment date of an upwind area under certain 
conditions.326 EPA openly acknowledged that it intended to allow 
states to ''bump up" to a later nonattainment category's attainment 
320 42 u.S.C. § 7511a(c)-(d). This scenario is no hyperbolic hypothetical. Michigan's Governor 
claims that western Michigan cannot attain by its 1996 deadline because the Chicago area with 
its 2007 deadline contributes 90% of the ozone in the Michigan area. See Wendy Koch, Gov. 
Engler Still Wants Moratorium on Clean Air Rules, GANNETI' NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 9, 1995. 
321 See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a)-(b). See also supra note 215 for general discussion. 
322 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). See also supra note 177 for general discussion. 
323 EPA has noted this statutory inconsistency. See Proposed Rulemaking on Ozone Transport 
Commission; Emission Vehicle Program for the Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 21,720, 21,729 n. 17 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51) (remarking that the restriction 
of upwind emissions would be "at odds with" the program of graduated attainment dates and 
controls). 
324 See Areas With Transported Ozone, supra note 212. 
325 Memorandum from Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Adm'r for Air and Radiation to Regional 
Air Div. Directors Regarding Ozone Attainment Dates for Areas Affected by Overwhelming 
Transport (Sept. 1, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Overwhelming Transport Memoran-
dum]. 
326 [d. app. at 1. The policy is applicable not only between two states but also between two 
areas within the same state. [d. app. at 5. 
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date without having to adopt the mandatory control measures of the 
higher category.327 
To establish its status as an area with overwhelming transport, the 
state must demonstrate through EPA-approved modeling that it 
would attain the NAAQS by its own original attainment date ''but 
for" the overwhelming amount of ozone from an identified upwind 
area with a later attainment date.328 Importantly, the policy explicitly 
states that an area may have to adopt more emissions control meas-
ures than otherwise required under the statute in order to satisfy this 
''but for" test.329 Thereafter, the state must submit a SIP revision that 
includes: (i) adoption of all mandatory control measures for its original 
nonattainment classification; (ii) rate of progress requirements consis-
tent with its original attainment date; (iii) a demonstration that the 
area can attain by the new attainment date; and (iv) modeling analysis 
establishing that the area could not adopt any "practicable" additional 
control measures to reach attainment sooner.330 With regard to the 
latter point, the memorandum indicates that EPA might require a 
state to enact additional control measures as part of any agreement 
to extend the attainment date if such measures are practicable.331 
The EPA policy also requires the active participation of the upwind 
jurisdiction in this process. The upwind area must submit to EPA 
documentation to establish: (i) its adoption of all mandatory control 
measures for a nonattainment area of its classification; (ii) a demon-
stration that the area will meet its own attainment date; and (iii) 
modeling analysis of whether the downwind jurisdiction can attain 
prior to the upwind area's attainment date.332 The policy is less clear, 
however, about whether the upwind area must take steps above and 
327 See Areas With 'I'ransported Ozone, supra note 212. 
328 See Overwhelming 'I'ransport Memorandum, supa note 325, app. at 1,2,5. The state must 
show that the transport is overwhelming by running alternative modeling scenarios assuming 
boundary conditions both before and after the attainment date of the upwind jurisdiction. If the 
first analysis does not demonstrate attainment, there may be overwhelming transport. If the 
second analysis assuming border conditions after the date of the upwind jurisdiction's attain-
ment deadline does not show attainment, then there is overwhelming transport from the upwind 
state. If after the second analysis the downwind state still cannot attain it indicates that the 
downwind state has internal sources that preclude attainment. See id. app. at 5. 
329 See id. app. at 2. 
830 [d. app. at 2, 3. 
331 [d. app. at 3. 
332 [d. The requirement that the upwind state must provide modeling on the downwind state 
will presumably provide· a check on abuse of the policy as the upwind state will have an interest 
in demonstrating that the downwind state can comply without modification of the upwind state's 
control measures. See id. 
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beyond those mandated by Section 181 in order to aid the attainment 
of a downwind jurisdiction.333 The memorandum states that an upwind 
area "is not obliged to accelerate reductions" if the acceleration would 
be "clearly impracticable."334 By negative implication, this suggests 
that EPA might force upwind jurisdictions to accelerate some control 
measures for the benefit of downwind areas regardless of the osten-
sibly immutable attainment deadlines and control measure stipula-
tions of Section 181.335 
EPA's Overwhelming Transport Memorandum leaves to the SIP 
process the precise determination of whether either adoption of an 
additional control measure by a downwind area or acceleration of a 
control measure by an upwind area is "practicable."336 The definition 
of practicability is, thus, of great import. In the case of downwind 
jurisdictions seeking an extension, the memorandum indicates that 
the state must "at a minimum" analyze the impact of the adoption of 
the mandatory control measures under the eAA for the next higher 
level of nonattainment.337 For upwind states seeking to avoid accel-
eration of control measures, the memorandum suggests a number of 
things that are clearly impracticable: (i) imposition of federal control 
measures when it would be impracticable for the state to enact state 
rules to implement the policy earlier; (ii) imposition of control meas-
ures that require long preparation that states could not have begun 
earlier; and (iii) imposition of any other measure that the state estab-
lishes as impracticable because of "excessive economic burdens" or 
for "technological" reasons.338 
333 See Overwhelming Transport Memorandum, supra note 325, app. at 3. The policy indicates 
that upwind states "may have to implement additional controls," but then describes the proce-
dure to avoid such controls. Id. 
334 Id. app. at 3. The entire provision states that: 
Id. 
The upwind area is not obliged to accelerate reductions in its area when the [SIP] 
demonstration shows that such acceleration would be clearly impracticable in order to 
allow the downwind area to attain by the date generally applicable for the area's 
classification, or earlier than the selected new attainment date for the downwind area. 
335 See id. This inference is consistent with EP.Ns policy in other situations such as its guidance 
for SIP attainment demonstrations. See Memorandum Regarding Ozone Attainment Demon-
strations, from Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Adm'r for Air and Radiation, to Regional Adm'rs, 
Regions I-X, at 1 (Mar. 2, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter SIP Derrwnstration Merrw-
randum]. 
336 Id. app. at 3-4. The upwind area's SIP must contain a demonstration of attainment includ-
ing analysis of measures to allow the downwind area to attain. Failure to include this analysis 
risks an EPA finding of an incomplete submittal or disapproval of the SIP. Id. app. at 3. 
837Id. at 2-3. 
838 Overwhelming Transport Memorandum, supra note 325, at 4. 
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The elasticity of these definitions probably allows EPA maximum 
maneuvering room to reach negotiated settlements between states. 
Despite the ambiguity as to what EPA will deem impracticable in each 
SIP review process, EPA has signaled that it may require more of 
both downwind and upwind jurisdictions as part of any attainment 
deadline extension. The converse is also true, however, in that EPA's 
policy at least contemplates extensions without any additional control 
measures in either jurisdiction. 
Anticipating challenges to its policy, EPA preemptively included its 
legal rationale. First, EPA grounded the policy on its privilege to 
interpret ambiguous statutory provisions.339 The staggered attain-
ment dates in Section 181 stipulate the timeframe for attainment and 
the control measures for each classification of ozone nonattainment 
area.340 Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), however, instructs EPA to approve 
only SIPs that prohibit emissions that contribute significantly to 
nonattainment in other jurisdictions. This latter Section further obli-
gates EPA to enforce its application "consistent with the provisions 
of [title I]," thereby emphasizing that EPA must observe other statu-
tory limitations on that power such as those in Section 181.341 EPA 
considers these provisions to be contradictory because Section 181 
appears to guaranty upwind nonattainment areas the statutory time 
limit to reach attainment and to stipulate the required control meas-
ures, whereas Section 110 purports to give EPA power to supersede 
that guaranty.342 In light of this apparent conflict in the statutory 
language, EPA chose to exercise its authority to interpret or other-
wise harmonize ambiguous statutory language in accordance with the 
Chevron test. EPA concluded that Congress could not have intended 
EPA to negate the graduated attainment date schedule.343 
Assuming that the attainment date of an upwind area must be 
inviolate, EPA then reasoned that it would be unjust to punish a 
downwind jurisdiction for failure to attain if that failure unquestion-
339 See id. at 5-6. 
340 42 V.S.C. § 7511(a). 
341 See 42 V.S.C. § 7410. 
342 Overwhelming Transport Memorandum, supra note 325, app. at 2, 5. The official legislative 
history does not completely support the conclusion that the staggered attainment dates are 
guaranteed without limitation. A key House of Representatives report characterized the dates 
as "outside limits" and stated that the "objective is to achieve the standard as early as possible 
with effective and enforceable measures and without gaming by the States, industry, and 
others." H.R. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1990), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY II, supra note 45, at 3253. 
343 Overwhelming Transport Memorandum, supra note 325, app. at 6. 
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ably resulted from transport from the upwind area.344 EPA inferred 
that Congress could not have intended that result from the interplay 
of Section 181 and Section llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). EPA's guidance memo-
randum does not elaborate upon its analysis and merely states that it 
would be an "absurd" result.345 This oblique reference presumably 
relates to the legal principle of absurd results that prevents an agency 
from enforcing a statute in an illogical way.346 The principle has com-
mon sense appeal, but courts have been hesitant to use it except when 
the result of an interpretation is patently absurd in order to avoid the 
risk of the court finding absurdity where the legislature saw ration-
ality.347 
Faced with a dilemma, EPA interpreted the CAA to allow exten-
sion of attainment dates for the downwind jurisdiction to avoid pun-
ishing either upwind or downwind states in situations involving over-
whelming ozone transport. Regardless of the Agency's effort to 
harmonize arguably conflicting provisions, environmental groups 
have sued the Agency alleging that the policy flagrantly violates the 
CAA.348 The environmental groups contend that the language of the 
CAA does not provide EPA with authority to extend attainment 
dates in this fashion based upon the excuse of overwhelming trans-
port.349 
The challenge to EPA's Overwhelming Transport Memorandum is 
well founded. Nothing in the CAA explicitly permits EPA to allow 
downwind jurisdictions to assume the attainment deadline of an up-
wind jurisdiction. To the contrary, the CAA already contains two 
explicit provisions allowing extensions that are inconsistent with 
344 [d. 
345 The precise explanation is that "it would be an odd or even absurd result for downwind 
areas unable to attain due to transport to be penalized for failure to address a problem that is 
beyond their ability to control." [d. 
346 See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.07 
(5th ed. 1992). Courts have held that a literal interpretation of a statute is inappropriate when 
it would lead to absurd results, i.e., results clearly contrary to legislative intent. See id. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently utilized this 
principle to uphold an EPA interpretation of the 1990 CAA stating that because a ''literal 
reading" of the statute would "actually frustrate the congressional intent supporting it," the 
court would defer to EPA's reasonable interpretation consistent with that intent. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
347 SINGER, supra note 346, § 46.07. The risk lies in abuse of the principle when the court 
simply disagrees with the logic of what the legislature intended to do. [d. 
348 See Conservation Law Found. v. EPA, No. 94-1692 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1994). 
349 Petitioners' Motion For Expedited Review at 5-8, Conservation Law Found. v. EPA, No. 
94-1692 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1994). 
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EPA's policy. Section 181(a)(5) permits EPA to issue up to two one-
year extensions of an area's attainment date if the area has fully 
complied with its approved SIP and there has not been more than one 
violation of the ozone NAAQS in the preceding year.350 EPA's over-
whelming transport policy potentially extends the attainment date 
beyond the extensions Congress explicitly created and does not re-
strict it to areas that have only limited NAAQS violations. 
Similarly, EPA's overwhelming transport policy conflicts with the 
express provisions of Section 181(b) concerning the reclassification of 
an area that fails to attain by its statutory deadline. For such an area, 
the statute requires a reclassification by operation of law to the higher 
of: (i) the next tier of nonattainment; or (ii) the tier reflecting the true 
degree of nonattainment.351 The statute also provides for voluntary 
reclassification at the request of the state to a higher classification.352 
In neither instance, however, does the provision allow the area to 
receive special dispensation to avoid adherence to the schedule of 
mandatory control measures for each classification of ozone nonattain-
ment.353 In this important regard, EPA's Overwhelming Transport 
Memorandum diverges from the statutory scheme set forth in the 
1990 CAA by potentially extending an attainment date without re-
quiring the stipulated control measures for that level of nonattain-
ment. Whatever the fairness arguments in favor of EPA's overwhelm-
ing transport policy, it violates a cardinal rule of statutory 
interpretation, viz., that an agency should read a statute so as to give 
effect to all of its provisions.354 
350 Section 181(a)(5) provides: 
Upon application by any State, the Administrator may extend for 1 additional year 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Extension Year") the date specified in table 1 of 
[§ 181(a)(I)] if-
(A) the State has complied with all requirements and commitments pertaining to the 
area in the applicable implementation plan, and 
(B) no more than 1 exceedence of the national ambient air quality standard level for 
ozone has occurred in the area in the year preceding the Extension Year. 
No more that 2 one-year extensions may be issued under this paragraph for a single 
nonattainment area. 
42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(5). 
351 [d. § 7511(b)(2)(A). 
352 [d. § 7511(b)(3). 
353 Lest there be any misconstruction of the statutory language, the available legislative 
history confirms that Congress intended reclassified areas to meet the requirements of the 
higher category of nonattainment and explicitly denied "adjustments" of deadlines. See H.R. 
REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 232-33, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY II, supra note 
45, at 3256--57. 
354 See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (citing the "well 
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EPA's Overwhelming Transport Memorandum could provide relief 
to downwind jurisdictions if it survives judicial challenge. By allowing 
states to benefit by the later attainment dates of more seriously 
polluted upwind states, the downwind states will have a more realistic 
chance to attain and can avoid more drastic control measures only 
necessary because of ozone transport into their jurisdictions.355 The 
policy would thus allow EPA flexibility to ameliorate perceived in-
equities under the CAA administratively in the appropriate circum-
stances rather than allowing a wholesale extension to all states, in-
cluding those that may have failed to attain in bad faith. 
C. Adoption of an Eighty Percent Rule 
for SIP Submittal Acceptance 
EPA has also striven to aid states subject to transport by adminis-
tratively softening some of the requirements and deadlines ofthe 1990 
CAA. One key requirement of the CAA is for the submission of SIP 
revisions with attainment demonstrations, i.e., proof that the control 
measures in place will reduce emissions and allow the state to attain 
the ozone NAAQS by the applicable statutory deadline. This SIP 
submission must include: (i) an attainment demonstration with mod-
eling to show attainment by the applicable deadline; (ii) a rate of 
progress plan to reflect a three percent reduction in ozone precursors 
for each three-year period until the attainment date; and (iii) evidence 
that the state has already enacted statutes to implement the control 
measures necessary to implement (i) and (ii). The deadline for the 
submission of attainment SIPs was November, 1994, for serious, se-
settled" rule that an agency is to interpret a statute to give effect to all provisions where 
possible). 
355 EPA has not yet employed the policy to extend an attainment deadline, probably because 
many of the relevant attainment deadlines are yet to occur. The policy has arisen obliquely in 
other contexts. In connection with the redesignation to attainment of certain counties in Wis-
consin, the state had alleged that the area suffered from overwhelming transport. Because the 
monitors for the area in fact showed no violation for 1992-94, EPA did not have to reach the 
issue of a violation caused by overwhelming transport and its effect upon redesignation. See 
Final Rule, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans and Designation of Areas for 
Air Quality Planning Purposes; State of Wisconsin, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,668, 43,672-73 (1996) 
[hereinafter Wisconsin Redesignationl. In a redesignation of an area in Michigan, however, EPA 
considered evidence that the area itself contributed ozone to a nonattainment area in Indiana 
beset by overwhelming transport. EPA found the modeling inconclusive to deny the redesigna-
tion, but retained the right to issue a later finding that the Michigan area's SIP violated 
§ 1l0(a)(2)(D) and to require additional control measures to stop transport if subsequent infor-
mation established the impact of transport. See Grand Rapids Redesignation, supra note 209, 
at 31,841. 
64 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:1 
vere, and extreme ozone nonattainment areas.356 Many jurisdictions 
had difficulty in meeting the deadline.357 
Theoretically, all states should have been able to submit a SIP to 
demonstrate appropriate ozone precursor reductions by the statutory 
deadline. Unfortunately, because of difficulties in data collection for 
the preliminary emissions inventory and calculation of the emissions 
baseline, most states were unable to comply in a timely fashion.358 
Ozone transport exacerbated the modeling and data collection prob-
lems for states attempting to devise attainment demonstrations. The 
time and resources necessary to obtain pollutant modeling on a larger 
geographic scale have made compliance more daunting than EPA 
originally contemplated.359 Moreover, states were uncertain how EPA 
would treat upwind and downwind jurisdictions and whether EPA 
would require additional control measures of either jurisdiction in 
accordance with Section 1l0(a)(2)(D), or merely enforce the schedule 
of control measures in Section 18l,360 
The statutory deadlines of the 1990 CAA are specific and intention-
ally aggressive to encourage technological development.361 The dead-
lines are firm unless the statute explicitly provides authority for EPA 
to modify them.362 Not only must states actually meet the NAAQS for 
ozone by the ultimate attainment dates in Section 181, but they must 
also comply with a regime of interim SIP submissions and "milestone" 
reductions of ozone precursors at specific intervals prior to the final 
attainment date.363 The inability of states to comply with the deadline 
356 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(AHB), (DHE). 
357 See SIP Demonstrations Memorandum, supra note 335, at 1. 
358 EPA acknowledged that technical difficulties in data collection rendered the emissions 
inventories "unavoidably delayed due to unforeseen circumstances." Id. 
359 Both state and area authorities have encountered difficulties in performing the initial 
inventories of their own emissions and in developing modeling sufficient to assess the impacts 
of transport. Cynics suspect "footdragging" has exacerbated the delays. See, e.g., Greens Draw 
Line in Sand for Clean Air Enforcement, ENv'T WK., May 4, 1995 [hereinafter Greens Draw 
Line]. 
360 Id. 
361 The 1990 CAA was the first to impose specific deadlines for SIP submissions and SIP 
revisions and thus the first to test states' ability to comply with dates certain. The explicit 
deadlines in the statute confirm the importance of prompt, timely compliance to Congress. See 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
362 The Supreme Court has stated that the SIP deadlines of the CAA are unequivocal and that 
the statute does not permit EPA to consider such factors as technological or economic infeasi-
bility as a reason to extend the statutory deadlines absent express authority. Union Elec. Co. 
v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1975). 
363 42 U.S.C. § 7511a. Section 182 provides that serious, severe, and extreme nonattainment 
areas must submit SIP revisions that demonstrate VOC reductions of at least three percent 
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for attainment SIPs tested the resolve of EPA to enforce the dead-
lines of the CAA rigorously. 
Faced with the prospect of mass noncompliance, EPA issued a 
guidance memorandum providing an interim policy for conditional 
acceptance of SIPs notwithstanding the problem of incomplete data 
or uncertain EPA policy regarding ozone transport.364 The Submittal 
Completeness Memorandum in effect redefined the "completeness" 
criteria EPA normally uses to assess whether a state has fully com-
plied with the minimum content requirements for a SIP.365 EP.Ns 
guidance memorandum provided that the agency would consider a 
state's SIP submittal at least conditionally "complete" if it included: 
(i) fully adopted control measures to obtain at least eighty percent of 
the emissions reduction necessary for attainment; (ii) similar meas-
ures to obtain at least eighty percent of the reasonable further pro-
gress reduction; and (iii) a binding commitment to adopt further con-
trol measures to obtain the remaining twenty percent of reductions 
for both attainment and reasonable further progress.366 
In addition, the Submittal Completeness Memorandum required a 
state to submit a detailed explanation of its need for further time 
beyond the deadline to submit additional plan elements necessary for 
the remaining reductions. As an illustration, the memorandum stated 
that EPA expected to receive a "timeline showing the State's past and 
future progress toward completion of modeling and rule adoption in 
order to justify delays" and an explanation of gaps in that timeline.367 
Significantly, EPA suggested that the need for development of re-
gional strategies "necessary or appropriate" to abate pollution "may 
also be suitable explanations for certain delays."368 
Ironically, EP.Ns legal rationale for this policy was based both upon 
a provision of the CAA and upon a recent court decision rejecting the 
per year on average from the ozone baseline for five years following enactment of the 1990 CAA 
or until they reach attainment. Extreme areas must continue annual three percent reductions 
thereafter. [d. 
364 Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Director of the Office of Air Quality, Planning, and 
Standards, to the Regional Air Directors (Sept. 1, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Submittal Completeness Memorandum]. 
360 EPA has issued regulations detailing its normal procedure for assessing completeness of a 
state submittal. 40 C.F.R. § 51, App. v (1995). The Submittal Completeness Memorandum states 
that EPA intends to modify those regulations to conform with the contents of the memorandum. 
Submittal Completeness Memorandum, supra note 364, at n.1. 
366 Submittal Completeness Memorandum, supra note 364, at n.1. 
367 [d. 
368 [d. 
66 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:1 
agency's prior interpretation of that same provision. Under Section 
llO(k)(4), EPA may "conditionally" approve SIPs, i.e., give states 
credit for timely compliance and thereby avoid imposition of sanc-
tions.369 Until recently, EPA applied this conditional approval author-
ity generously by allowing states to make a submittal that merely 
contained a promise to submit rules imposing a control measure up to 
one year after the initial submission. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disapproved of EPA's 
broad interpretation of the statute and held that Section llO(k)(4) 
permitted EPA to approve a submittal conditionally only when the 
submittal was "substantive, but not entirely satisfactory."37o The court 
concluded that the CAA only empowers EPA to grant conditional 
approval for a SIP submittal that is predominantly complete rather 
than predominantly incomplete. 
The court's holding created a bright-line test prohibiting agency 
expansion of the conditional approval mechanism to afford states 
extra time to comply. Confusing matters, however, the District of 
Columbia Circuit also held that EPA may grant a state an extension 
when the state was unable to make a complete SIP submittal for 
reasons clearly beyond its control.371 The court therefore upheld the 
one-year extension contrary to the express provisions of the CAA in 
order to provide states relief. EPA designed its Submittal Completion 
Memorandum guidance with the District of Columbia Circuit's admo-
nitions in mind, explicitly stating its conviction that a SIP with eighty 
percent of required reductions would constitute a substantive, if not 
369 Section 110(k)(4) provides: 
The Administrator may approve a plan revision based on a commitment of the State 
to adopt specific enforceable measures by a date certain, but not later than 1 year after 
the date of approval of the plan revision. Any such conditional approval shall be treated 
as a disapproval if the State fails to comply with such commitment. 
42 U.S.C. § 741O(k)(4). 
370 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 11~5 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
371 [d. at 1136-37. EPA's memorandum is silent about the circumstances that made compliance 
beyond a state's control. The CAA instructed EPA to issue guidance for enhanced inspection 
and maintenance plans by November 15, 1992, and required states to submit revised SIPs 
containing enhanced inspection and maintenance plans by November 15, 1993. EPA was unable 
to issue the guidance until 10 days prior to the deadline for the states' SIP submissions. EPA 
sought to use the mechanism of conditional approval to grant states a de facto one-year 
extension. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit expressly 
disapproved of the use of conditional acceptance to grant states additional time. The court held 
instead that states could have an additional year to comply because the statute indicated that 
Congress intended states to have one year after receipt of EPA guidance to devise their 
enhanced inspection and maintenance plans. [d. 
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entirely satisfactory SIP, especially when accompanied by a detailed 
explanation of why the other twenty percent of reductions must come 
later.372 In essence, EPA implicitly acknowledged that modeling 
difficulties were a condition beyond a state's control sufficient to jus-
tify an extension. 
Given the ongoing debate in resolving ozone transport problems, 
EPA's policy of conditionally accepting SIPs with partial reductions 
was one means of treating the states with a more flexible or pragmatic 
approach. The Submittal Completeness Memorandum encouraged 
states to continue work on SIP attainment plans by allowing an addi-
tional year for completion of modeling and development of plans to 
address ozone transport. The agency policy also encouraged states to 
work with neighboring states on a regional basis to devise additional 
control measures. As a reward for this behavior, the policy explicitly 
stated that EPA would consider the need for time to devise regional 
approaches to control ozone a prima facie explanation for a request 
for conditional SIP approval. 
The EPA's Submittal Completeness Memorandum was not without 
critics, however, and environmental groups, industry groups, and a 
state challenged the agency position.373 Opponents of the policy be-
lieve that EPA has no authority under the CAA or its own complete-
ness regulations to accept, even conditionally, SIPs that contain meas-
ures to generate less than one hundred percent of the reductions 
needed for attainment and reasonable further progress. From a 
purely legal perspective, environmental groups led by NRDC alleged 
that EPA's conditional acceptance of eighty percent complete SIP 
submissions is an intentional subversion of the explicit deadlines of 
the CAA.374 From a policy perspective, NRDC contended that the 
acceptance of SIPs with only eighty percent of required reductions 
will cut short the lead time necessary to develop new control strate-
gies and meet other interim deadlines.375 Rather than encouraging 
compliance with the deadline, NRDC predicted that EPA's policy 
372 See Submittal Completeness Memorandum, supra note 364, at l. 
373 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a Massachusetts industry trade group, national 
trade groups representing utilities, and a group of environmental organizations have either filed 
suit or sought leave to intervene in a petition for review of the policy under § 307(d) of the CAA 
in the District of Columbia Circuit. See Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 95--1242 (D.C. Cir. filed May 
1, 1995); Associated Industries of Mass. v. EPA, No. 95--1235 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 28, 1995); 
Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, No. 94-1692 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 31,1994). 
374 See Petitioners' Motion For Expedited Review at 4, Conservation Law Found. v. EPA, No. 
94-1692 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1994). 
376Id. at 4-5. 
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would invite dilatory behavior by states. NRDC was concerned that 
states would abuse any conditional approval policy to drag out the 
date by which it must submit an approvable SIP attainment demon-
stration for years.376 
The challenges by Massachusetts and Massachusetts industry more 
directly attacked the Submittal Completeness Memorandum for its 
failure to stop ozone transport. Whatever its merits to grant states 
flexibility, Massachusetts alleged that the EPA policy merely allowed 
upwind states to "shirk responsibility" for the effects of transport on 
downwind jurisdictions.377 A Massachusetts industry group alleged 
that the policy would unfairly impact the economy of the state rather 
than forcing emission reductions on the upwind sources of the ozone.378 
Massachusetts in particular wants its compliance burden eased by 
more stringent emission controls in the New York City area.379 
In response to these challenges, EPA revoked the Submittal Com-
pleteness Memorandum.380 This result is unfortunate because EPA 
designed the policy to permit states to submit SIPs that begin to 
reduce ozone, and at the same time to focus upon development of 
regional control measures necessary for attainment rather than fight 
lawsuits to stave off mandatory sanctions. The policy thus allowed 
EPA to obviate some of the more severe effects of the CAA such as 
the start of the mandatory sanctions clock for states that were work-
ing in good faith to comply with the SIP attainment demonstration 
requirement. Admittedly, the policy could have been subject to abuse 
if states used it merely to evade mandatory control measures, but the 
policy allowed EPA to single out dilatory states that could not ade-
quately establish their need for additional time to obtain the remain-
der of the reductions. 
D. Extension of Deadlines for SIP Attainment Demonstrations 
In response to modeling delays and other complications caused in 
part by ozone transport, EPA has continued to attempt to modify the 
376Id. at 9-10. 
377 See State Cooperative Effort to Investigate Ozone Transport Solutions, INSIDE EPA, May 
17,1995. 
378 See Utilities, Massachusetts Asks Court to Review EPA Standards for Northeast, 1995 
Util. Env't Rep. (McGraw-Hill) 14 (May 12,1995). 
379 See id. 
380 EPA rescinded the Submittal Completeness Memorandum. Memorandum from John S. 
Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, EPA (May 1995) (on file with 
author). 
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attainment demonstration deadlines of the CAA administratively.381 
In a 1995 memorandum, EPA issued guidance to states "significantly 
affected by ozone" regarding compliance with SIP attainment dem-
onstration deadlines.382 The SIP Demonstrations Memorandum pro-
vides an alternative means for areas with ozone nonattainment clas-
sified as serious and above to demonstrate attainment.383 Notably, 
EPA's policy does not extend the ultimate attainment date for any 
area. Instead, the policy merely provides additional time for submis-
sion of complete attainment demonstrations.384 The SIP Demonstra-
tions Memorandum outlines a two-phase program in which EPA will 
cooperate with states to overcome nonattainment resulting from 
ozone transport.385 
In the first phase, EPA requires states to submit a SIP containing 
specific control measures to reduce the level of ozone precursors, 
including reductions to meet reasonable further progress.386 The 
memorandum contemplates that states in this phase will make certain 
interim undertakings to reduce emissions pending development of 
SIPs that fully demonstrate attainment.387 EPA will assess the 
efficacy of these interim plans in most areas on a case-by-case basis.338 
For states in the Northeast OTR, however, the SIP Demonstrations 
Memorandum stipulates that the SIPs must contain all control meas-
ures mandatory under the CAA, all measures mandatory under a 
regional NOx memorandum of understanding entered into by the 
Northeast OTR states, and the OTC LEV or other equivalent alter-
native measure adopted by the Northeast OTR and approved by 
EPA.389 Most importantly, however, the states must submit SIP revi-
sions that contain enforceable commitments to: (i) participate in a 
381 EPA did not describe this policy as a replacement for the Submittal Completeness Memo-
randum discussed above, but it does apply to the same types of nonattainment areas and 
remains in effect after EPA's rescission of the other policy. 
382 SIP Derrwnstrations Merrwrandum, supra note 335, at 1. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. at 2. 
386 Id. 
387 SIP Demonstrations Memorandum, supra note 335, at 2. 
388 Id. 
389 Id. This memorandum differs from the rescinded Submittal Completeness Memorandum 
that required control measures necessary to achieve 80% of needed reductions. This policy 
requires adoption of all measures required by the CAA and is silent as to what will occur if 
these initial control measures do not provide 100% of necessary reductions. It appears that EPA 
is attempting to grant states the same leniency without red flagging its intention to accept SIPs 
that do not initially provide for complete attainment. 
70 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:1 
"consultative process" on regional transport; (ii) adopt more control 
measures if necessary to reach attainment; and (iii) identify reduc-
tions from other jurisdictions that will be necessary for the state to 
attain the ozone NAAQS.390 Each state's new promise to work to 
develop regional control measures comprises the consideration for 
EPA's leniency on currently due SIP demonstrations.391 This trade is 
fitting given that a stated reason for attainment demonstration delays 
has been the difficulty in coping with transported pollutants.392 
The SIP Demonstrations Memorandum includes a second phase, in 
effect concurrently with the first, in which states must collaborate to 
evaluate additional "regional control strategies."393 EPA is to assist 
states to "reach consensus" on additional control measures necessary 
to attain the ozone NAAQS.394 The guidance memorandum explicitly 
provides that if the states are unable to agree upon such measures by 
the end of 1997, EPA will use its authority under Sections 126 and 110 
to motivate states to meet their attainment obligations regarding 
transport.395 In essence, EPA has offered to forbear from prompt 
exercise of those powers in order to allow states the opportunity to 
devise new regional solutions voluntarily.396 In response to this phase 
of the SIP Demonstrations Memorandum, states formed the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group (OTAG).397 
OTAG is comprised of EPA officials, representatives of the states 
involved, and other interested parties including environmental 
groups and industry groupS.398 OTAG currently encompasses thirty-
seven states east of the Rocky Mountains.399 OTAG's goals have been 
to develop more accurate models to assess ozone transport and to 
390 Id. at 2-3. 
391Id. Although not explicit on this point, the SIP Demonstration Memorandum contains a 
series of deadlines by which states must have accomplished certain tasks. By implication, failure 
to cooperate will cause EPA to insist upon submission of the SIP by the original deadline and 
thus trigger potential sanctions. 
392 EPA officials have noted that the main reason for the policy is to assist states having 
difficulty because of ozone transport. See Air Pollution: Two-Phased SIP Approval Policy 
Offers Flexibility on Ozone Attainment Plans, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 2181 (Mar. 10, 1995). 
393 SIP Demonstrations Memorandum, supra note 335, at 3. 
394 I d. at 2-3. 
395Id. at 3. 
396 See id. at 1-4. 
397 Regional Ozone Group Looks at Fuel Issues, OCTANE WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 1. 
398 See Nichols Testimony, supra note 19. A complete discussion of OTAG and the byzantine 
manuverings of group members is beyond the scope of this article. Interested readers may wish 
to explore OTAG further in the "Inside OTAG" publication which chronicles the organization. 
399 See Nichols, supra note 15. 
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devise new regional control measures to reduce ozone transport.4OO 
The group has explored a variety of measures, including: (i) expansion 
of the Northeast OTR to include all thirty-seven states of OTAG;401 
(ii) major reductions of NO x emissions across all thirty-seven states;402 
and (iii) development of new, cleaner automobile fuels.403 The express 
purpose of OTAG is to allow states flexibility to come up with their 
own measures to reduce ozone transport before EPA must begin 
enforcement of Section 1l0(a)(2)(D).404 
EPA's SIP Demonstrations Memorandum provides answers to criti-
cal transport questions under the 1990 CAA. First, in accordance with 
the statutory mandates of the CAA, EPA confirms that it will require 
states to comply with the ultimate attainment deadlines rather than 
granting de facto exemptions by inaction.405 This approach will, at 
least officially, discourage the expectation of attainment date slippage 
that might tempt states to avoid politically unpopular control meas-
ures. Second, the EPA guidance allows states to adopt workable 
interim attainment plans subject to agency approvaL406 This stance 
will provide states continued flexibility to enact control measures best 
suited to reach attainment in their jurisdictions. EPA's guidance only 
requires states to enact those measures already stipulated by statute 
or, in the case of the Northeast OTR states, those measures that the 
states have already agreed to among themselves.407 Importantly, how-
ever, the first phase requires states to agree prospectively to enact 
more control measures if necessary to reach attainment.408 This im-
plies that states must agree to impose more control measures than 
otherwise stipulated in the CAA for the applicable category of nonat-
tainment. Finally, EPA confirmed its willingness to enter the fray as 
an active facilitator in regional efforts to address ozone transport. 
Rather than imposing mandatory solutions, EPA has chosen the role 
400Id. 
401 Smog: Tighter Controls Could Affect Midwest, South, GREENWIRE, Mar. 20, 1996, available 
in LEXIS, News Library, Greenwire File. 
402 See Doug Sword, Midwest Fights Dirty Image; Blame For Pollution Called Unfair, CLEV. 
PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 17, 1996, at 17A. 
403 See Concept ofOTAG-Optimized Fuel Creates Confusion, OCTANE WK., Apr. 15, 1996. 
404 See Nichols Testimony, supra note 19. 
405 The memorandum states that the a "basic principle" of the agency's policy is to "meet 
attainment dates in the Clean Air Act while maintaining progress." SIP Demonstrations Memo-
randum, supra note 335, at 1. 
406 For example, the state may support its SIP with modeling based upon "interim assump-
tions" about the effects of transport or else assumed boundary conditions. Id. at 2. 
407Id. 
408 Id. 
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of catalyst to encourage states to cooperate to find communal solu-
tions. If states do not reach agreement voluntarily, EPA has expressly 
affirmed its intention to impose solutions under Sections 126 and 
110.409 
Critics have challenged EPA's policy, alleging that it does not go far 
enough to discourage transport from upwind jurisdictions.410 NRDC 
sued for review of the policy alleging that it abrogates the deadlines 
of the 1990 CAA by permitting EPA to accept SIP submissions that 
do not "provide for" attainment by the attainment date.411 NRDC 
evidently was alluding to the Section 182(c)(2)(A) requirement that 
states submit SIP revisions that "will provide for attainment of the 
ozone [NAAQS] by the applicable attainment date."412 Massachusetts 
has sued for review of the policy claiming that it violates Section 
110(k)(1) and (k)(3), thereby intimating that the policy allows EPA to 
accept SIPs that fail to meet all the applicable requirements of the 
CAA.413 The state's particular concern is that the SIP Demonstrations 
Memorandum allows acceptance of SIPs that fail to abate interstate 
transport and therefore violates Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Both suits 
challenge agency interpretations of the 1990 CAA and must therefore 
overcome the significant hurdles of a Chevron analysis.414 Both suits 
are still pending, presumably awaiting the outcome of the OTAG 
process. 
Thus far, EPA's approach in the SIP Demonstrations Memorandum 
has had mixed results. Under the first phase, states had to submit 
409 Nichols Testirrwny, supra note 19, at 3. EPA has elsewhere stated its intention to utilize 
its authority under § 110(a)(2)(D) when necessary to stop transport. See Lake Michigan NOx 
Waiver, supra note 16, at 2431 (stating that the Agency will nullify an otherwise available 
control measure exemption if new modeling establishes an ozone transport impact). 
410 See, e.g., Greens Draw Line, supra note 359. 
411 See Preliminary Statement of Issue to be Raised, Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for 
Clean Air v. Browner, No. 95-1241 (D.C. Cir. filed June 1, 1995). 
412 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A). 
413 See Statement of Issues, Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 95-1242 (D.C. Cir. filed May 24,1995). 
The essence of the claim is that EPA's policy does not require SIPs that prevent significant 
contribution to air quality problems in other jurisdictions. As discussed above, however, the 
"significant contribution" standard remains elastic and both legally and historically has been a 
determination largely within the discretion of EPA on a case-by-case basis. The state's challenge 
to the policy must overcome the body of precedents confirming EPA's authority to interpret the 
standard in the § 126 cases. See supra notes 126-48 and accompanying text. 
414 The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has applied this 
analysis stringently in recent challenges to EPA policies derived from agency interpretations 
of the 1990 CAA. See National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1138 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (rejecting EPA's interpretation of the phrase "take effect" in § 182 because it "strained 
credulity"). 
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interim plans by the end of 1995 to meet rate of progress ozone 
reductions along with demonstrations of attainment and a commit-
ment to enact other control measures as necessary.415 In July, 1996, 
EPA issued a final rule finding that ten states had neither made the 
required submissions416 nor were proceeding in a sufficiently expedi-
tious manner to be considered in substantial compliance with Phase I 
deadlines.417 This finding by the Agency started the mandatory sanc-
tions clock against all of the jurisdictions.418 The states must make the 
required submissions or face sanctions.419 
Meanwhile, under the second phase of the policy, the OTAG process 
has met resistance from certain states and industry groups. A number 
of states have passed or threatened to pass legislation restricting the 
powers of their own representatives to OTAG to bind their states.420 
Other states have threatened to drop out of the OTAG process en-
tirely.421 Industry groups have mounted campaigns to oppose any new 
regional control measures that impinge upon their profitability.422 
Some observers are dubious that OTAG will be able to reach any 
consensus.423 Other observers have been overtly hostile to the proc-
415 See SIP Demonstrations Memorandum, supra note 335, at 2. 
416 See Final Rule Making Findings of Failure to Submit Required State Implementation Plans 
for Nonattainment Areas for Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,292, 36,292 (1996). 
417Id. at 36,293. 
418Id. 
419 Significantly, the SIP Demonstrations Memorandum and the Final Rule both treat the 
states leniently because they must only demonstrate how they will obtain the initial nine percent 
of rate of progress reductions rather than the full 15% contemplated by the statute. See SIP 
Demonstrations Memorandum, supra note 335, at 2. 
420 Virginia and Illinois have placed restrictions on their participation in any OTAG proposals. 
See States Bailing Out of OTAG, Passing Laws to Limit Involvement, OCTANE WK., June 10, 
1996. 
421Id. Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota are reportedly considering opting 
out of OTAG entirely. Id. Most states are unlikely to opt out because they would lose the right 
to help shape the OTAG recommendations to EPA. Id. 
422 Automobile manufacturers feel that "designer fuels" proposed by OTAG will impair drive-
ability and result in customer dissatisfaction. See GM Warns Against "Designer Fuels", INSIDE 
OTAG, Aug. 1, 1996. Oil companies are likewise concerned about the reliance on a "mystery 
fuel" that OTAG might require to reduce emissions. See Concept of OTAG-Optimized Fuel 
Creates Confusion, OCTANE WK., Apr. 15, 1996. Midwestern coal mining and utility interests 
oppose additional NOx controls to limit transport into the Northeast OTR. See Coal, Rail 
Interests Working to Delay National Ozone Transport Standard, Env't Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 10, 
1995). Industry associations have even formed their own "Midwest Ozone Group" to generate 
studies and reports to counter those of OTAG. See Industry Study Predicts Huge Pricetag From 
Creation of Ozone Mega-Region, ENV'T WK., Dec. 1, 1995. 
423 For example, mixed results from OTAG-sponsored modeling of ozone transport have 
caused rifts between various members of OTAG, especially Midwest members balking at expen-
sive control measures to benefit the Northeast OTR states. The chairp'erson of OTAG has 
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ess.424 In spite of these difficulties, officials at EPA have reiterated the 
Agency's intention to utilize Section llO(a)(2)(D) and Section 126 
against any state that fails to follow through with commitments made 
through OTAG.425 
EPA's SIP Demonstrations Memorandum should aid downwind 
states "significantly affected by ozone."426 It requires states to submit 
a SIP that includes the mandatory control measures for the area's 
designated nonattainment classification.427 Compliance with the stipu-
lated measures does not excuse the state from enacting control meas-
ures to counteract ozone from upwind states. For example, if an area 
is severe rather than serious because of transport, it must still enact 
the control measures for a severe ozone nonattainment area. This 
obligates states to continue to implement programs necessary to pro-
tect the health of its citizens. The relief to downwind states arises 
from EPA's requirement that all states agree to participate in coop-
erative efforts on regional transport, and that all states expressly 
agree to adopt more stringent control measures than otherwise re-
quired under the CAA. The SIP Demonstrations Memorandum is also 
important because EPA has asserted its willingness to assume a more 
active role in reduction of transport from upwind jurisdictions and an 
intention to reject SIPs of states that do not participate in the re-
gional process. EPA is only deferring action under Section 
llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) for states that act in good faith to devise additional 
control measures in cooperation with their neighbors. 
commented that there "will be some heated policy decisions in the next several months." See 
Nichols, supra note 15. The Governor of Maine has stated that "Maine businesses and people 
should not have to bear the cost of economic windfalls realized by dirty upwind utilities." See 
Air From the Feds, BANGOR DAILY NEws, May 20,1996. After a preliminary ozone study was 
less conclusive about transport than expected, an Ohio EPA official suggested that the study 
"says to Northeast [OTR] states, 'You fix your cars, and then we [in the Midwest] will talk about 
spending $5 billion to fix our power plants.'" See Smog: New Study Disputes Midwest Role in 
Northeast Problem, GREENWIRE (American Political Network, Inc.), Sept. 5,1996, at 2. 
424 See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Kay H. Jones Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Commerce, l04th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 9, 1995 (contending that 
OTAG is unauthorized and should be abolished along with the Northeast OTC); Eric Peters, 
Motorists Beware of the OTAG Monster!, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 4,1996, at A14 (describing OTAG 
as a "multi-jurisdictional hydra encompassing 37 states from Maine to Texas for the purpose of 
bringing the swagger stick of government down on the heads of motorists and the automobile 
industry"). 
425 OTAG States Failing 7b Abide By Commitment Can Be Required To Take Action, EPA 
Official Says, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 781 (Aug. 2, 1996) (quoting Assistant Adm'r for Air 
and Radiation Mary Nichols' statement: ''We have the statutory authority and the political 
will."). 
426 SIP Demonstrations Memorandum, supra note 335, at 1. 
427 Id. 
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E. Changes in NAAQS and Modeling Assumptions 
Another alternative solution to relieve downwind states is to 
change the border assumptions in computer modeling of ozone pollu-
tion.428 Currently, states must utilize either the Regional Oxidant 
Model (ROM), the Urban Airshed Model (UAM), or a combination of 
the two in order to perform attainment demonstrations in the SIP 
process.429 Regardless of which model is appropriate, states in the 
Northeast OTR except for Vermont will have difficulty establishing 
that they can reach attainment.43o For example, if air crossing the 
border between New York and Connecticut is already at the NAAQS 
for ozone, then Connecticut cannot add another molecule of ozone 
precursors without risking a violation of the standard.431 Both the 
ROM and UAM models currently factor in the actual amount of ozone 
measured or estimated at the border of each state, and give no credit 
or offset for ozone crossing the border from another state.432 
One possible approach to alleviate the legal ramifications of trans-
ported ozone on downwind areas would be to change the standard for 
the border conditions in the computer models. Instead of setting the 
border assumptions at a level where the downwind state cannot emit 
anything, EPA could set those standards so as to give the state credit 
for the amount of the pollutant transported from adjacent jurisdic-
tions.433 The downwind state could thus avoid punishment for viola-
tions that result wholly or in part from ozone transport from the 
428 See LEV PROGRAM COMMENTS, supra note 282, at 36-88. The proper geographic scope 
and assumptions of modeling were a major source of conflict in the OTC LEV process. Id. 
429 EPA has promulgated a general guidance document on computer modeling in "Guideline 
on Air Quality Models Revised," 40 C.F.R. § 51, app. W (1995). EPA has also generated guidance 
specifically concerning ozone transport in accordance with § 184( d) in "Criteria for Assessing 
the Role of Transported OzonelPrecursors in Ozone Nonattainment Areas," EPA REPORT 
450/4-91-015 (1991). It is unclear whether states must use ROM, DAM, or a "nested" combina-
tion of the two in order to demonstrate attainment. The lack of sufficient data for DAM models 
was at least one reason EPA had to rely exclusively on the ROM model to determine the efficacy 
of the OTC LEV control measure on the entire Northeast OTR. 
430 See OTR TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 23, at 2. 
431 Just such situations exist in the Northeast OTR. See, e.g., Sharon Voas, Smog Sneaks In, 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 19, 1996, at Al (noting that monitors in rural southwest Pennsylvania 
registered readings at or above the ozone NAAQS before the air even reached Pittsburgh on 
the days that Pittsburgh violated the NAAQS in 1995). 
432 Some states subject to ozone transport have pressured EPA to change this. Both of 
Pennsylvania's senators have petitioned EPA to declare the Pittsburgh area in attainment 
because transport contributes to the area's pollution. Id. 
433 Members of the 104th Congress have proposed such a solution to the transport problem 
by changing the definition of non attainment. See infra Section V (discussing pending legislation). 
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neighboring state, and the downwind state could utilize the full incre-
ment of precursor emissions permitted by the CAA. 
EPA theoretically has the ability to reconcile the problem in this 
fashion because Congress empowered the Agency to establish the 
NAAQS by regulation rather than explicitly setting forth the 
NAAQS by statute.434 Because EPA has the authority to set the level 
of the NAAQS, EPA arguably has the power to set that number 
differently in different contexts to account for the effects of ozone 
transport.435 Likewise, the Agency has authority to design the models 
necessary to assess attainment or nonattainment for pollutants. For 
the most part, the 1990 CAA leaves the specifics of these models for 
EPA to determine through appropriate rule making procedures.436 
Given that both the N AAQS and the models are arguably within 
EPA's discretion to establish, EPA could change the border assump-
tions through the rulemaking process to negate the impact of ozone 
transport.437 Assuming that the Agency follows the proper procedures 
and generates a rational basis for the changes, EPA's action would 
likely survive a judicial challenge. Courts have consistently held that 
EPA is best situated to make determinations based upon scientific 
information in furtherance of its duties under protective statutes like 
the CAA and courts therefore grant great deference to EPA ac-
434 See 42 u.s.c. § 7409. 
435 For example, some critics suggest that EPA should base the NAAQS on the average ozone 
level over eight hours instead of the current one hour peak. This change would make the ozone 
NAAQS less stringent because ozone production typically peaks during a certain portion of the 
day and then dissipates. If the peak is the average over eight hours it will usually be lower than 
the highest one hour peak. See Tim Bonfield, Some Say Smog Law Too Strict, CIN. ENQUIRER, 
Aug. 22, 1995, at AI. 
436 In the case of models for ozone transport, Congress has instructed EPA in § 184(d) to issue 
criteria for evaluating the level of contribution of sources in one area to the nonattainment in 
another and has stipulated only that the criteria must require the "best available air quality 
monitoring and modeling techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(d). Even this direct instruction, how-
ever, merely requires EPA to exercise its discretion to determine what is the best available 
under the circumstances. Id. 
437 The potentially outcome-determinative nature of such modifications is reflected in the 
current debate over changing the ozone NAAQS as a means to transmogrify nonattainment 
areas into attainment areas instantly without enacting additional unpopular control measures. 
See supra note 39. One member of Congress has introduced a bill to stipulate the averaging 
period, the concentration level, the monitoring, and the number of exceedences permitted per 
year, thereby depriving EPA of authority to set these standards. See H.R. 3446, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess. § 108 (1995). Observers have opined that the cumulative effect of this bill will be 
"relaxing regulations for roughly 87 refineries and petrochemical plants" in the congressman's 
district. See Draft Bill Would Repeal Parts of Air Act In Attempt to Help Petrochemical 
Industry, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 5 (May 3,1996). 
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tions.438 The interpretation and use of computer modeling information 
is particularly within the province of EP.A:s discretion and expertise.439 
Notwithstanding the apparent ease with which this approach might 
alleviate some of the impact of the CAA on downwind jurisdictions, 
EPA should not follow this course because it will conflict with the 
explicit policy goals of the statute.440 The declaration of purposes of 
the CAA contains an unequivocal statement that Congress intended 
the statute "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population."441 In addition, Section 109(b)(1) 
expressly instructs EPA to establish the NAAQS to provide "an 
adequate margin of safety" to protect human health.442 Were EPA to 
change the border assumptions in the computer models, the Agency 
would potentially allow a drastic increase in the levels of ozone 
throughout the N ortheast.443 
A change in the model assumptions that would give each state a 
clean slate for ozone might be defensible in a situation in which the 
downwind state did not have significant emissions of ozone precursors 
and therefore the citizens of that state did not risk exposure to sig-
nificantly elevated levels of ozone. The closer the downwind area's 
actual ozone level to the NAAQS, the less objectionable the modeling 
change. The alteration of model assumptions might also be defensible 
if the effects of ozone transport did not extend beyond the borders of 
438 See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cen. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
Those decisions within the scope of EPA's authority and expertise are granted great deference 
and generally survive attacks on decisions or rulemaking activities. Id. 
439 See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cen. denied sub nom. Maine v. 
EPA, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989). 
440 Recent pronouncements by Agency officials indicate no intention to back off this directive 
of the 1990 CAA. See, e.g., Nichols Testimony, supra note 19 (noting that the agency could either 
ignore the quality of the air at the borders and force downwind areas to enact stricter controls 
or else work for more cost effective means to control transport from upwind areas, i.e., ignoring 
the pollution was not an option enumerated). 
44142 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). The definition of effects on welfare in § 302(h) is extremely inclusive: 
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects on 
soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, 
and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, 
as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether 
caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with other air pollutants. 
Id. § 7602(h). 
442Id. § 7409(b)(1). 
443 For example, a Rhode Island monitor on the border with Connecticut reportedly registers 
ozone levels at or near the ozone NAAQS regularly. See Wyss, supra note 29. Exclusion of this 
ozone could thus expose Rhode Island residents to twice the ozone NAAQS. 
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the next adjacent jurisdiction and therefore did not result in a domino 
effect. In the Northeast OTR, however, such a change without stricter 
limitations on emissions would have disastrous effects. For example, 
an air current that traveled a straight line from Virginia to Maine 
could cross the borders of eleven jurisdictions. If the approved model 
allowed each state credit for the level of ozone transported across its 
borders, and permitted it to emit precursors to create the full amount 
of ozone allowed by the NAAQS within its borders, there could theo-
retically be eleven times the current legal standard. In reality, the 
meteorological and chemical processes involved with ozone transport 
defy so simple a calculation of the end result, but one may assume 
that the actual level of ozone could easily exceed the current permis-
sible levels. 
Similarly, EPA should resist efforts by some states to make out-
come-determinative changes in data collection.444 Critics of the CAA 
are fond of denigrating the accuracy of the data by pointing out the 
limited number of monitors and the small number of violations at any 
given monitor necessary to establish nonattainment.445 A number of 
jurisdictions desire to move or deactivate certain air quality monitors 
as a means of changing their nonattainment classification.446 For ex-
ample, some Rhode Island officials wish to dispense with a specific 
monitor because it registers ozone transported across the border from 
Connecticut.447 Without further information, it is difficult to assess 
whether this change would improve the accuracy of modeling in 
Rhode Island or merely subvert the modeling process.448 Viewed in 
444 There are already serious problems with state underestimation of emissions and overesti-
mation of reductions. See RETHINKING OZONE, supra note 1, at 67-91. 
445 See, e.g., If Virginia Prevails in Suit, Clean Air Act to be Unconstitutional, Allen Testifies, 
State Env't Daily (BNA) No. 57, at D-21 (Mar. 24,1995) (explaining the statements of Virginia's 
Governor who demonstrates his dislike of the CAA by contending that the Hampton Roads area 
went from marginal to moderate nonattainment because of five episodes in three years that 
comprised fewer than ten hours out of the 26,000 hours in that three-year period); see also 
Attack of the Ozone Troopers, THE DETROIT NEWS, July 24,1995, at A6 (complaining that after 
four violations over a three-year span the current heat wave "may inspire the feds to come 
marching in"). 
446 The location of monitors can be crucial. For example, in the redesignation of Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, EPA relied upon data from two counties comprising the nonattainment area. See 
Grand Rapids Redesignation, supra note 209. In so doing, EPA declined to include data from 
monitors in adjacent counties that commenters contended registered enough violations to halt 
the redesignation. ld. 
447 See Wyss, supra note 29. Critics are unhappy with a West Greenwich, R.I., monitoring 
station that they believe penalized the state for air emanating from the New York City area. 
448 Data from 1995 indicates that transported ozone registered at the monitor is not the sole 
cause of the state's violations. See Bob Wyss, Bad Air May Mean Tougher Car Checks, PROVI-
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the best light, one must question why a state would want to deactivate 
a monitor that helps establish the contribution of another state to its 
nonattainment.449 
Comparable efforts are afoot to reduce the size of nonattainment 
areas as much as possible and thereby to minimize the geographic 
scope of required control measures. For example, some California 
politicians want to redraw the boundaries of the air quality district 
that contains the Mojave Desert.450 They claim that the area has a 
higher than necessary nonattainment classification because the moni-
toring for the area includes data from a specific monitor affected by 
air from the Los Angeles basin.451 Characterizing the current bounda-
ries as "gerrymandered," state politicians want to redraw the bounda-
ries to change the nonattainment classification.452 In this instance the 
modification of area boundaries may arise from the purest motives, 
but that presupposes that the state itself previously drew the bounda-
ries without regard to proper meteorological analysis. 
Historically, states designated air quality control regions based 
primarily upon political considerations such as county or city bounda-
ries with little emphasis upon meteorological considerations. Creation 
of nonattainment areas based upon political expediency already has 
resulted in areas with arbitrary borders with little hope for attain-
ment because they fail to encompass necessary emissions sources.453 
Wholesale redefinition of modeling boundaries for the mere purpose 
of changing nonattainment classifications will lead to inevitable abuse. 
Rather than redrawing air district borders based upon appropriate 
scientific criteria, the redrawn borders may derive solely from politi-
cal criteria. EPA should reject unjustified efforts to modify nonattain-
DENCE JOURNAL-BuLLETIN, Sept. 22, 1995, at 1A. The monitor registered levels in excess of 
the standard during three of the four violations of 1995, but other monitors in the state 
registered the violations as well. Rhode Island environmental officials have acknowledged that 
the state cannot blame the problem solely upon transport. See id. 
449 By contrast, other jurisdictions are setting up new monitors for the express purpose of 
demonstrating the level of transport into their jurisdiction. See New Site in PA to Monitor Ozone 
from Other Areas, CLEAN AIR NETWORK ONLINE TODAY, Aug. 6,1996 (noting the creation of 
a new monitor to provide data on transport for OTAG). 
450 See Ray Sotero, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2901772. 
451 [d. 
452 [d. 
453 See, e.g., Andrew Melnykovych, Getting Rational About Ozone, COURIER-JOURNAL (Lou-
isville, Ky.), Sept. 12, 1995, at 9A (describing the absurdity of Louisville, Kentucky's "gerryman-
dered" nonattainment area that failed to include significant emissions sources in the immediate 
vicinity and required gas stations on one side of a street to sell reformulated fuel but not those 
on the other side). 
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ment status through the manipulation of borders or the placement of 
monitors. If states desire to redraw area borders, EPA should require 
new areas based upon appropriate meteorological considerations.454 
EPA is currently considering significant changes in ozone monitor-
ing in connection with the change of the ozone NAAQS.455 This change 
would potentially entail averaging of monitoring data across an area 
and weighing monitoring data to reflect population density.456 Also 
under consideration is reliance less upon individual areas for manage-
ment of ozone control and more upon larger regional efforts, with the 
regions more reflective of the location of unhealthy air rather than 
existing political boundaries.457 These types of changes may relieve 
pressure upon areas subject to transport and help to alleviate the 
perception that the 1990 CAA imposes inequitable emissions restric-
tions based upon arbitrary criteria such as the placement of monitors 
or the boundaries of political jurisdictions. 
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS OF THE 104TH CONGRESS 
Members of the 104th Congress have introduced a large number of 
bills to amend the 1990 CAA. Many of the legislative proposals spe-
cifically address the concerns of states with nonattainment areas. The 
majority of these bills focus on limited issues: (i) elimination of man-
datory employer trip reduction measures;458 (ii) elimination or 
modification of vehicle inspection and maintenance measures;459 (iii) 
454 Section 107(c) grants EPA the power to designate interstate and intrastate air quality 
regions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407. The provision implicitly contemplates creation of areas with 
boundaries based upon meteorological facts of life rather than state or county borders. See id. 
455 See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,719 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50). 
456 See Alec Zacoroli, Spatial Population Weighted May Undercut Tighter PM, Ozone Stand-
ard, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 131, at A-5 (July 9,1996). Critics are skeptical of this approach 
because they view it as an attempt to "set a tighter standard but at the same time dull the 
potential effects in terms of the number of non-attainment areas that are going to be created." 
[d. 
457 See Regional Approach To Area Designations Recommended For Ozone, Particulate 
Rules, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 814 (Aug. 9, 1996) (describing recommendations of EPA's 
Clean Air Advisory Committee). 
458 See, e.g., H.R. 325, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 235, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
Congress passed H.R. 325 as Pub. L. No. 104-70, § 1, 109 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 7511a(d)(1)(B». One notable exception appears in § 107 which grants EPA the power 
to designate interstate and intrastate air quality regions. 42 U.S.C. § 7407. 
459 See, e.g., H.R. 46, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 236, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
Congress passed a bill regarding inspection and maintenance issues that restricts EPA's reliance 
upon centralized testing and maintenance for automobiles. See S. 440, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1996), Pub. L. No. 104-59, Title III, § 305(b), 109 Stat. 580 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7506(c)(5». 
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elimination of requirements for reformulated gasoline;460 (iv) morato-
riums on enforcement action or sanctions by EPA against states;461 (v) 
extensions of the attainment deadlines;462 or (vi) rebukes against 
EPA.463 The more extreme bills propose repeal of the CAA464 or its 
constituent partS.465 The less extreme bills merely direct EPA to 
reconsider its regulations for a specific control measure such as cen-
tralized vehicle testing and maintenance.466 Most of the bills respond 
to popular outcry over certain control measures that inconvenience 
drivers.467 Others reflect thinly disguised attempts to gut environ-
mental regulations because of anti-federal government fervor.468 A 
number of bills propose to rein in EPA by statutorily requiring cost-
benefit analysis in setting the ozone NAAQS or other agency deter-
minations formerly premised primarily on adequate protection of hu-
man health.469 Many bills appear to be attempts to achieve the goals 
of the 1990 CAA by moving the goalposts.47o 
460 See, e.g., H.R. 1052, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
461 See, e.g., H.R. 1602, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 375, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
462 See, e.g., S. 1021, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
463 See H.R. 3824, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proclaiming a bill "for the refunding of expenses 
incurred by innocent persons in the State of Maine required to comply with automobile inspec-
tion and maintenance requirements negligently imposed by [EPA],,). 
464 See H.R. 479, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
465 See, e.g., H.R. 473, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (repealing all hazardous air pollutant 
provisions); H.R. 474, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (repealing all acid rain provisions); H.R. 475, 
l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (repealing all stratospheric ozone protection provisions). 
466 See S. 248, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (directing EPA to reconsider its regulations for 
vehicle emissions testing and suggesting that the agency find a way to approve decentralized 
testing). Presumably this bill is moot given the passage of S. 440. See supra note 459. 
467 Ironically, other statutory changes demanded by voters are on a collision course with the 
1990 CAA. Recent repeal of the 55 miles-per-hour speed limit in many states will result in 
additional pollution from mobile sources that must be offset by more stringent controls else-
where. See Additional Controls May Be Needed in States that Raise Speed Limits, EPA Says, 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1990 (Feb. 16, 1996). 
468 See, e.g., Let's Lift Federal Burdens, ROLL CALL, Apr. 3, 1995 (discussing Virginia Con-
gressman Bliley's polemic against "nit picking federal environmental rules and regulations"); 
see also Some Folks Who Still Like the EPA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1995, at 4B 
(quoting Texas Congressman DeLay as saying that "the EPA, the Gestapo of government, pure 
and simple, has been one of the major claw hooks that the government has maintained on the 
backs of our constituents."). 
469 See H.R. 3519, l04th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1996); H.R. 3446, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 
(1996). Environmentalists characterize these types of amendments as a "direct assault" on the 
protection of human health. See Texas Rep. Barton Unveils Bill to Amend Clean Air Act; No 
Action Likely in 1996, 1996 Uti!. Env't Rep. (McGraw-Hill) 1 (June 7, 1996). 
470 See, e.g., H.R. 3446, l04th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing to allow five violations of the 
ozone NAAQS per year, as well as to redefine a violation to mean a continuous ten hour period 
above the standard and to require EPA to ignore violations in years with "anomalous 
meterological conditions"). 
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The 104th Congress has passed two measures with the net effect 
of weakening two stringent control measures required in the 1990 
CAA, mandatory employer trip reduction measures471 and centralized 
automobile emissions testing,472 thereby potentially exacerbating 
ozone transport. Piecemeal dismemberment of the 1990 CAA is not 
without consequences. For example, dilution of EPA's centralized 
inspection and maintenance program and the alleged delay tactics by 
some states have rendered compliance with the rate of progress re-
quirements of Section 182 impossible.473 It is unclear how areas in the 
Northeast OTR such as Washington, D.C., can possibly obtain the 
same emission reductions without the measure.474 Environmental 
groups have sued EPA, demanding that it fulfill its statutory obliga-
tion to develop a federal implementation plan and impose it upon 
recalcitrant states.475 Similarly, elimination of mandatory employer 
trip reduction measures is seen by some as evidence of lack of political 
will to take unpopular stances.476 
471 The l04th Congress amended § 182(d)(1)(B) to make the employer trip reduction control 
measure discretionary rather than mandatory. Critics of the measure had argued that it was 
too onerous and expensive for employers and the emissions reductions too small to justify it. 
See 141 CONGo REC. S18,573 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Santorum regarding 
H.R. 325). Significantly, the Amendment does not dilute the other provisions of the 1990 CAA 
and if a state chooses not to institute the control measure, it must still meet the ozone NAAQS 
and attainment deadlines. One of the supporters of the bill, Senator Baucus, stated that he 
supported the bill because it preserved the CAA "[b Jut where there are efforts to roll back our 
standards, to weaken the protection of human health and the environment, then we must stand 
firm against such changes." See id. (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
472 In response to criticism of EPA's development of mandatory centralized automobile emis-
sions inspection, the l04th Congress included a provision in the National Highway Designation 
Act of 1995 to redirect the agency. It has forbidden EPA from requiring centralized testing or 
automatically reducing the credit given to emissions reductions if the state chooses another type 
of inspection and maintenance program. See, e.g., H.R. 325, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 235, 
l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Congress passed H.R. 325 as Pub. L. No. 104-70, § 1, 109 Stat. 
773 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1995». 
473 See Environmental Groups Sue EPA to Enforce VOC-Reduction Requirements in Three 
Cities, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 461 (June 19, 1996). 
474 [d. 
476 [d. 
476 Cynics view amendment of this Section as an example of lawmakers' unwillingness to risk 
unpopular positions. See Don Behm, Shawdown Over Ozone Could Cost State Millions, MIL-
WAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 1996, at 13 ("the goal of prodding people out of their 
cars has evaporated like so much ether"). Representatives of industry are concerned that their 
clients will bear the brunt of amendments to the CAA that eliminate control measures unpopu-
lar with the public. See Mining, Pawer Expecting 7b Pay Thb of Cutting Mega-Control-Area 
NOx, 34 ArRIWATER POLLUTION REPORTS ENV'T WK. § 7 (1996) (quoting an attorney repre-
senting utility interests as saying "if you're serious about solving the problem, then look at all 
sources and go after them"). 
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Of the remaining legislative initiatives under consideration by the 
104th Congress, few strike at the heart of the statutory or policy 
problems of the 1990 CAA or aid EPA in implementing the statute 
more effectively. There are four pending bills that warrant closer 
examination because they illustrate issues under consideration by 
Congress: (i) H.R. 1582; (ii) H.R. 581; (iii) H.R. 3519; and (iv) S. 721. 
The House of Representatives is considering one bill that directly 
addresses the problems of downwind states suffering from ozone 
transport. H.R. 1582 proposes an amendment to Section 181(a) of the 
1990 CAA to require the reclassification of downwind nonattainment 
areas to factor out the effects of ozone transport.477 The bill provides 
that EPA will reclassify areas "to reflect an adjusted ozone design 
value which excludes ozone concentrations attributable to transport 
from an upwind area."478 If the subtraction of the ozone from transport 
makes the area "attain" the NAAQS, the bill proposes to require EPA 
to redesignate the area as attainment.479 In essence, H.R. 1582 in-
structs EPA to make nonattainment calculations excluding the ozone 
resulting from transport, regardless of the true air quality of the 
area.480 
H.R. 1582 makes this relief widely available by defining a "down-
wind nonattainment area" broadly to include "a nonattainment area 
where the air entering the area at the upwind boundary already 
contains ozone or ozone precursors."481 This means of avoiding nonat-
tainment status is thus theoretically available to all areas with any 
amount of transport. Those areas with the largest proportion of ozone 
from transport will benefit the most by the change of policy, i.e., a 
nonattainment area with no emissions sources will receive the most 
relief, whereas a state whose own emissions are already at or near 
477 H.R. 1582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
478 [d. § l(a). 
479 [d. 
480 Of course, the same artificial results are obtainable through other means without any actual 
emissions reductions. Another bill would accomplish the same outcome by statutorily defining 
a violation of the standard as an average concentration of 0.10 ppm over an eight-hour period 
at two monitors in the area with four violations allowed per year. See H.R. 3446, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess. § 108 (1996). A study commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute reportedly 
concluded that if EPA sets the standard as an eight hour concentration of .105 ppm with only 
three allowed exceedences, based upon 1993-95 data there would only be 19 nonattainment 
areas nationwide. See Standard Process for Ozone, PM to be Coordinated Under New EPA 
Process, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 372 (May 31, 1996). House Bill 3446 would presumably 
drastically reduce the number of nonattainment areas without any change in the actual level of 
ozone pollution. 
481 H.R. 1582 § l(a). 
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the N AAQS will not receive as large a boon. Significantly, the net 
effect of the bill is that every state will evidently be able to permit 
emissions up to the full limit of the N AAQS. 
H.R. 1582 also extends the right to redesignation to areas that 
suffer from transport from within the same state.482 The bill will 
amend Section llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) to provide that EPA must review 
SIPs for provisions to prevent significant transport not only from 
another state, but from areas within the state.483 On its face, this 
suggests that EPA will have additional power to halt transport. In 
practice, however, this may shift to EPA the burden formerly borne 
by states to insure compliance by sources in different parts of the 
state. The agency already struggles to determine when a SIP fails to 
prevent significant contribution from one state to another and this 
expansion may magnify the agency's SIP review obligations. State 
governments profess to want to make all decisions at the local level, 
but this may be less appealing when it comes to telling the voters in 
one county that they must endure more stringent control measures 
for the benefit of voters in another county. 
If passed, H.R. 1582 will undoubtedly provide statutory relief to 
downwind areas with significant transport. With the stroke of a pen, 
these areas will be entitled to lower classifications of nonattainment 
or may even attain the NAAQS. These areas immediately avoid costly 
and unpopular control measures necessary to achieve greater emis-
sions reductions from in-state sources. Unfortunately, this attainment 
will be fictional and the inhabitants of the state may still endure 
unhealthy levels of ozone. 
The most serious drawbacks of H.R. 1582 are that it will neither 
decrease the amount of transport from the upwind jurisdiction nor 
prevent the downwind state from contributing increased ozone to 
states further downwind. By artificially negating the effects of trans-
port on downwind states, H.R. 1582 will remove the incentive for 
those states to exert political and other pressure on upwind states to 
reduce emissions. Instead of focussing energy on obtaining needed 
reductions from upwind states, the amendment will divert the atten-
tion and resources of EPA and other interested parties to whitewash-
ing the true air quality in downwind areas. Perhaps worst of all, 
H.R. 1582 will permit a transport domino effect as EPA judges each 
state down the line only on the basis of its own in-state emissions. 
Potentially, states at the end of the ozone plume will have air that 
482 [d. § l(b). 
483 [d. 
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contains many times the current ozone NAAQS. Assuming that each 
state has met the truncated CAA requirements and that EPA has 
observed the procedural niceties, citizens exposed to demonstrably 
unhealthy air will have no recourse. 
In another significant pending bill, the House of Representatives is 
also considering an expansion of the existing exemption for rural 
transport areas to make the exemption available for all areas subject 
to transport regardless of population.484 H.R. 581 proposes an amend-
ment to Section 182(h) of the 1990 CAA to permit both rural and 
non-rural areas to comply with the nonattainment provisions by ob-
servance of the requirements for marginal areas, regardless of their 
actual level of ozone.485 Designation as a marginal nonattainment area 
by operation of law allows a state to evade the hydra of unpopular 
controls elsewhere in Section 182 such as reasonable further progress 
reductions, enhanced vehicle inspection and maintenance, and (until 
recently made voluntary) employer trip reduction measures.486 
H.R. 581 is extremely significant because it contains a specific per-
centage level of ozone to define when an area is eligible for the 
exemption. The bill states that the area qualifies if "the sources of 
VOC (and where the Administrator determines relevant, NOx) emis-
sions within the area do not contribute to more than thirty-five per-
cent of the ozone concentrations measured in the area or in other 
areas."487 Section 182(h) of the current CAA provides that the exemp-
tion is available conditioned upon an EPA finding that the sources 
within the area "do not make a significant contribution" to ozone in 
the area or elsewhere.488 The author of H.R. 581 has thus provided 
explicit guidance on what should constitute "significant contribution" 
to another jurisdiction's air quality.489 
484 See 141 CONGo REC. S4589 (daily ed. Mar. 24,1995) (statement of Sen. Levin); see also supra 
text accompanying note 244. 
485 See H.R. 581, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
486 This raises some confusion because the deadline for marginal area attainment has already 
passed. The bill intends that rural transport areas need only comply with the control measures 
set out in the statute for areas with a marginal designation, regardless of whether the deadline 
for such areas has passed. In addition, however, EPA may continue to designate other new 
nonattainment areas in the future to which these control measures would apply. See, e.g., 
Designation of Area for Air Quality Planning Purposes; New Mexico; Designation of Sunland 
Park Ozone Nonattainment Area, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,789--90 (1995) (creation of a new marginal 
nonattainment area because of violations in 1992-94). EPA set the attainment date as three 
years from the effective date of the redesignation. 
487 H.R. 581. 
488 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(h)(2) (1990). 
489 The Senate analog to H.R. 581, S. 622, maintains the current significant contribution 
standard. See S. 622, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The sponsor of S. 622 has suggested, however, 
86 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:1 
The definition of "significant contribution" as thirty-five percent of 
the downwind state's ozone level poses interesting problems. For the 
area itself, it provides a wide margin of protection for areas subject 
to sixty-five percent or more of ozone from external sources. This will 
presumably apply to a limited number of areas with small amounts of 
local emissions. With regard to the states downwind from this "vic-
tim" state, however, it provides less protection. The proposed amend-
ment would allow an exempt area to contribute up to thirty-five 
percent of the ozone in a downwind area without limitation on the 
absolute quantity of the pollutant, i.e., thirty-five percent of one hun-
dred tons of VOCs differs markedly from thirty-five percent of one 
million tons of VOCs. Deletion of the "rural" limitation by removal of 
the popUlation requirements for exemption thus potentially permits 
exemption of areas with large amounts of emissions. Reliance on a 
fixed percentage deprives EPA of the authority to stop contribution 
that is significant in terms of absolute quantity, if not in percentage. 
Arguably, the effects of H.R. 581 alone will not result in drastic 
increases in ozone transport because the number of areas capable of 
qualifying for the exemption will be small. The greater danger lies in 
the possible extension of its standard for "significant contribution" to 
other contexts. For example, if courts extrapolate that this definition 
reflects congressional intent for the same standard in Section 
llO(a)(2)(D), it will severely limit EPA's power to stop ozone trans-
port. Definition of "significant contribution" as thirty-five percent is 
also extremely high in the abstract. Such a high trigger for "sig-
nificant contribution" under the CAA will mean that downwind states 
must either limit their own emissions to sixty-five percent of the 
NAAQS to avoid nonattainment or bear the costs of control measures 
to offset up to thirty-five percent of their ozone level before they may 
seek relief from transport.490 In either case, the downwind state suf-
fers as a result of upwind emissions. This definition of "significant 
contribution" fails to address the inequities of transport for downwind 
states and does not adequately restrict transport. 
that Congress "refine this legislation further or make the legislative history so clear that the 
definition of 'significant contribution' is not subject to excessively narrow interpretation by an 
EPA Administrator .... " See 141 CONGo REC., S4589 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Levin). 
490 Use of nice, round numbers disguises the complicated and problematic modeling that will 
be necessary to establish that, for example, at least 36% of ozone comes from transport and that 
the state is therefore entitled to relief. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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Another relevant bill pending before the 104th Congress directly 
addresses the problem of "overwhelming" ozone transport, i.e., the 
situation in which an area cannot possibly attain because of transport 
from another area.491 In H.R. 3519, styled "The Clean Air Amend-
ments Act of 1996," one member has proposed a broad array of 
amendments to the 1990 CAA.492 One segment of this bill would amend 
Section 181 in order to redesignate an area as attainment, or to lower 
its non attainment classification upon an Agency determination that 
the area suffers from overwhelming transport.493 Potentially, this 
change could allow EPA to alleviate some of the statutory pressure 
upon jurisdictions subject to transport and otherwise unable to re-
duce ambient ozone levels sufficiently to avoid sanctions.494 
The proposed provision makes sense for a number of reasons. First, 
the amended Section maintains EPA's authority and discretion to 
make the underlying determination and explicitly states that the 
Agency "may" change the nonattainment designation, rather than 
"shall" change it.495 Second, the provision notes that it should be 
inapplicable in situations where ozone sources in the area at issue 
make a "significant contribution" to nonattainment in other areas, 
thereby mitigating the potential domino effect upon areas further 
downwind.496 Finally, the proposed provision indicates that EPA's 
power to redesignate or reclassify an area should not be generally 
available to all nonattainment areas, only those in which indigenous 
sources do not "make a significant contribution" to the area's own 
491 See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
492 H.R. 3519, l04th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). Environmentalists have described this bill as a 
whole as an attempt to "repeal the basic tenet that national clean air standards should be 
adequate to protect human health." See Air Pollution Group Says Proposed Amendment Would 
Alter Entire Premise ojCAA, ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 104, at D-5 (May 30,1996). 
493 H.R. 3519, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1996). Specifically, the bill describes the determina-
tion to be: 
[T]hat the area is a downwind nonattainment area receiving ozone or ozone precursor 
transport from outside the area and control of ozone concentration is beyond the ability 
of the area to control because the volatile organic compounds and oxides of nitrogen 
from sources within such area do not make a significant contribution to ozone concen-
trations in such area (or in any other ozone nonattainment area). 
494 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
495 H.R. 3519 § 15; cf H.R. 1582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (stating that the EPA must 
exclude all ozone attributable to transport in redesignation or reclassification determinations 
and must redesignate an area as attainment regardless of the true air quality if exclusion of the 
ozone from transport would compel this conclusion). 
496 Compare H.R. 3519 § 15 with H.R. 1582 (H.R. 1582 ignores the potential impact of trans-
port on other areas farther downwind). 
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nonattainment.497 Unlike H.R. 1582, this would not be an open invita-
tion to all areas with any transport to seek special dispensation.498 
The latter strength of H.R. 3519 is simultaneously its weakness. By 
stipulating that EPA may redesignate the area if its indigenous 
sources do not make a "significant contribution" to its own nonattain-
ment (or that of another area), the bill perpetuates the use of an 
ambiguous standard.499 The bill is silent as to what level of contribu-
tion should be sufficiently insignificant to justify relief, whether one 
percent, ninety-nine percent, or some point in between. 
In addition, H.R. 3519 does not empower EPA to use flexibility with 
regard to control measures for a nonattainment area subject to over-
whelming transport. The two options are merely to lower the area's 
nonattainment classification or to redesignate it to attainment.5OO EPA 
has drawn its own policy for overwhelming transport more narrowly 
to permit states to assume the later attainment date of an upwind 
area, not to avoid controls by redesignation or reclassification.501 
EPA's policy maintains the downwind area's obligation to reduce its 
own emissions and even suggests that the Agency might require more 
of both the upwind and downwind jurisdictions.502 In short, H.R. 3519 
would instruct EPA simply to ignore the elevated level of ozone and 
require no further steps to alleviate it. 
Both houses of Congress are also considering moratoriums or other 
limitations on EPA enforcement and sanctions authority as a means 
of relieving states subject to transport.503 S. 721 is illustrative of these 
proposals.504 S. 721 proposes to impose a moratorium on all EPA en-
forcement action against areas or states designated as marginal or 
moderate nonattainment.505 The bill defines enforcement action 
broadly to include all of EPA's enforcement levers under the 1990 
CAA, including: (i) withholding of grants; (ii) imposition of a FIP; (iii) 
497 [d. 
498 See supra note 479 and accompanying text. 
499 See supra notes 126-48 and accompanying text (discussing standard in context of § 126 
cases). 
500 H.R. 3519, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1996). 
50! See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
502 See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
503 One bill would extend the deadline for imposition of mandatory sanctions from 18 to 30 
months. See H.R. 1255, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a) (1995). Another would abolish mandatory 
sanctions altogether and make sanctions purely discretionary, presumably making them less 
certain. H.R. 3519, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1996). 
504 See S. 721, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1995). 
505 [d. § l(a). 
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imposition of a sanction; or (iv) any other action "intended to obtain 
compliance ... or punish noncompliance."506 The bill's sponsor indi-
cated that it is intended to offset the unfairness to downwind states 
whose nonattainment results from ozone transport.507 
S. 721 limits its effect to marginal and moderate nonattainment 
areas. This is attributable, in part, to the attainment deadlines for 
those areas that make them the most likely candidates for sanctions. 
It is also arguably justifiable on environmental and health protection 
grounds because these areas have relatively lower ozone NAAQS 
violations than serious, severe, and extreme ozone nonattainment 
areas. S. 721 in its current form would not restrict EPA's ability to 
sanction more seriously polluted areas for such things as failure to 
implement mandatory control measures. S. 721 is also commendable 
because it does not seek to dilute the substantive requirements of the 
CAA, but rather to grant states extra time to enact and implement 
appropriate control measures. To the extent that this allows states 
acting in good faith to reduce emissions without fear of harsh eco-
nomic sanctions, it could encourage states to focus resources on com-
pliance rather than mere avoidance of sanctions through litigation or 
other delay tactics.508 
The most serious drawback of S. 721 is that it does not limit its 
applicability to areas suffering from ozone transport. As currently 
drafted, all areas with marginal or moderate nonattainment could 
avoid enforcement action of any kind for at least two years509 regard-
less of whether their nonattainment resulted from transport or their 
own recalcitrance in implementing necessary control measures. S. 721 
thus goes too far in removing EPA's ability to motivate dilatory states 
to take responsible action to meet the current attainment dates. EPA's 
ability to sanction states with mandatory or discretionary sanctions 
506 Id. § l(b). 
507 See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text; supra note 261 (statement of Maine's Sen. 
Snowe). 
508 For example, states could focus on devising ways to make decentralized vehicle testing 
more reliable as a control measure instead of pursuing constitutional challenges to the 1990 
CAA. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
509 In reality, the delay of attainment could be far longer if at the end of one year EPA must 
issue a finding of SIP insufficiency and the state has eighteen months before mandatory sanc-
tions apply. Even then, the state may make a facially sufficient SIP submission that EPA must 
review and ultimately reject giving the state further time to comply. Clearly a state intent on 
"gaming" the CAA could drag out the process considerably, all to the detriment not only of its 
own citizens, but those of other states as well who might have to endure more stringent control 
measures as a result. 
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is effective to get the attention of states unwilling to follow the stric-
tures of the 1990 CAA.510 
As a corollary problem, S. 721 does not go far enough to protect all 
areas injured by transport. Even severe ozone nonattainment areas 
such as New York City suffer from inordinate amounts of ozone influx 
from New Jersey and points south. If, as is the stated goal, S. 721 is 
to relieve inequity to downwind states, its limitation to marginal and 
moderate ozone nonattainment areas is untenable. Aside from simple 
equity for the citizens of New York, it is unclear why moderate 
nonattainment areas farther south should receive special dispensation 
to continue contributing to New York's nonattainment without fear of 
retribution through enforcement actions. If the Senate continues con-
sideration of S. 721, one could expect to see other members seek to 
expand its scope to include the full range of nonattainment classifica-
tions. Such an expansion of the enforcement moratorium would re-
move all teeth from the CAA and render it purely hortatory for years 
at a time when stronger action is essential.511 
The legislation currently before the 104th Congress thus does not 
address the fundamental problems of the 1990 CAA. The bills attempt 
to treat the symptoms of problems, such as unpopular control meas-
ures, but fail to reach the underlying policy questions. If the purpose 
of the statute is to obtain clean air as expeditiously as possible, should 
some degree of inequity be tolerated? Permitting Virginia to evade a 
particular control measure could conceivably fulfill some larger policy 
objective. Should the CAA continue to require some states to enact 
more restrictive control measures than neighboring states? There 
may be reasons why the drivers of a state like Maine should continue 
to use reformulated gasoline even though their own local emissions 
would not alone require it under the CAA. Should an upwind state 
with a later attainment date lose some or all of the benefit of that later 
attainment date by accelerated imposition of control measures? There 
may be legitimate need for New York to accelerate control measures 
solely to benefit Connecticut and other downwind states. Congress 
has not sought to elucidate its position on such questions. Based upon 
610 See, e.g., Air Pollution: Congress Passes Bill That Would Delete Requirement For Test-
Only 11M Facilities, ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 26, at 1262 (Nov. 24, 1995) (the mere threat of 
sanctions had five governors pleading their case directly to Sen. Dole and Rep. Gingrich). 
511 The prospect of blanket extensions shows a shocking lack of historical perspective on the 
series of ignored attainment dates that made the explicit firm deadlines of the 1990 CAA 
necessary in the first place. 
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the bills currently before Congress, one would assume that repudia-
tion of a control measure or unanesthetized extraction of the CAA's 
teeth is all that is required to solve the tropospheric ozone problem. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
As illustrated by the examples discussed above, EPA has gone to 
great lengths, if not contortions, to devise implementation strategies 
to reduce the impacts of ozone transport that are still consistent with 
the provisions of the 1990 CAA. Congress now has an opportunity to 
clarify how it wants EPA to implement the CAA to abate the epidemic 
problems of ozone transport. The following suggestions address the 
current implementation problems of the CAA and propose means to 
alleviate the inequities, yet encourage continued progress toward 
attainment. 
A. Modification of Provisions Applicable to Nonattainment 
Areas to Aid Downwind Jurisdictions 
The most pressing need is to provide downwind states with statu-
tory relief from the inequitable impacts of ozone transport under the 
1990 CAA.512 EPA has attempted to interpret the CAA administra-
tively to alleviate some of the harsher effects of the statute but, as 
discussed above, the Agency is constrained by the provisions of the 
statute and its efforts have generated judicial challenges.513 If Con-
gress intends EPA to afford states greater flexibility to meet the 
goals of the CAA, it should amend the statute accordingly. Three 
potential changes would provide relief: (i) modification of the defini-
tion of "nonattainment" to exclude areas that would attain but for the 
transported pollution from another jurisdiction (as in the case of 
international transport scenarios); (ii) limitation of required control 
strategies to those that are necessary to reach a reduction of emis-
sions proportionate to the amount actually generated within the 
downwind jurisdiction; and (iii) creation of explicit statutory exten-
sions of compliance deadlines to allow downwind jurisdictions the 
same degree of leniency accorded to upwind neighbors. 
The first proposal to modify the definition of nonattainment to 
exclude areas that violate the NAAQS because of ozone transport 
512 See supra Section III. 
513 See supra Section IV. 
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from other jurisdictions requires amendment of the definition of 
nonattainment in Section 107(d)(1)(A).514 Congress could decree that 
EPA calculate the level of a state's nonattainment by excluding the 
ozone that results from transport.515 This amendment appears neces-
sary purely as a matter of fairness so that the CAA does not penalize 
states for the misfortune of being downwind from states with sub-
stantial emissions.516 Congress should not, however, merely modify the 
definition without taking further steps to insure that both upwind and 
downwind states reduce actual emissions. Changing the definition of 
"attainment," without more, may be politically expedient, but it will 
not remedy the underlying pollution problem. 
So long as protection of the public health and welfare remains a 
primary purpose of the CAA, Congress should not amend the statute 
to permit manipulation of ambient air data to make areas attain on 
paper but not in fact. Congress should amend the definition of nonat-
tainment only in conjunction with a number of other requirements to 
reduce emissions such as: (i) unequivocally requiring upwind states to 
limit precursor emissions to prevent transport even if they are oth-
erwise in attainment;517 (ii) providing that downwind states benefitted 
by the new definition must enact practicable control measures to 
reduce in-state emissions even if the measures exceed those other-
wise required;518 and (iii) instructing EPA to police each state's in-
state emissions for NAAQS attainment more aggressively and to hold 
the state accountable to keep the air at its own borders beneath the 
NAAQS to avoid a domino effect.519 Unless Congress amends the 
CAA to provide for more stringent reduction of emissions in both 
514 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A). 
515 The 104th Congress has proposed such a measure. See supra Section V (discussion of H.R. 
1582). 
516 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
517 For example, Congress might amend the CAA to provide explicitly that the ozone NAAQS 
are not a quota for emissions and that EPA may lower the NAAQS for all or part of a state to 
prevent transport from a given area. 
518 What would be "practicable" would entail difficult political decisions, but if Congress 
explicitly required downwind areas to enact more control measures it would alleviate more 
transport. For example, § 182(h) now permits rural transport areas to comply by enacting the 
mandatory measures for marginal nonattainment areas. Congress might follow this precedent 
and require redesignated areas to continue to impose the measures for a specific category of 
nonattainment or to choose from a menu of reasonable control measures. 
519 Increased EPA enforcement would be essential to prevent abuse of the redesignation. 
Congress must be willing to make EPA's authority more explicit than the current "significant 
contribution" standard of § 1l0(a)(2)(D) and must be willing to provide sufficient appropriations 
for the increased cost of modeling and enforcement apparatus. 
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upwind and downwind states, a new definition of nonattainment will 
be an excuse for states to continue with the status quo and avoid 
unpopular control measures. Changing the definition of nonattain-
ment without clearer directives to reduce ozone precursor emissions 
will result in more ozone transport, not less. 
The second proposal to require only those control measures that 
provide emissions reductions proportionate to the amount of emis-
sions generated within the state entails amendment of the regime of 
control measures in Section 182.520 This change would eliminate the 
unfairness of requiring states to adopt more intrusive control meas-
ures to offset ozone from another jurisdiction.521 Like the first pro-
posal, this change is also fundamentally at odds with the purpose of 
the CAA to protect the health of the public, whatever the source of 
the ozone. Citizens of a downwind state should not suffer exposure to 
unhealthy levels of ozone from upwind emissions simply because the 
downwind state has performed some legally required bare-minimum 
effort to restrict in-state emissions. . 
Congress should amend the CAA to require those control measures 
necessary to reduce the proportionate in-state contribution to nonat-
tainment only if it can protect adequately the health of the public in 
another way. Congress could more safely make this change if, for 
example, it also unequivocally empowers EPA to restrict emissions 
from upwind states to prevent any transport into a downwind juris-
diction.522 Without this qualification, a citizen of a downwind state will 
potentially breathe air that contains many times the amount of ozone 
allowed by the N AAQS and the state will have no legal obligation to 
take any steps not designed for in-state emissions reductions alone. 
Again, this amendment without counterbalancing increases of EPA's 
power to restrict cross-boundary emissions will exacerbate the ozone 
problem. 
The third proposal, i.e., extending attainment dates for downwind 
areas, requires revision of the attainment deadlines in Section 181.523 
Such an amendment would allow EPA to extend the attainment dates 
of downwind areas within the plume of ozone from upwind areas with 
520 42 U.S.C. § 751la. 
521 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
522 The more transport EPA can prevent, the less harmful exposure the citizens of downwind 
states must endure because of reduced control measure requirements. EPA should not have to 
extract commitments from states by cutting deals as it appears to have done in the SIP 
Demonstrations Memorandum. See supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
523 42 U.S.C. § 7511. 
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later attainment dates without the imposition of additional control 
measures as currently contemplated by Section 181(b).524 This change 
is equitable because it would allow downwind states to have as much 
additional time to comply with the NAAQS as their upwind neigh-
bors, and to avoid additional control measures necessary only as a 
result of upwind emissions. 
The obvious drawback of this change is that it may result in a 
domino effect causing areas further downwind to miss their own 
attainment deadlines. For example, the New York City area's attain-
ment date currently makes it more difficult for the Boston area to 
attain by its own earlier attainment deadline. If Congress amends the 
CAA to allow areas such as Boston to enjoy the longer attainment 
period of an upwind jurisdiction, it presumably will interfere with the 
attainment of areas farther downwind like Portland, Maine. Maine 
will probably demand a comparable extension to counteract the later 
date for Boston. If states repeat this process all across the Northeast 
OTR, the potential result is that all states may end up with later 
attainment dates.525 Such an outcome conflicts with the stated con-
gressional desire to provide for attainment at the earliest possible 
date. 
If Congress amends the CAA to provide extensions to alleviate the 
juxtaposition of differing attainment deadlines, it should do so consis-
tently with EPA's Overwhelming Transport Memorandum.526 EPA's 
policy allows administrative extensions only after examination of the 
emissions modeling submitted by both the upwind and the downwind 
state to determine that neither can do anything practicable to main-
tain the original attainment deadline. EPA indicated that to grant the 
extension it might require adoption of additional control measures by 
downwind states and acceleration of control measures by upwind 
states. In short, EPA's policy could require more of both states than 
otherwise stipulated in the CAA. Any amendment to the CAA to 
provide extensions to downwind states under these circumstances 
should ratify EPA's policy and confirm explicitly that EPA may im-
pose additional control measures and thereby avoid the potential 
524 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
525 All jurisdictions will probably gravitate toward the last attainment date in the region, at 
which point officials in the most severely polluted jurisdiction likely will argue that they need 
additional time because of the contribution from other areas and thus start a new round of 
extensions. 
526 See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
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domino effect for states farther downwind. Such an amendment would 
make moot the current challenges to EPA's policy.527 
B. Creation ofa Mechanismfor States to Initiate EPA 
Review of Ozone Transport from Upwind States 
A second necessary form of relief is the creation of an effective 
means for states subject to transport to petition EPA to assess the 
validity of an upwind state's SIP for compliance with Section 
llO(a)(2)(D). At present, states may submit comments during the 
Agency review of another state's SIP but, absent a pending EPA SIP 
review, a state has no easy mechanism to direct EPA attention to a 
particular transport problem.528 Section llO(a)(2)(D) provides a down-
wind state with no independent right to seek review of an upwind 
state's SIP in the event of "significant contribution" to the downwind 
state's nonattainment.529 Section 126 ostensibly provides states with 
such a mechanism, but the nature of the sources encompassed and the 
high threshold necessary for redress severely limit its relevance.53o To 
date, it has provided little direct assistance for downwind states for 
any pollutant and its utility for ozone transport is probably even more 
attenuated.531 
527 See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
528 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
529 See New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 577-79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The right to petition is limited 
expressly to states. In the redesignation of an area in Wisconsin, one commenter contended that 
EPA had failed to enforce prohibitions against interstate pollution. EPA's response was, in 
essence, that because no state had filed a § 126 petition, the Agency had no duty to consider the 
issue. See Wisconsin Redesignation, supra note 355, at 43,669. 
530 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
531 States are left floundering for a viable means to obtain redress. For example, Maine's 
governor sent a letter to EPA in August of 1995 demanding action to reduce ozone transport 
and had to provide a vague basis for his claim under § 110 and § 126, neither of which really 
provide a vehicle for independent review of another state's complete SIP on demand. Sig-
nificantly, Governor King proposed to waive Maine's right to a resolution of the § 126 petition 
within sixty days if EPA would make certain concessions. Chief among these is the Agency's 
stipulation that transport of ozone into Maine "significantly contributes" to the state's nonat-
tainment. Governor King wants this stipulation to remove "the unrealistic burden" of proving 
this fact. Even if EPA could ignore the express language of § 126 that limits its applicability to 
major stationary sources, failure to develop modeling proof would render it impossible to 
identify the sources subject to emission restrictions or cessation in accordance with § 126(c). 
Moreover, it is unclear how EPA could waive proof of a standard that would prejudice sources 
in other states. These complications highlight the limited utility of § 126 for states seeking 
redress for transport. Maine doubtless suffers from ozone transport, but proving this fact and 
obtaining relief are difficult under the current CAA. See Letter from Angus S. King Jr., 
Governor of Maine, to Carol Browner, Adm'r, EPA, regarding "Maine's Ozone Attainment 
Deadline, Overwhelming Transport Designation, Section 1101126 Petitions" (Aug. 1, 1995) [here-
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Congress should create a new mechanism for states to focus EPA 
attention on specific transport problems other than the small universe 
of contexts in which Section 126 is applicable. This right could be 
analogous to Section 126, but specifically allow the petitioner to seek 
redress for transport from a broader spectrum of sources that gener-
ate ozone precursors.532 It would be unwise, however, to allow states 
to force EPA to review another state's entire SIP without adequate 
grounds. The normal SIP review process is very time and resource 
intensive and it would tax the Agency's already limited resources to 
investigate each and every alleged instance of "significant contribu-
tion" to the complaining state's nonattainment.533 Allowance of a re-
view with limited focus like that of Section 126 on the effects of 
specific sources is thus preferable. Similarly, the right to petition 
should be limited to states that can establish more than de minimis 
transport effects, like EPA's current policy for states or areas subject 
to "overwhelming transport."534 
In the past, Congress has allowed EPA to set the threshold at which 
redress for transport is available to a downwind state. Hence, the 
Agency has stringent standards for relief in Section 126 proceedings. 
More recently, Congress has empowered EPA to take a stronger role 
in transport abatement by strengthening the standard of SIP review 
in Section llO(a)(2)(D). In the process of instructing EPA how to 
assess new control measures proposed by the Northeast OTC in 
Section 184(c), Congress also indicated a desire to allow states to 
enact more stringent regional control measures that EPA finds are 
"necessary" to allow the states to attain the ozone NAAQS.535 This 
standard is more protective of downwind states because it shifts the 
focus of the analysis to the effect of the pollutant, rather than the 
relative proportion of in-state and out-of-state emissions.536 Congress 
inafter Maine Demand Letter]. By letter, EPA deferred action upon Maine's petition pending 
the outcome of OTAG's inquiries and efforts to develop more regional control measures. See 
Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Assistant Adm'r for Air and Radiation, EPA, to the Honorable 
Angus S. King, Jr., Governor of Maine (Sept. 5, 1995) (on file with author). 
532 The inherent limitations in modeling would likely limit the use of such a provision to the 
most egregious situations. Modeling to show the precise source of ozone is difficult. Only the 
most clear-cut of cases allow redress. Unless a state could establish that its nonattainment 
stemmed from transport from the upwind state sources, the provision would be irrelevant. In 
this way, Congress could avoid abuse of the mechanism. 
533 The court New York v. EPA noted that it would paralyze the Agency to review a SIP 
repeatedly without adequate time and resources. New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d at 577-79. 
534 See supra note 324. 
535 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
536Id. 
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should consider mandating the use of the necessity standard for re-
view of state petitions that allege unacceptable contribution of trans-
ported ozone from an upwind state, rather than the more vague 
"significant contribution" standard currently in both Section 126 and 
Section 110. The analysis would thus be whether the elimination of 
ozone transport is necessary to allow the downwind state to attain. 
The former analysis of the relative proportions of in-state and out-of-
state contributions should be subsumed in the analysis of interstate 
equity issues as discussed below. 
C. Stricter Enforcement of Section 110(a)(2)(D) 
to Address Resource Allocation Issues 
Congress has gradually strengthened EPA's authority to review 
SIPs for their effects upon other states.537 The standard of SIP scru-
tiny has risen from checking for mere inclusion of "information ex-
change" provisions to insuring substantive prohibition of significant 
contribution.538 Thus far, Congress has left to EPA the determination 
of what degree of contribution is significant and what amount of 
transport is a violation of the standard of Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).539 
This reflects EPA's inherent expertise to resolve complex technologi-
cal determinations regarding pollution and its effects.54o Unfortu-
nately, the transfer of responsibility to EPA has also provided a means 
for Congress to avoid the underlying issues of interstate pollution 
prevention. Recently, members of the 104th Congress have voiced 
their concerns that the CAA is inequitable to some states.541 This may 
indicate the first willingness to confront the difficulties at the heart 
of the CAA transport provisions. 
Air is a resource shared by all in common. Without adequate con-
trols, individuals will use this resource according to the paradigm of 
the tragedy of the commons.542 Absent a strong regulating force, 
individual states will continue to allow use of air resources in ways 
that are in their own self-interest. An upwind state will not voluntar-
ily close down or restrict its industry and put its citizens out of work 
537 See supra Section II. 
538 See supra notes 72, 97, 177 and accompanying text. 
539 EPA alone makes this determination in the SIP approval process. See supra note 71. 
540 See supra note 435. 
541 See, e.g., 141 CONGo REC. S5604 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Snowe intro-
ducing S. 721); 141 CONGo REC. S4590 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin 
introducing H.R. 622). 
542 See supra note 61. 
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to benefit a downwind state.543 The political, economic, and social costs 
make restriction of emissions for the benefit of others perhaps hun-
dreds of miles away unattractive. Externalizing the true costs of 
in-state emissions remains the path ofleast resistance. Unfortunately, 
this behavior will result in decreased air quality for all.544 
The hesitancy of EPA to use Section llO(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) aggressively 
may result in part from fear of the Gordian Knot of "interstate eq-
uity."545 Under what circumstances should EPA permit one state to 
pollute the air of another? Interstate equity would require EPA to 
address the problem of ozone transport in a way that fairly allocates 
the benefits and burdens associated with the resolution among the 
states. For example, an analysis of the SIPs of two adjoining states 
with a shared transport problem might require EPA to explore fac-
tors such as: (i) whether pollutant sources in each state are new or 
existing and the relative proportions thereof in each state; (ii) 
whether the states have SIPs with equal standards for emissions and 
equal control measures; (iii) whether the states enforce their SIPs 
equally vigorously; (iv) whether the nonattainment status of either 
state results from sources within its own borders or is the result of 
transport and the relative proportions of indigenous and transported 
pollutants in each state; (v) whether the states have an equivalent 
number of drivers or vehicles and the degree to which cross-border 
commuters contribute to the problem of one jurisdiction or the other; 
and (vi) the relative economic impacts of various solutions upon each 
state. The sheer complexity of such an analysis is daunting. The 
variables would cause a quagmire. The amount of political will and 
patience it would require to resolve the issues to the satisfaction of 
the affected parties is tremendous. At present, the CAA provides 
EPA with no guidance to resolve transport disputes between states 
except in the broadest terms of alleviating "significant contribution." 
I t is unreasonable to expect states to act altruistically at all times. 
Thus, some entity must protect air resources and insure that they are 
543 Recent events suggest that states will not even risk asking their citizens to endure an 
inconvenient wait for an automobile inspection. See, e.g., Milne, supra note 263 (detailing 
opposition to centralized vehicle emissions testing). Attempts at implementing the reformulated 
gasoline control measure in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin indicated that the public would not 
even pay 5 to 15 cents more per gallon of gasoline and would rather foist the problem off on 
industry. See Mobile Sources Not Big Game For Nitrogen Oxide, OCTANE WK., Feb. 5,1996. 
544 This is the natural course of events in the tragedy of the commons scenario. See supra note 
61. 
545 For an insightful exploration of the nuances of this concept in the context of interstate air 
pollution, see Silverstein, supra note 52. 
1996] INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION 99 
shared, if not strictly equitably, at least according to a rational distri-
bution plan agreed upon by the appropriate parties. Either EPA or 
Congress should resolve the fundamental issues of resource allocation 
directly by agreed-upon means. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to engage in the complex technical, economic, and political analysis 
that is necessary to devise an appropriate plan for resource alloca-
tion.546 Based upon the historical development of the CAA and EPA's 
efforts to implement its provisions, however, it is possible to observe 
that the ozone transport problem is far from solved. The last three 
revisions of the CAA included progressively more stringent require-
ments for SIP reviews. When the stakes for nonattainment of the 
ozone NAAQS were lower, there was less political pressure to devise 
more protective standards. Now that costly and unpopular mandatory 
control measures directly affect downwind states, these states will 
clamor for more direct resolution of allocation issues.547 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ground level ozone pollution is an increasingly critical concern 
throughout the United States and in the northeastern states in par-
ticular. Because ozone can travel great distances in the atmosphere, 
it often exacerbates the air quality in geographic areas far downwind 
from the sources that generated its precursor chemicals. These down-
wind areas are often within different states, subject to different SIPs, 
and thus have no direct power to regulate the upwind emissions. 
Despite this lack of control over the upwind precursor emissions, the 
1990 CAA penalizes the downwind jurisdiction for nonattainment 
without regard to the actual sources of the ozone. This problem is 
particularly acute in the northeast corridor of the United States, 
where prevailing winds and a chain of densely populated areas create 
646 Commentators have proposed workable plans. One would require enactment of specific 
regional plans to allocate both "decrements," where the states must allocate reductions in 
existing emissions to attain the NAAQS, and ''increments,'' where states may share permissible 
new emissions comparable to the PSD increment analysis currently in § 163. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7473. In each formula, the decision maker must balance complex variables with whatever form 
of fairness is agreed upon. See Hirsch & Abramovitz, supra note 74, at 71-74. 
647 See, e.g., Maine's DerruJ,nd Letter, supra note 531. Maine demanded that EPA: (i) grant 
redesignations, NOx waivers, and Northeast OTR opt-out petitions; (ii) allow designation as an 
overwhelming transport region; (iii) accelerate regional control measure initiatives; and (iv) take 
decisive action against other states under § 110 and § 126. Similar demands were made by New 
York and business interests in Pennsylvania. See supra notes 49, 265. 
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a mass of ozone-laden air that subjects each downwind state to ozone 
from neighboring states. 
The issue of ozone transport under the CAA raises essential ques-
tions about the nation's pollution policy. How should the law allocate 
the benefits and burdens of pollution control? Is it equitable that one 
jurisdiction through the vagaries of geography and meteorology 
should suffer both from the adjacent state's pollution and from the 
nation's laws? Why must downwind states bear additional burdens of 
pollution control when the measures will not significantly alleviate the 
pollution and when upwind states could easily do more to reduce 
pollution? The current CAA relies too heavily on the altruism of one 
state to preserve the air quality of another. It takes tremendous 
political will to enact unpopular laws that restrict economic develop-
ment or the use of automobiles by one's own citizens; it is more 
difficult to do so when it is for the benefit of citizens of distant 
jurisdictions. 
EPA has recognized fundamental inconsistencies or inequities in 
the CAA statutory language concerning nonattainment areas. The 
Agency has attempted to devise administrative policies to alleviate 
some of the burden that ozone transport imposes on downwind states 
and to prevent creation of unfair burdens on upwind states. EPA 
geared these policies to minimize inequities while still requiring ex-
peditious progress towards attainment of the ozone NAAQS by all 
areas in all states. EPA is now embroiled in litigation to defend its 
policies, hounded by both pro- and anti-environmental forces. 
Congress has indicated its readiness to amend the 1990 CAA to 
rectify perceived problems. Rather than weakening the statute by 
revoking control measures, delaying compliance, or diluting EPA's 
powers, Congress should look to the fundamental underlying prob-
lems of resource allocation. Either Congress should directly address 
the issue of resource allocation in interstate pollution contexts, or it 
should unequivocally empower EPA to make such decisions. The cur-
rent provisions authorizing EPA to stop interstate transport through 
SIP reviews in Section 1l0(a)(2)(D) and Section 126 have not been 
effective enough. Congress should openly debate and decide what 
constitutes "significant contribution" in the transport context. This 
may result in an inadequately protective standard like that in legis-
lation already proposed in the 104th Congress, but at least it will 
reflect a consensus of opinion on the fundamental question. Alterna-
tively, and probably preferably, Congress should explicitly empower 
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EPA to determine what constitutes "significant contribution" on a 
case-by-case basis and to impose more stringent control measures as 
necessary for attainment. Federal regulation and federal agencies are 
popular whipping boys in the present political climate, but interstate 
pollution prevention is one area in which strong federal authority is 
essential. 
